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 The rapid establishment and expansion of economics departments in colleges 
across the United State in the late nineteenth century indicates a significant shift in the 
way Americans understood economic science and its importance to federal economic 
policy. This dissertation addresses that phenomenon by explaining how American 
economists professionalized; and how that process influenced economic policymaking in 
the U.S. from the formation of the American Economic Association in 1885 to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Chapters alternate between analyzing the dilemmas economists 
faced while crafting a distinct academic discipline and investing early professional 
economists’ role in the federal economic policymaking process.  
Three emerging themes help explain the consistent failure of early U.S. 
economists to translate modern economic theory to economic policy in a timely fashion. 
First, public skepticism and the persistence of folk economics proved to be a powerful 
deterrent to professionally-trained economists’ authority in debates over policy matters. 
The combination of democratic idealism, populist politics, and skepticism regarding the 
motivations of professionally-trained economists undercut much of the social prestige 
  
   
professional economists garnered as educated elites. Second, disagreement among 
professional economists, often brought on by young economists’ efforts to overturn a 
century’s worth of received wisdom in classical economic theory, fostered considerable 
dissent within the field. Dissent, in turn, undermined the authority of professional 
economists and often led to doubt regarding economists’ abilities among the public and 
policy compromises that failed to solve economic problems. Third, networking was 
central in the policymaking process. Personal relationships often were crucial in 
determining which prerogatives won out, a fact that indicates how haphazardly economic 
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Tremors from the sub-prime financial crisis of 2008 continue to reverberate 
through the world economy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that professional and armchair 
economists alike have received a dramatic increase in media attention since the crisis 
emerged – particularly in the last year of the 2012 Presidential race when the candidates’ 
economic expertise dominated discussion. Along with arguments from former 
presidential economic advisors, Federal Reserve board members, and Secretaries of the 
Treasury, voters heard candidates invoke the ideas of a grab-bag of economists.  
Perhaps none better illustrate this race for the high ground than Harvard 
economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Their highly-influential book, This 
Time Its Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly and follow-up working paper were 
released shortly after the crisis began and directly addressed the ramifications of national 
debt and financial collapse in modern economies – a salient issue throughout the 
election.1 In true political fashion, those on both sides of the political spectrum attempted 
to invoke Reinhart and Rogoff’s work as evidence of their opponents’ failure to grasp 
economic reality, although fiscal conservatives seemed to benefit most by virtue of the 
study’s conclusion regarding a negative correlation between high national debt and 
economic growth.2 A minor controversy erupted in April 2013 when a graduate student in 
                                                          
1
 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a 
Time of Debt, NBER Working Paper 15639 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
January 2010). 
2
 Paul Krugman and Robin Wells, “Our Giant Banking Crisis—What to Expect,” The New York Review of 
Books, May 13, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/our-giant-banking-crisis/. 
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economics at the University of Massachusetts – Amherst discovered errors in Rogoff and 
Reinhart’s calculations, completely discrediting their conclusions for some, merely 
modifying conclusions according to others, and laying bare the frustrations of applying 
economic expertise to public policy for all.3 Such a contentious and politicized invocation 
of economists’ expertise may strike some as evidence of a recent decline in the integrity 
and competence of both American economists and politicians. In fact, the practice of 
choosing economists based on policies they prescribe, or selectively co-opting their ideas 
for political gain, is as old as the profession itself. Since their emergence in the late 
nineteenth-century, professional economists have been a fixture in public life in the 
United States. They have been a particularly frustrating and complicated fixture for 
policymakers and the voting public alike, however. Professional economists in the U.S. 
have consistently been accused of being indecisive and unreliable, yet have continued 
garner press coverage, prestigious awards, and advisory roles at the highest level of 
government.  
This dissertation explains the roots of this paradox by focusing on the 
professionalization of economics in the U.S. – a process that began with a notable 
increase in the number of faculty lines dedicated to the study of political economy in the 
1880s and culminated with the establishment of disciplinary norms and institutions by the 
late 1920s. Like their twenty-first-century descendants, late nineteenth-century 
professional economists struggled with an apparent paradox. They often made the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Jon Ward, “Bill Clinton Cites Economist Kenneth Rogoff To Argue Obama Needs Four More Years,” 
Huffington Post, November 1, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/01/bill-clinton-economist-
kenneth-rogoff-obama_n_2061734.html. Anders Aslund, “Reinhart-Rogoff Austerity Case Still Stands,” 
Financial Times, April 19, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2df58ce0-a8ba-11e2-bcfb-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2R76xkyzq.  
3
 Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin, Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic 
Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff, Working Paper Series 322 (Amherst, MA, April 2013). 
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“Who’s Who” lists of the era, were routinely quoted by journalists, and advised powerful 
politicians. And yet, such social prestige translated into influence in a haphazard fashion 
at best.  
I argue that the challenges early professional economists faced while establishing 
the discipline and attempting to translate their ideas into action sheds new light on the 
fundamental challenges faced by professional economists throughout the twentieth 
century, including the often-limited role of expertise in a democratic society. Rather than 
delivering clear and actionable research, as they had originally intended, the nation’s first 
generations of professional economists found themselves hamstrung by doubt, criticism, 
and entrenched social systems both within academia and within the public policymaking 
process. The history of applied economics during these crucial years of development adds 
clarity to the policymaking process and offers an explanation as to why modern 
policymakers often fail to anticipate or properly respond to economic crises. My 
conclusions about the gap between economic theory and economic policy also call into 
question the stories we tell concerning the course of economic history in the U.S. over the 
past century. Narratives that focus on the birth, life, and death of economic eras that 
revolve around the ideas of the academy are, I conclude in the conclusion, built on the 
indefensible premise that professional economists have played a clear and pivotal role in 
shaping economic policy in the U.S.       
Economists and historians have long debated the significance of changes in the 
field of economics around the turn of the twentieth century. The dramatic increase in the 
amount of resources committed to the study of political economy, combined with 
changes in methodology and theory, triggered a notable shift in attitudes toward the 
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dismal science. Although there is little doubt that industrialization and the expansion of 
higher education precipitated the explosion in the study of economics, it remains unclear 
how the decisions about the role of economists during the professionalization process 
affected economic policy over subsequent generations. 
In the succeeding chapters, I explain how economists in the U.S. molded the 
discipline into a distinct profession, and examine the profession’s influence on economic 
policymaking. Economists, not unlike doctors or psychologists, professionalized by 
creating institutions, professional networks, and terminology designed to distinguish 
themselves from amateur enthusiasts and to lay claim to expertise. In doing so, 
professional economists established themselves as social analysts whose value lay in their 
ability to wade through the complexities of the market and offer clear conclusions on 
which public policies could be built.  
Historian Mary Furner has argued that the influence of intellectuals such as 
economists can be a subtle and indirect force.4 Intellectuals secure influence, Furner 
suggests, by “bringing policymakers to inhabit, in some sense, the same mental world 
that they do.”5 The public intellectuals’ influence is therefore rarely complete, but 
nevertheless omnipresent. Although appealing, such an assessment allows for the 
systematic dismissal of examples that suggest a distinct lack of influence. Using this 
understanding of influence to determine early twentieth century economists’ influence 
can quickly lead to fuzzy math – for how many examples of economists’ general 
influence are necessary to outweigh examples of economists’ lack of influence in the 
                                                          
4
 Mary O. Furner, “Social Scientists and the State: Constructing the Knowledge Base for Public Policy, 
1880-1920,” in Intellectuals and Public Life: Between Radicalism and Reform, ed. Leon Fink, Stephen T. 
Leonard, and Donald M. Reid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 145–181. 
5
 Ibid., 145. 
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drafting of economic policies? And yet the frankness with which professional economists 
pursued policy reform at the turn of the twentieth century, the response of non-
economists, and the juxtaposition of intradisciplinary debates with public policy debates 
make it possible for us to dissect policy histories in order to appraise economists’ 
influence, or lack thereof, with reasonable precision.  
I have therefore attempted to bring clarity to the question of economists’ influence 
by exploring the economic policymaking process at crucial stages in order to balance the 
tendency to assume general influence. This approach had left me critical of claims like 
Furner’s about the nature and consistency of professional economists’ influence in the 
early twentieth century and beyond. Despite the impressive growth of the discipline, 
American economists’ influence was limited by obstacles inherent to a society with many 
competing interests. Economists quickly discovered that establishing economics as a 
vibrant facet of American higher education meant less than one might expect because the 
connection between knowledge and authority was tenuous at best.  
Three themes help make sense of the first decades of professional economics in 
the U.S, all of which run throughout the succeeding chapters. The first theme deals with 
the persistence of what economist Paul Rubin calls “folk economics.”6 Defined as “the 
intuitive economics of untrained people,” the concept of folk economics offers a short-
hand reference for non-professional economists whose ideas competed with those of 
professionally trained economists for the support of voters and lawmakers.7 Exploring lay 
economists’ ideas and their criticism of professional economists and their theories from 
1880 to 1929 highlights economists’ struggle to transform economics from moral 
                                                          
6
 Paul H. Rubin, “Folk Economics,” Southern Economic Journal 70, no. 1 (July 2003): 157–171. 
7
 Ibid., 157. 
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philosophy based largely on tradition into an objective science. Efforts to reform 
economic theory took place alongside efforts to reform economic life in the U.S., as the 
overlap between these two struggles often made clear.  Many Americans harbored 
suspicions about the intent of professional economists. Socialism was taboo to most 
Americans outside the labor movement (and even to many within the movement), and the 
“European” ideas imported by young economists were readily exploited as evidence of 
mal intent. Concerns about the relationship between conservative academic economists 
and business leaders were just as ripe. In both cases, suspicions were exacerbated by the 
erection of barriers that helped distinguish between expert and amateur, which seemingly 
excluded dissenters on both sides of the political spectrum. Folk economists and their 
ideas survived and thrived because of their ability to exploit such fears and to offer 
economic policies that appealed to notions of common sense and egalitarianism. 
A widespread suspicion among the public that economists, regardless of intent, 
lacked any special insight or claim to authority further exacerbated the rift between 
amateur and expert and undercut professional economists’ relevance in the eyes of many. 
As economist David C. Colander has noted, economics is bound together by a “grand 
theory” that gives the discipline a greater sense of coherency than many other academic 
disciplines.8 Yet within that “grand theory” fundamental disagreements persisted through 
a long past and continue to hold a promising future. The internal dissent that pitted 
economists against one another fed the notion that economists lacked meaningful insight 
and serves as the second theme for this study. Tensions within professional economics 
were present from the formation of the American Economic Association through the 
                                                          
8
 David C. Colander, “The Invisible Hand of Truth,” in The Spread of Economic Ideas, ed. A.W. Coats and 
David C. Colander (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 31–36. 
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1920s and beyond. Economists disagreed about a host of issues including, but not limited 
to, methodology and the appropriate relationship between academia and politics. 
Although the discipline reached a general consensus on the broad outlines of economic 
policy at several key moments, such successes were undercut by internecine squabbling. 
The struggle between neoclassical economics and what is now referred to as institutional 
economics established a pattern of conflict within the discipline and undercut any hope of 
professional cohesion, which in turn diminished professional economists’ influence. 
Despite the heavy criticism it endured in the 1890s and 1900s, classical economic theory 
remained central to American economic thought – not because it proved most accurate, I 
argue, but rather because it proved most consistent in a field perceived by outsiders as 
woefully unreliable. The challenges to classical theory posed by the new economists and 
their German Historical School-inspired economics failed to develop the simplicity 
inherent in classical theory and as a result moved forward haphazardly, albeit with great 
enthusiasm and promise.  
The third and final theme of this study considers the conditions in which 
economists exercised notable influence over economic policy. I conclude that although 
networking or public prestige might secure an economist’s access to the policymaking 
process in the early twentieth-century, it rarely translated into direct influence. 
Lawmakers routinely dismissed economists’ recommendations in favor of political 
expediency or their own opinion, thus underscoring the often tenuous connection between 
economic expertise and public policy. Furthermore, business leaders proved to be tough 
competition to those economists seeking the confidence of elected officials. In the 
public’s eye, academic training and business success conferred the same degree of 
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authority on economic issues. Private business groups, including farmers’ associations, 
possessed additional persuasive powers thanks to their ability to fund media campaigns 
and lobby politicians. The most influential economists, I conclude, relied on a 
combination of personal networking, organizational skills, and the ability to engage with 
political battles that were tangential to their ideas about economics. Economists such as 
Richard T. Ely, Irving Fisher, and George F. Warren succeeded in influencing economic 
policy not because their ideas were universally acclaimed, but rather because they had a 
knack for maneuvering themselves into a position from which they would be consulted 
for advice.  
These barriers limited economists’ ability to effectively champion dramatic 
economic and social reform, but they did not stall efforts. Economists in the U.S., both 
those in academia and those who increasingly found positions in the public and private 
sectors, worked around such challenges in an effort to achieve the improvement of 
economic policy. In addition to noting setbacks and failures, I chronicle the substantial 
progress of professional economics in the early twentieth century, including the 
significance of long-running organizations and journals that continue to shape the 
discipline to this day.  
These themes and their implications may leave the reader with the 
misapprehension that this study portrays economics as a failed discipline unworthy of 
continued investment or respect. In the course of this study I have concluded that, taken 
as a whole, economists in the U.S. have done a commendable job. At the most basic 
level, the discipline’s growth has ensured a steady supply of technicians armed with the 
necessary combination of training in critical thinking and research skills to give 
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American businesses and government the capacity to improve efficiency. Such persons 
existed prior to the establishment of economics departments across the country, naturally, 
but it is impossible to envision the creation of agencies with a research capacity on par 
with that of the National Bureau of Economic Research or the Agricultural Research 
Service without trained economists.  
Rather, this study’s key criticism is directed at the cultural and social institutions 
that have allowed so many Americans to largely ignore professional economists and their 
theories from the late nineteenth-century onward. Even so, it is difficult to fault anyone 
for failing to more directly meld economic expertise to economic policy since that can at 
times require abrogating the democratic process. I am more critical of the discipline’s 
long-running exclusion of women. The necessities of professionalizing understandably 
required the erection of barriers to distinguish between amateur and professional, but it 
seems indefensible to claim that such necessity justified the nearly complete exclusion of 
women from the profession in the crucial first decades of the professionalization process. 
One can only wonder what economic theory would look like if the prerogatives of 




Historiography   
 
 
 The body of scholarship that deals with the intersection of economists and public 
policy suggests that economists were fairly insignificant prior to the Great Depression 
and the subsequent pursuit of managed growth in the post-World War II period. A look at 
the data (wholly appropriate for a study of economists) seemingly confirms this view, as 
  
   
10 
 
the number of American Economic Association members per 100,000 Americans rose 
from 2.2 in 1920 to a high of 9.2 in 1970. Additionally, scholarship that recalls the efforts 
of economists on the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) during the post-WW II years 
support the notion that while the Great Depression put economists and their craft on the 
map, it was the discipline’s work during the Cold War that highlighted their influence in 
U.S. society.  
There are several flaws in this argument, beginning with the numbers. The 
number of economists in the U.S. trained and engaged with the discipline certainly 
increased substantially from 1920 to 1970, but there was an equally dramatic rise in the 
number of economists from 1880 to 1900. From 1887 to 1930 the number of AEA 
members per 100,000 Americans rose from .48 to 3.1.9 Second, focusing on the CEA as 
evidence of economists’ influence on economic policy, and therefore relevance to those 
interested in understanding the policymaking process, assumes that proximity yielded 
influence. But a casual reading of the literature on economists in Washington quickly 
leads to the conclusion that for much of their history, the CEA never enjoyed a 
predominate voice in debates regarding economic policy.10  
 By dismissing this earlier expansion of the discipline and the influence of early 
twentieth-century economists, we run the risk of discounting the past and romanticizing 
the present. When looking back at the policy miscues of generations past it is easy to 
assume naivety and, in some cases, irrationality. In fact, our predecessors grappled with 
                                                          
9
 See Appendix A 
10
 Erwin C. Hargrove and Samuel A Morley, eds., The President and the Council of Economic Advisers: 
Interviews with CEA Chairmen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). Herbert Stein, Presidential 
Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1984). David C. Colander and A. W Coats, eds., The Spread of Economic Ideas (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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many of the same questions that continue to paralyze policymakers, including the degree 
to which government should regulate the money supply and the level of aid necessary to 
maintain a healthy agricultural sector. Early economists also debated equally relevant 
philosophical issues, such as the proper role of expertise in a representative democracy 
and whether or not government should be adjusted in response to emerging social and 
economic trends. All these issues weighed heavily on the minds of early twentieth-
century Americans who welcomed the rise of the professional economist with wary 
enthusiasm.    
 Historians of economic thought may note that I am flying close to danger by 
beginning with the assumption that modern economics is “broken,” with the intent of 
working backward through history in search of the root source of the breakdown. As E. 
Roy Weintraub notes, this would require the general rejection of modern economics, 
which seems overly rash and indefensible (not to mention insulting to more than a few 
highly-capable scholars).11 Fortunately, my research has not led me to conclude that 
economics is broken, although there is always room for improvement. The discipline as a 
whole has consistently demonstrated a strong commitment to open discourse, rigorous 
peer review, and a deep-seated concern with ensuring the work done by professional 
economists will help improve everyday life. The connection between economic theory 
and public policy has proven frail, however. It has never been defined in a manner that is 
wholly coherent or acceptable to the many who depend on their government for sound, 
reasoned economic policy. 
                                                          
11
 E. Roy Weintraub, ed., The Future of the History of Economics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2002), 5–6. 
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Much of the scholarship on the history of economics at the turn of the twentieth 
century focuses on the methodological marginal revolution (or evolution, as some prefer) 
– that changed the way the Western world thought of and spoke about the exchange of 
goods and services. A considerable amount of discussion has been devoted to the 
marginal revolution, particularly the source of the revolution and the reason for the 
methodology’s apparent dominance. By the 1970s, most authorities acknowledged that 
the discipline’s turn toward marginal utility theory – which focuses on maximizing utility 
in order to satisfy the greatest number of wants – constituted a fundamental shift away 
from the labor value theories that once preoccupied economists’ attentions.12 Such a 
theory departed from the previous arguments that value derived from labor or similar 
factors of input and reflected the abundance that resulted from industrial production. The 
pressing questions therefore revolved around why W.S. Jevons, Carl Menger, and Léon 
Walras seized on this idea simultaneously in isolation of one another and why their ideas 
proceeded to redefine the study of economics in the Western world.13  
The debate was never truly resolved, although a reasonable consensus emerged 
that recognized the importance of industrial production and professionalization in 
codifying and spreading marginal utility theory. This consensus posited that the new 
problems associated with industrial production combined with a more sophisticated and 
coherent professional body of economists to provide marginal utility a place to grow. 
Once rooted, the theory proved resilient for reasons that continue to be debated. This 
                                                          
12
 R.S. Howey, The Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870-1889 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1989), 57. 
13
 Mark Blaug, “Was There a Marginal Revolution?,” History of Political Economy 4, no. 2 (Fall 1972): 
269–280. Howey, The Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870-1889. R.D. Collison Black, A.W. Coats, 
and Craufurd D. Goodwin, eds., The Marginal Revolution in Economics: Interpretation and Evaluation 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1973). Robert V. Eagly, ed., Events, Ideology, and Economic 
Theory: The Determinants of Progress in the Development of Economic Analysis (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1968). 
  
   
13 
 
study’s focus on U.S. economics thought precludes a thorough discussion of the birth of 
marginalism and its spread through Europe. Instead, the theory emerges in this study 
much as it did in late nineteenth-century American colleges: in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century and in contention with the ideas of the German Historical School. At 
no point do I consciously advocate for the veracity of one theory or the other. Instead, I 
attempt to contribute to the discussion of marginal utility theory in U.S. by explaining 
why it proved so appealing and how it influenced the professionalization process. With a 
nod toward economic historian Geoffrey Hodgson, I conclude that it was a combination 
of marginalism’s ability to present to the public the necessary airs and graces of scientific 
rigor, along with the heterodox economists’ inability to deliver a similarly coherent 
alternative, that ultimately ensured neoclassicial economics’ supremacy in the U.S.14 The 
intellectual “battle” between the two intellectual camps left a legacy of dissent that 
persists to this day, however.   
Although it seemed for some time that the marginal revolution was swift and 
complete, a resurgence of interest in the work of heterodox economists in the U.S. in the 
early twentieth century has reinvigorated the debate over the evolution of economics in 
America.15 Malcolm Rutherford’s and Hodgson’s work stands out among the recent 
efforts to portray a more complicated and contentious state of economic theory at the turn 
of the twentieth century.16 Both Rutherford’s and Hodgson’s championing of the 
American institutional school of economics suggests that the marginal revolution was 
                                                          
14
 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure, and Darwinism in 
American Institutionalism (London; New York: Routledge, 2004). 
15
 Mary S. Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford, eds., “From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism,” 
History of Political Economy 30, no. Supplement (1998). 
16
 Malcolm Rutherford, The Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918-1947: Science and 
Social Control (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Geoffrey Martin Hodgson, How 
Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002). Hodgson, The Evolution of Institutional Economics. 
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not, in fact, as complete as once assumed. This study sympathizes with the turn toward 
understanding non-mainstream economic ideas – particularly attempts to grasp why such 
dissenting voices failed to establish themselves within the mainstream of American 
economic thought. Still, because of American institutionalism’s persistent inability to 
deliver on its grand promises to redefine how American’s viewed political economy, I 
disagree with the assertion that it was a powerful and viable alternative to neoclassical 
economics as late as the 1930s. Although relevant, the American heterodox thinkers 
never seriously challenged the standing of their neoclassical colleagues. Hodgson, 
Rutherford, and Mary S. Morgan are right to note the difficulty of characterizing early 
twentieth-century American economics, but their insistence on emphasizing the unique 
value of individual economists’ ideas exposes their analysis to the same pitfalls that 
eventually swallowed their institutionalist subjects.17  
Focusing on the struggle between the German Historical School-inspired new 
economists and the more traditional neoclassical economists, I will argue that 
marginalism was in fact dominant in early American economics and succeeded not 
because it was a perfect theory, but rather because it was the only theory that could strike 
a balance between the needs for efficacy, coherency, and marketability. This bifurcation 
is justified by the goal of this study, which is ultimately to explain economists’ role in the 
economy policymaking process. However engaging analysis of the nuances of either 
neoclassical or institutional economics might be to some readers, it would ultimately 
                                                          
17
 Mary S. Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford, “American Economics: The Charter of the Transformation,” 
History of Political Economy 30, no. Supplement (1998): 3. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ed., Recent 
Developments in Institutional Economics (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: E. Elgar, 2003). Hodgson, 
The Evolution of Institutional Economics. Ronald Coase, “The New Institutional Economics,” American 
Economic Review 88, no. 2 (1998): 72–74. Oliver E. Williamson, “The Economics of Governance,” 
American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 1–18. It should be noted that Institutional economists 
have proven resilient, committed, and notable presence in the field despite the criticism and confusion, 
however. 
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detract from my central task as well as create a false understanding of how professional 
economists, policymakers, and those Americans engage with the civic life viewed and 
understood economic theory. The vast majority of Americans were either uninterested or 
ill-equipped to quibble about the nuances of Veblenian psychology in relation to Alfred 
Marshall’s Principles.18 They understood economic theory was a complex world, but 
strove for simplicity so as to obtain clarity in regards to which economic policies were 
worth pursuing. 
This study also speaks to scholarship on the process of professionalization in the 
U.S., particularly in the social sciences.19 The work of those concerned with the genesis 
and evolution of the professional economist provided a thorough account of early 
struggles within the discipline from which I was able to ask questions regarding the 
relationship between lay and professional and the role of expertise in a democratic 
society. Although at times I delve deeper into the topics previously explored by scholars 
of professionalization, I ultimately seek to advance this line of inquiry by more directly 
connecting professional economists to the communities they sought to serve. 
 I have extracted my definitions of “professionalism” and “professionalization” 
from Thomas Kuhn by way of Thomas Haskell, whose explanation of the concept in the 
introduction of The Emergence of Professional Social Science struck me as reasonable 
and defensible. As Haskell notes, “professions are collective enterprises” and 
professionalization is marked by a three-part process in which the professionals 
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distinguish themselves from the public at large, enhance communication and discipline 
within the group, and pursue heightened credibility in the eyes of the public.20 Despite the 
clarity and crispness of this definition, professionalization was not a formulaic process. 
Questions abound, particularly in regards to the pursuit of heightened credibility in the 
eyes of the public. Evidence of such credibility must differ from profession to profession 
– a professional golfer cannot be subjected to the same standards of measurement as a 
professional doctor. In the case of professional economists, I argue that the standard of 
success was established in the closing decades of the nineteenth century when a 
combination of Americans’ expectations and the enthusiasm of young economists led to 
assumptions regarding the discipline’s ability to deliver clear-cut, actionable advice. 
Although tempered by the 1910s, these visions of a more technocratic society stuck and 
became the measure by which professional economists’ success was judged. Professional 
economists’ tendency to appear in the public sphere primarily as policy advocates from 
the late nineteenth century onward has served to deepen this misconception. As a result, 
the professional economists’ value to society has been consistently misconstrued by those 
outside the discipline (and even by some within).   
A few works in this line of inquiry stand out as worthy of closer consideration, 
including Mary Furner’s Advocacy and Objectivity and Dorothy Ross’s The Origins of 
American Social Science.21 Furner’s Advocacy and Objectivity, which is ostensibly an 
account of the professionalization of the social sciences but largely focuses on 
economics, captures quite well the inner workings of the discipline through its early 
years. Furner’s documentation of the tit-for-tat maneuvering that characterized the new 
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economics provides insight about how professional economics was shaped by the 
personalities who held sway within academia at a crucial time. I engage with some of the 
same internal issues Furner analyzed while at the same time turning my focus outward to 
explain the crucial link between the growing discipline and the non-academic world they 
were so eager to influence.  
I also challenge Furner’s thesis regarding the loss of morality in American 
economics. Although I agree that much of the overt moralistic sentiment that drove new 
economists in the late nineteenth century gradually disappeared, I think one vital 
component remained – the privileging of intellectual freedom. A series of academic 
freedom cases clearly illustrated limitations as to what kind of theories their benefactors 
were willing to tolerate, and professional economists proved incapable of protecting their 
own as a result of reservations about overt propagandizing. The incidents, which labor 
historian Leon Fink has labeled an “intellectual Haymarket,” have served to underline 
professional economists’ coerced withdrawal from social action.22 Yet it is clear that 
professional economists consistently placed a premium on intellectual freedom. They 
were sensitive to fact that the ostracizing of “outsiders” would irreversibly mark their 
profession as the brutish manifestation of vested interests. Early professional economists 
therefore worried about being labeled subjective intellectuals or written off as unduly 
influenced by their academic employers. To avoid such a fatal labeling, the American 
Economic Association attempted to support academic freedom passively and from a 
distance, although the results were decidedly mixed. I also question the speed with which 
Furner suggests other aspects of morality were stripped from American economics. 
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Whereas Furner argues that the discipline’s internal fighting robbed U.S. economics of its 
moralistic underpinnings by the 1890s, I argue that the new economists’ inability to 
translate Christian ideals into practical economic policies are what gradually severed the 
more overt links between morality and economics by the 1910s. Beyond that point, 
questions of morality still permeated American economics, although the invocation of 
Christian values certainly did recede to the background of debate. 
 My argument about the general maintenance of academic freedom within 
professional economics leads me to disagree with Furner’s conclusion, which is critical 
of the social sciences’ failure to deliver on its early promises of expertise. Whereas 
Furner and Fink see the failure in large part a result of conservative pressure and 
individual economists’ personal shortcomings, I identify overreach and cultural 
impediments that ultimately distribute the onus of failure to broad and necessarily 
nebulous forces. Professional economists did not fail to achieve morally sound and 
economically effective reforms because they wilted under the pressure of capitalist 
forces. They simply encountered the same questions of morality and the vagaries of the 
democratic process that had frustrated earlier generations and, faced with the choice of 
adaptation or complete irrelevance, chose marginal relevance through adaptation.  
 The arguments in succeeding chapters are more closely in line with those of 
Ross’s The Origins of American Science, although I once again must note several 
distinctions that seem to arise from differences in methodology. Whereas Ross pursues a 
relatively straightforward intellectual history, I have attempted to balance my analysis of 
ideas with an analysis of policymaking through a series of case studies. As a result, our 
explanations of the failure of the new economists differ. Ross attributes the marginalist 
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neoclassical economists’ success to their compatibility with traditional American notions 
of exceptionalism. I, too, argue that American social and political institutions stymied 
heterodox economists’ progress, but I also think it crucial to understand how these 
traditional notions of individuality and democratic participation molded the 
professionalization process in the favor of advocates of neoclassical economics. 
Furthermore, drawing “lay” economists into the story of the professionalization of 
economics leaves me uncomfortable with Ross’s general assertion that Americans 
rejected historicism in the social sciences because of seemingly irrational notions of 
American exceptionalism. Such a conclusion may apply to the intellectual elites who 
debated one another within academia, but such sophisticated distinctions were not visible 
in the debates between professional and amateur economists. Instead, attention was 
focused on a combination of a proposed policy’s origins (nefarious or not) and its 
potential material outcomes.  
 Similarly relevant is Michael Bernstein’s Perilous Progress, an excellent account 
of the history of professional economics with which I also disagree throughout my 
study.23 Like Bernstein, I agree that the early decades of professionalization established a 
pattern of behavior and expectations that heavily influenced economic thought 
throughout the twentieth century. I similarly conclude with a fairly pessimistic portrayal 
of economists’ influence over economic policymaking in the U.S. However, with some 
exceptions, I disagree with Bernstein’s explanation of how and why professional 
economists in the U.S. struggled to exert their will. The disagreement stems from two 
fundamental divergences in our methodology. First, whereas Bernstein consciously 
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ignored “thought outside of debate among mainstream economists” I have attempted to 
give such discussions equal billing.24 Second, I have dug deeper into select policy 
histories in an attempt to move past cursory observations and to more securely nail down 
the elusive concept of “influence.” These two differences have led me to question 
Bernstein’s portrayal of the relationship between professional economics and public 
policy in the United States. In particular, his claims in later chapters regarding the 
twilight of professional economists’ influence with Washington policymakers from the 
Nixon administration onward strike me as peculiar and only defensible should we accept 
a relatively narrow definition of a professional economist as someone who subscribes to 
particular economic theories, as well as a timeline that emphasizes the preeminence of the 
1950s and 1960s. Although this study focuses on the early twentieth century the 
conclusions I draw directly challenge both premises.25 
At its core, my dissertation joins this rich historiography in considering the 
relationship between academic achievement and public welfare. Practitioners of most 
academic disciplines have visited this issue repeatedly since the modernization of higher 
education in the late nineteenth-century, yet frustration persists regarding the perceived 
uselessness of academic pursuits or a lack of academic integrity. This pattern of 
introspection and skepticism suggests that reflection on the utility of academic 
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achievement is not exceptional, but rather the norm. Each generation must consider the 
merits of academic pursuits in order to conceptualize their relevancy to public life. 
Exploring this issue, I believe, resonates with not only economic historians and those 
interested in understanding the development of economic policy in the twentieth-century, 





As a whole, Americans embraced the concept of the economic expert in the late 
nineteenth century and heartily supported the growth of the profession despite 
reservations against allowing the discipline too much authority in the policymaking 
process. Attempts to document this story and analyze the meaning of this paradox led me 
to the economists themselves, most of whom possessed a keen awareness of the dilemma. 
Memoirs, obituaries, biographies, and manuscript collections pointed me toward the most 
significant people and events in formative years of U.S. professional economics that 
warranted closer study. Of particular interest were the papers of the Wisconsin School 
economists housed at the Wisconsin Historical Society and the personal papers of Charles 
Neill and Frank Taussig, which are held in the Harvard University Archives.  
 Such accounts are by nature relatively myopic, so I turned also to the records of 
the American Economic Association, held in the Rare Books and Manuscripts Library at 
Duke University. The AEA’s secretaries proved to be fairly reliable record keepers, and 
their documentation of the organization’s activities gave me a sense of the “big picture.” 
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As I note in chapter one, the AEA did not initially enjoy its current status as the 
preeminent economics organization in the U.S. I therefore turned to the leading journals 
for economists to fill in my understanding of the discipline’s early years – namely the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Political Economy, and the less 
specialized Annals of American Social Science. 
Both the AEA’s leadership and individual economists proved sensitive to public 
criticism, and their papers gave me some insight as to how public opinion shaped or was 
shaped by professional economists. However, my particular interest in precisely how 
professional economists fit into the broader world of public policymaking led me to take 
advantage of newspaper, magazine, and book databases, where advances in the 
digitization of primary sources has now made it possible for a single scholar to efficiently 
gather references to the discipline, individual economists, or particular economic issues. 
Combined with the secondary literature described above, these sources provide the 
evidentiary basis for the arguments I put forth in this dissertation. 
This study begins shortly before the organization of the American Economic 
Association in order to capture the significance of U.S. students’ studies abroad to the 
rise of American economics. I argue for the relevancy of this phenomenon because, 
although American graduate students did not return from Europe in intellectual lock-step 
with their foreign teachers, a critical mass of ideas did make the return trip and 
undoubtedly altered the intellectual landscape in the U.S. Furthermore, as Daniel Rodgers 
notes in his study of trans-Atlantic reform culture, European intellectualism carried a 
particular cachet in the U.S. during this period.26 The connection between European 
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intellectualism and American radicalism helps explain why professional economists had a 
hard time convincing their public audience to move past conclusions in order to 
understand the evidence. Those Americans who feared in particular socialist uprisings 
viewed the work of German-trained “new economists” with suspicion. Following World 
War I, prominent Yale economist Irving Fisher chastised American heterodox economists 
for subscribing to the ideas of intellectuals he judged to be in league with the imperialist 
German government. The origin of an idea (perceived or otherwise) weighed as much on 
the minds of turn-of-the-century Americans as it does today. 
I consider both the growth of academic economics and the struggle over specific 
economic policies in order to understand the interwoven dynamics between discussion of 
theoretical and applied economics. These chapters seek to establish that professional 
economists operated in two distinct worlds – the academic and non-academic – but rarely 
perceived the border between the two as insurmountable. Professional economists’ 
activities outside academia are therefore just as important, if not more so, than the ideas 
they espoused in academic journals and lecture halls. Well-informed readers may note the 
absence of discussion about the tariff policy – one of the more heated economic policy 
battles of the period. The decision to omit discussion of the tariff policy was based on 
time and space constraints and should not be construed as an implicit argument that the 
tariff was not important or not an issue that attracted economists’ attentions. 
After analyzing the struggle to “modernize” American economics in Chapter One, 
I describe the role economists played in the lengthy struggle over monetary policy from 
the post-Civil War through the creation of the Federal Reserve in the second chapter. I 
argue that professional economists’ recommendation of a regulated, responsive money 
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supply was largely obscured by the heated rhetoric of both “free silverites” and “gold 
bugs” leading up to the 1896 Presidential election. Although advocates on both sides of 
this hotly contested issue attempted to build the perception of unassailable expertise on 
monetary issues, neither seemed to grasp the nuanced argument presented by the 
overwhelming majority of economists at the time.   
In Chapter Three, I return to the institutional development of the discipline in 
order to explain how attempts to remake economics into a more practical science ran 
aground on interdisciplinary strife and on the limitations of economic theory. In what I 
describe as a curious paradox, the study of economics and employment of professional 
economists expanded while efforts to deliver on the promises made by the “new 
economists” failed to materialize. At fault, I explain, was the combination of internal 
dissent and a reluctance to form disciplinary consensus. The continued rift between 
conservative economists, who tended to come from the classical cum neoclassical school 
of economic thought, and reform-minded economists, who largely embraced a mixed 
methodology that included heavy doses of historical and social inquiry, fueled lay 
suspicions that economics was merely politics disguised as scholarship. The AEA’s 
sustained reluctance to push for and publicize a disciplinary consensus on issues relevant 
to the voting public encouraged the opportunistic invocation of economic expertise. 
To illustrate this point, the fourth chapter analyzes how professional economists 
weighed in on the matter of labor reform in the early twentieth-century, culminating with 
the missed opportunity of the U.S. Industrial Commission (also known as the Walsh 
Commission). The Wisconsin School economists figure largely in this chapter, given 
their role as leaders within American economics at the time, particularly with regard to 
  
   
25 
 
labor economics. I explain how, despite tremendous progress in advising public 
policymakers at the state level, the period’s leading labor economists were largely 
ignored by federal lawmakers and the voting public alike. The U.S. Industrial 
Commission’s descent into a politicized, unconstrained trial of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 
and his fellow plutocrats alienated labor economist John D. Commons and stalled the 
momentum he and his pupils had built through research and action at the state level. 
The fifth chapter, which is the last to deal with the profession’s institutional and 
cultural development, examines what happened when the momentum the reform-minded 
New Economists enjoyed prior to the 1920s evaporated. The assertion is not that the new 
economics disappeared. In fact, it was during the 1920s that serious attempts were made 
to bind the heterodox strands of American economic thought into a more coherent 
American Institutional School of economics. Rather, this chapter argues that the 
combination of pragmatism and the turn away from reformist impulses reinforced the 
neoclassical school’s centrality in American economic thought. The discipline as a whole 
was elated by the fact that it had grown by such leaps and bounds; but this optimism must 
be balanced by the persistence of folk economics and the damage caused by ongoing 
dissent within the discipline.   
 A survey of farm relief efforts and in Chapter Six illustrates the cause and effect 
relationship between the struggle over economic ideas and their application to farm 
policy. Agricultural economists, unwilling to abandon the basic premises of supply-and-
demand to endorse the McNary-Haugen Plan, engaged with farmers and lawmakers alike 
in an attempt to stabilize farm commodity prices and prevent the erosion of rural 
communities. The “farm question” raised an interesting dilemma for economists. Sure of 
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the problem, but unable to reconfigure the political economy of the nation, the discipline 
was hard-pressed to offer an appealing solution. When the nation’s leading agricultural 
economists did present a workable solution in the form of an allotment program its 
adoption was delayed by want of political viability. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of economists’ role in the design of relief programs during the first half of 
the Great Depression, including the Agricultural Adjustment Act and gold purchasing 
program, to illustrate how the adoption of economic theories based on their political 
expediency likely prolonged unnecessary economic suffering. My study ends in the 
middle of the United States’ struggle to rise up and out of the Great Depression to 
underscore that the “mold” of professional economics was set before that calamitous 
event, thereby challenging those who downplay the significance of early twentieth-
century economics by arguing that the Keynesian response to the Great Depression 
ushered in the era of modern economics.  
The conclusion doubles as an epilogue to help clarify how the arguments 
presented in this dissertation relate to the events of the more recent past. In particular, I 
further explain my skepticism regarding the nature and significance of the Keynesian 
Consensus, as well as the neoliberal Regan Revolution that historians are increasingly 











Chapter One  
 
The Problems at Hand, 1885-1900 
 
In his 1897 study of the history of American economic thought, economist Simon 
Sherwood suggested that Americans’ preoccupation with practical matters for the first 
three-quarters of the nineteenth century – namely the building of its impressive economy 
- had left little time for the deep contemplation necessary to advance American economic 
thought beyond Adam Smith.27 He was, on one level, correct in commenting on the lack 
of economic thought. American intellectuals’ lack of interest in economic theory 
compared to their English or German counterparts was odd considering the nation’s zeal 
for commerce and prosperity. Furthermore, the United States did boast a growing post-
secondary education system that was certainly capable of supporting scholars who could 
engage with European economists. 
But what Sherwood and many of his colleagues failed to properly acknowledge 
was that Americans were engaged in the study of economic theory. Throughout the 
century, laborers, politicians, and reformers had implicitly and explicitly challenged one 
another in debates over production and distribution. In doing so, they forged a brand of 
folk economics in the breech of social and political conflict that they then spread through 
the community and passed on to the next generation. The modernization of economic 
theory in the U.S. would therefore depend not only on emulating the leading European 
economic theorists, but also supplanting the influence of the folk economists with that of 
academically trained professionals.  
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The push to modernize American economic thought followed the Civil War, when 
the economy expanded at a pace that delivered both incredible prosperity and instability. 
The search for ideas about how to manage a newly industrialized society led a cadre of 
young men to Europe, where they became convinced that the pursuit of scholarly 
economics as demonstrated in European universities held the key to improved quality of 
life back home. European scholars, too, had begun to address the unique challenges of 
industrial abundance, and their work found a ready audience among American students.28 
These scholars’ efforts following their return from Europe laid the groundwork for a 
dramatic expansion in the study of economics and modernized American economic 
thought. It also marked the beginning of an ongoing struggle to situate economic 
expertise in a democracy where folk economics remained a powerful force.  
 
Enter the Modern Economist 
 
The study of economics held a place in American higher education long before 
the economic upheaval of the late nineteenth century, but it was a fairly static field and 
far removed from the modern incarnation of the discipline. Academics and laymen alike 
referred to the study of exchange as political economy, which conveyed the commonly 
held notion that public policy and economic behavior were intimately intertwined. Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations, with its caution against over-regulation of the market, was 
familiar to many graduates of the nation’s colleges and universities. Numerous printings 
ensured that the book circulated throughout the U.S. well beyond Smith’s death in 1790. 
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Such was the ubiquity of Smith’s work that in an 1889 review of past scholarship Simon 
Newcomb could confidently assert that “every class of economic writer” had bestowed 
upon the Scotsman “all the laurels of victory” in the century since his death.29 Smith’s 
work, and subsequent contributions to classical economics by David Ricardo, James Mill, 
and Thomas Malthus, provided a common grounding for American economic thought 
and ensured a space for political economy among the varied topics pursued in America’s 
colleges and universities. 
Although dominant, Smith’s ideas were by no means the only relevant ones 
regarding political economy in the U.S. Henry C. Carey, a successful businessman and 
self-taught economist, published a noteworthy three-volume theory of American political 
economy, Principles of Political Economy, in the late 1830s. Carey went on to advise 
President Lincoln during the Civil War and pushed for protective tariffs and similar 
schemes designed to promote American economic independence throughout the mid-
nineteenth century, with mixed results. As Harvard economist Frank Taussig later noted, 
Carey was “guilty of many curious versions of economic history.”30 Carey’s work, like 
the work of most Americans who attempted to advance formal economic discourse in the 
U.S. in the eighty years following Smith was ultimately ephemeral and failed to establish 
a strong tradition within American economic thought.   
Despite Smith’s ubiquity and contributions from Carey and similar intellectuals, 
most Americans lacked significant exposure to rigorous academic economic theory. 
College was a rare experience for the overwhelming majority of Americans, as was 
access to advanced lectures on political economy. This is not to say that those who lacked 
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formal training in economic theory lacked grounding in economic thought, however. As 
economist Paul H. Rubin has recently noted, a lack of formal training or specialization 
does not render people incapable of understanding political economy.31 It does influence 
the way they understand how markets and their participants interact, however. 
Assumptions regarding foreign trade, capital investment, and the relationship between 
prices and production are more likely to be influenced by the individual’s experiences – a 
necessarily limited view in comparison to that of a person who studies political economy 
for a living. 
The economic turmoil of the post-Civil War decades challenged the assumptions 
of professional and folk economists alike and encouraged a dramatic increase in the study 
of economics in the U.S. The succeeding decades witnessed dramatic changes in the way 
economic thought was produced, packaged, and distributed, with the most striking 
developments taking shape in colleges and universities.32 In his observation of the general 
increase in economic instruction, economic historian A.W. Coats notes that from 1876 to 
1892 instructional hours in political economy courses nearly sextupled from 2,250 to 
13,116.33 Part of this increase can be attributed to the growth of higher education in 
general. More people pursued higher education, which led to an increase in the number of 
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course hours offered in all subjects. Yet the general expansion of higher education 
accounts for only a fraction of the rapid increase in courses offered on political economy. 
Of the 66 post-secondary institutions surveyed by the Journal of Political Economy, 26 
did not offer a single course in political economy for the 1876 academic year. By 1892 
the same 26 schools offered a combined 1,337 course hours in introductory or elementary 
political economy, which accounted for 12 percent of the total increase in courses 
offered. The addition of course hours in introductory or elementary political economy at 
institutions that already offered similar courses in 1876 accounted for only 3.6 percent of 
the total increase in political economy course hours offered.  
The upturn in instructional hours dedicated to political economy derived primarily 
from the addition of advanced courses – evidence of the intellectual expansion of the 
discipline. In just a 16-year span schools such as Yale and Columbia had progressed from 
offering introductory political economy courses to advanced seminars on topics such as 
“Taxation and Distribution,” “Public Finance and Economy,” and “Corporate Finance.” 
The University of Wisconsin, which was one of the 26 schools surveyed that did not offer 
any courses in political economy in 1876, added 612 course hours on advanced subjects 
including “Distribution of Wealth,” “Public Finance,” and “Recent Economic Theories.” 
One-third of post-secondary institutions surveyed offered at least four courses on political 
economy during the 1892-93 academic year, demonstrating a significant commitment to 
offering the discipline as a major course of study.34  
More courses in political economy, naturally, meant more instructors, and as 
colleges expanded course offerings they created institutional support for those interested 
in pursuing the study of political economy on a full-time basis. This often meant 
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recruiting those who had recently spent time studying in the centers of modern economic 
thought, primarily Germany, Austria, and England. Despite the growing supremacy of the 
American economy, U.S. economic thought continued to follow Europe’s lead prior to 
the twentieth century. Germany was a common destination for those who would go on to 
shake-up American economic thought – in particular the Universities of Berlin, Halle, 
and Heidelberg, where students were exposed to the Historical School methodology as 
practiced by Karl Knies and Gustav von Schmoller. In England, Alfred Marshall’s 
pioneering work on the relationship between productivity and wages carried on the 
tradition of classical economic theory. Vienna stood as an equally respected destination 
for budding political economists, as it boasted Austrian school luminaries Carl Menger 
and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, whose work established the foundation for modern 
libertarian thought.35   
 American students who encountered European political economy throughout the 
late nineteenth century shared a common enthusiasm for the flowering discipline. They 
exhibited an excitement for the knowledge they received in what were considered the 
most advanced universities in the world. American economics, as it was studied and 
taught in American colleges, was perceived to lack the independent thought that made 
European schools so attractive.36 Disputes regarding the appropriate manipulations of the 
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nation’s tariffs ensured consistent debate, but beyond that classical economic theory up to 
the 1870s was held to be “perfectly complete.”37 
 European economic thought, on the other hand, possessed an originality and 
creativity that promised great things. German economic thought, in particular, 
encouraged such enthusiasm. An 1880 article written by a young Richard T. Ely while 
studying in Berlin, and published in Harper’s Magazine, illustrated the allure.38 Higher 
education in the U.S. was in a “sad state” and failed to properly prepare young men and 
women for productive careers, Ely lamented. American students attended college to 
receive a general worldly knowledge, but left ill-prepared to make a living. Their German 
counterparts, Ely went on to explain, focused on a narrow course of study that culminated 
in a set of examinations designed to ensure competency in a chosen profession. Unlike 
American students, German pupils specialized – a prerequisite for establishing 
professional expertise. German faculty, accordingly, offered advanced discipline-specific 
courses on a variety of topics, including political economy. The depth of training 
provided for German students prepared them to apply their knowledge to their chosen 
career in a manner that eluded American graduates. Europe offered, it seemed, not only 
knowledge of the complexities of economic policy, but also the training necessary to 
apply that knowledge in a manner that could alleviate the unintended consequences of 
rapid industrial growth in the U.S. 
 Not all notable late nineteenth and early twentieth century American economists 
studied abroad, but enough did to justify prevailing arguments that emphasized the 
influence late nineteenth century European ideas had on the modernization of American 
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economic thought.39 Ely, Simon N. Patten, Edmund J. James, and Joseph French Johnson 
all enjoyed lengthy careers in economics following their studies abroad.40 Irving Fisher, 
Jeremiah Jenks, Frank Taussig, and Edwin Seligman each spent time at Germany 
universities as well. Together, these men taught nearly 250 years combined at Columbia, 
Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Michigan, the University 
of Wisconsin, and Yale – each a prominent institution in American economic thought. 
All contributed greatly to the vibrancy of American economics and were mainstays in the 
professional economics community at the turn of the century.   
 The infusion of new ideas combined with a lack of strong leadership in American 
economic thought led to clashes among American economists in the late nineteenth 
century.  Historians of economic thought have long noted the tension between American 
economists that stemmed from the European importation of diverse approaches to 
understanding political economy.41 Such divisions emerged and their consequences were 
far reaching, although disagreements were rarely dramatic or conducive to drawing 
clearly defined sides. The disagreements are nevertheless revealing, as they highlight the 
challenges of uprooting one intellectual heritage and replacing it with another.  
The most oft-observed rift was between the advocates of the German-inspired 
historical school and the American adherents to the English-rooted classical school. The 
historical school emphasized inductive logic, which required adherents to reach 
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conclusions based on careful analysis of institutions and accumulated data. For 
historicists, it seemed foolish to attempt to understand and solve a particular economic 
problem without first gathering all the relevant data because each economic issue 
possessed peculiarities that could only be revealed by the facts.  
 Classical economists disagreed. They believed that human behavior was 
predictable enough to allow conclusions based on carefully constructed logic. Classical 
economists were not opposed to the collection of data. The difference lay in the amount 
of data necessary. Whereas historicists sought data for each particular economic question 
to account for regional, cultural, and historical differences, classical economists believed 
a minimal amount of statistical evidence could be used to answer a host of economic 
questions through deductive reasoning. If man was a rational agent in the marketplace, 
classical theorists reasoned, then a simple baseline of rational behavior could be 
considered ample evidence from which to draw broad theoretical conclusion.  
 Divisions on the ground were blurry and often tough to observe. As a matter of 
principle, most economists maintained an open mind and abstained from dismissing their 
intellectual rivals outright. Departments of political economy in the late nineteenth 
century lacked the ideological identities they came to embody over the course of the 
twentieth century. The University of Chicago, considered a stronghold for neoclassical 
thought in the mid-twentieth century, boasted a diverse faculty chaired by the orthodox J. 
Laughlin Laurence and staffed with heterodox economists such as Thorstein Veblen and 
Robert Franklin Hoxie. Columbia demonstrated a similar openness with the addition of 
John Bates Clark who, fresh from his studies at the University of Heidelberg, was far 
more radical than later in his career. Even faculty at the University of Wisconsin, which 
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most aggressively pursued an institutional identity as a center of radical thought, 
maintained an open dialogue with their orthodox colleagues.42    
It is also difficult to draw sharp distinctions between schools of thought because 
the profession was only beginning to establish itself as a distinct discipline. Many 
economists saw their work as more appropriately described as sociological in nature and 
pulled double-duty as sociology instructors.43 Indeed, W.W. Folwell’s assertion at the 
third annual meeting of the American Economic Association that economics was in 
practice a sub-discipline of sociology met no resistance.44 The distinction was so thin that 
sociology and political economy could often be discussed interchangeably; and some 
argued that the two fields had to be intertwined if reasonable conclusions were to be 
drawn. As sociologist Edward Ross cautioned his colleagues in 1889, ignorance of 
custom, tradition, and authority – the stuff of sociology – left economists ill-equipped to 
carry out their analysis of trade.45 The American Economic Association maintained ties 
with the American Journal of Sociology and published several articles that explored the 
relationship between the two disciplines, including Albion Small’s “Relation of 
Sociology to Economics,” which echoed Folwell’s claim of interdependency.46 As 
Small’s analysis reveals, economists were as busy defending their discipline as a free-
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standing field as they were their respective methodologies. Political economy in the U.S. 
professionalized throughout the late nineteenth century, but it was a slow process. 
More concrete and revealing than the methodological “rift” was the dispute over 
the role of political economy in American society – specifically the question of how to 
use political economists’ work. The economic upheaval of the period was enough to 
encourage the study of economic behavior, but it did not offer clear-cut guidance as to 
what political economists should do with their newly acquired knowledge. The 
established orthodoxy in American political economics promoted a free-trade, hands-off 
approach.47 The “new economists,” as the “young Turks” fresh from study in Europe 
came to call themselves, argued for action.  
The divergence in opinion was most pronounced during the early years of the 
American Economic Association (AEA). The young economists who returned from their 
European studies in the 1870s and ‘80s lacked a professional organization through which 
they could translate newfound knowledge into action. Members of the American Political 
Economy Club (PEC), which was formed in 1883, demonstrated a clear affinity for the 
orthodoxy of free trade and laissez-faire public policy against which the new economists 
conscientiously aligned themselves. The PEC had grown from the exchange of letters 
between orthodox economist J. Laurence Laughlin, then at Harvard, and Edward 
Atkinson, a prominent businessmen and amateur economist from Boston.48 The PEC 
ostensibly attempted to adopt a scientific and unbiased organizing principle, but in 
                                                          
47
 Charles A. Beard, “The Idea of Let Us Alone,” The Virginia Quarterly Review 115, no. 4 (Autumn 
1939): 500–514.“ Historian Charles Beard attempted to dismiss the fact that classical economics, with its 
preference for laissez-faire policies, dominated American economic thought by arguing William Graham 
Sumner and J. Laurence Laughlin imported the notion in the post-Civil War period. His argument 
contradicted the recollections of every early twentieth century economist and was built on scant evidence.  
48
 A.W. Coats, “The Political Economy Club: A Neglected Episode in American Economic Thought,” The 
American Economic Review 51, no. 4 (1961): 626. 
  
   
38 
 
practice the group was quite conservative in terms of politics and economics. Its members 
and leaders leaned strongly toward the classical orthodoxy, and by its second year the 
PEC had acquired the same reputation for conservatism as the London Political Economy 
Club that had inspired its formation.49 
Founded just two years later in 1885, the American Economic Association soon 
became the preeminent organization for professional and amateur economists in the U.S. 
Although the PEC and AEA initially shared several characteristics, namely an ideological 
slant and academic leadership, the AEA proved more resilient. This stemmed largely 
from the stated goals of each organization. Whereas members of the PEC restricted the 
organization’s activities to informal meetings, often at the home of a member, the 
founders of the AEA expressly sought to expand and widely disseminate information on 
political economy. Of the AEA’s four founding articles, three addressed the expansion of 
the profession through encouragement of economic research, the publication of economic 
monographs, and the establishment of an information bureau to support members’ 
research.50 The AEA also quickly surpassed the PEC in terms of membership and 
significance thanks to its willingness to admit any new member (including women, 
although, as we will see, their numbers were few) provided he or she could afford the 
annual membership fee of $3.00.51 This broad acceptance not only fostered lay support in 
the form of dues and peer advertising (the AEA attracted a number of reformers and 
clergymen in its early years), but also allowed orthodox economists to quietly join the 
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organization without the drama that might have accompanied an exclusive application 
process.52  
Despite the AEA’s comparatively rapid success, its early years were marked by 
uncertainty as disputes over the organization’s leading principles alienated classical 
economists and discouraged a few prominent figures within the discipline from entering 
the group’s ranks. The AEA’s constitution proved to be a significant sticking point. This 
is not surprising considering its authors’ reputations as “rebels.”53 All six founding 
members – Henry C. Adams, John Bates Clark, Simon N. Patten, Edmund J. James, 
Edwin Seligman, and Richard Ely – had spent time in Germany and expressed 
enthusiasm for the politically active arch-type economist. The six founders began with 
the assumption that economics was “a science of human relationships,” the study of 
which should conclude with a plan of action.54 If this was not enough to alienate the 
orthodox establishment in American economics, the group’s overt mission statement was. 
With striking irony, the founding members of the AEA proposed to establish an 
organization dedicated to freedom of discussion, yet at the same time committed to 
uprooting orthodox doctrine (i.e. classical thought) from American economics.55 The 
AEA’s original constitution made plain its founders’ desire to meld political economy 
and social reform, not surprising given chief architect Richard T. Ely’s endorsement of 
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the controversial Knights of Labor in a book on labor drafted around the same time as the 
constitution.56  
 Moderation gradually prevailed by means of an ongoing debate within the pages 
of Science, a periodical of the American Association for the Advance of Science.57 Even 
Ely, the most ardent new economist, conceded that in order to ensure unbiased scientific 
inquiry and attract enough members to make the organization a legitimate voice for 
American economics, the founding members had to “tone down” the organization’s 
constitution.58 The AEA settled on an innocuous charter that called for members to 
“promote independent economic inquiry” and “disseminate economic knowledge.”59 
Despite these concessions to their orthodox colleagues, the authors of the AEA’s 
organizational platform retained obvious signs of their philosophical and political 
leanings. The AEA’s prospectus included references to the state as an “educational and 
ethical agency” that was responsible for “positive aid.”60 The charter expressly rejected 
the “final word” of previous laissez-faire economists and called attention to the ongoing 
conflict between capital and labor.  
The AEA’s founders and early supporters clearly envisioned an activist discipline 
that would engage with the hot-button economic issues of the day. Feedback on the 
prospectus illustrates the degree to which the early AEA tied itself to contemporary 
reform movements that sought to change America’s economic order. Dr. Albert Shaw, 
editor of the Minneapolis Tribune and a student of Ely’s, met the prospectus with 
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enthusiasm, declaring “the time is ripe for the movement… It seems to me the society 
will be a success from the start.”61  President White of Cornell University applauded the 
group’s rejection of laissez-faire orthodoxy, noting that it was “entirely inadequate to the 
needs of the modern state.”62 The prospectus garnered additional support from the 
Commission of Labor Carroll D. Wright as well as from one of Ely’s promising students, 
Woodrow Wilson.63 Although the AEA’s founders scaled back the rhetoric, their intent 
was clear.64     
 The AEA served as a common association to help facilitate research and 
legitimize the efforts of academic economists, a contribution to American intellectual life 
that cannot be underestimated. In order to follow through on its commitment to being an 
unbiased promoter of the field, the AEA undertook the publishing of monographs 
deemed relevant to field at large. In its first 15 years, the AEA published titles by 
Jeremiah J. Jenks, Edmund J. James, and Frank Taussig - important milestones for 
scholars who would go on to contribute greatly to American economics.65 The AEA also 
attempted to establish a strong sense of direction through the work of its committees.  
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 Committees were organized around topics of interest to both the application and 
the study of political economics. The work of committees was fairly straightforward; 
committee members collaborated to produce a committee report on their assigned topic, 
which was then presented at the annual meeting and published in the organizations 
quarterly journal. The influence of these early reports on the general public was likely 
minimal. They did not inspire widespread press coverage, nor were they granted special 
status at the annual meetings. Committee reports on the discipline’s internal matters 
likely had a more significant influence. The Committee on Economic Theory, for 
example, developed into a clearinghouse for economic terms.66 The Committee’s 1888 
report highlighted its unintended influence on the discipline and pushed the AEA to 
embrace its role as a regulator of economic thought, although the organization would 
consistently move away from such responsibility. The goal, for the committee, was to 
“eliminate from economic discussion the most serious misunderstandings” that resulted 
from diversity in terminology. It was a simple function, but significant in that it 
represented a concerted effort to transform economics into a coherent, professional 
discipline with a codified terminology.      
Progress was slow and uneven during the Association’s early years. Annual 
meetings were small, a fact that reflects the difficulties in organizing even the most 
enthusiastic of the professionalizing economists. The second annual meeting, held in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1888, attracted only 37 participants.67 The fourth annual 
meeting, held two years later in Washington DC, yielded 36. Geographic constraints 
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were, in part, to blame.68 Both meetings drew exclusively from the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic, apart from one 1888 attendee from Milwaukee.69 Despite drastically reduced 
transportation times, cross-country travel was still a financial and physical challenge. 
Early AEA leadership was sensitive to the matter and attempted to hold meetings further 
west to attract broader participation, but progress on that front was slow going.70 By 
1894, the number of attendees had reached 64, but the origins of attendees still revealed a 
strong East coast bias.    
 The AEA also found it difficult to promote and publish economics on a large 
scale owing to the fragmented nature of the emerging profession. By the early 1890s the 
AEA was the most prominent national organization for economics, yet it still competed 
with a host of similar organizations. The AEA’s monograph series editors searched for 
articles and circulation alongside several university-housed publications. Columbia, 
Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale all published scholarly journals that 
accepted economics papers and required faculty members to contribute to the in-house 
publications. The competition for quality papers was such that as late as 1900, Seligman 
expressed concern regarding the AEA’s plan to publish conference papers because doing 
so might discourage faculty who were obligated to publish in their home institution’s 
journal.71    
The discipline was still in the process of establishing the institutional and 
intellectual paradigms necessary to establish a sense of order in American economic 
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thought. This is not to suggest that there were no “rules” to govern late nineteenth century 
American economists, however. There was a loosely defined boundary within which 
reputable intellectuals, academic or otherwise, were expected to remain. Disagreement 
over responses to the five most significant economic issues of the day (tariff, money, 
monopolies, labor, and agriculture) was expected, but not necessarily tolerated. In some 
cases, disagreement elevated to controversy and revealed the restrictions placed on public 
debate of economic issues. Such was the case in Madison, Wisconsin where Richard T. 
Ely was accused of promoting socialism in the classroom.  
 
Policing the Boundaries 
 
 The significance of the late nineteenth century academic freedom cases lies in 
their ability to highlight intellectual boundaries in a society that ostensibly prided itself 
on a lack of such restrictions. As historian Mary Furner has noted, “academic freedom” 
incidents proved a crucial stepping stone in the development of the discipline because 
they placed limitations on what many middle-of-the-road and conservative Americans 
feared were unlimited social and intellectual movements.72 What is particularly revealing 
about the academic freedom cases in relation to the professionalization of economics is 
the degree to which hearsay skewed peoples’ perceptions of what was being said in the 
ongoing debate over economic issues.  
In some cases, such as the dismissal of Edward A. Ross, hearsay proved 
reasonably accurate and the outcome not surprising given the social and political mores 
of the period. Ross, a professor of sociology and economics at Stanford University, was 
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summarily dismissed by Mrs. Leland Stanford, widow of the school’s founder in 1900. 
By Ross’ own admission he had courted controversy. The Johns Hopkins-trained 
professor understood the risks he took when promoting ideas on the fringe of accepted 
discourse.73 Nevertheless, Ross was undeterred by the increasing regularity with which 
economists were “bulldozed into acquiescence” by those he labeled ruthless capitalists, 
and he vocally challenged the conservative political and ideological assumptions of his 
intellectual rivals.74  
Ross’ views were full of contradictions. He harbored a strong distrust of large 
corporations and business interests in general, yet also railed against the threat posed by 
the laborers he felt were being exploited by those very same business interests. Ross was 
also an early promoter of “race suicide” theories that proved popular during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and made clear his particular disdain for Asian 
immigrants. Despite recognizing that his faculty appointment was at risk throughout his 
tenure at Stanford, Ross continued to promote his most controversial views in public.75 
Matters came to a head following two lectures in the summer of 1900. In a statement 
distributed to the press, Ross explained that an address he had given to an organized labor 
group regarding the threat of Oriental labor and a later public lecture on municipal 
ownership of utilities and transportation were what sealed his fate. Both opinions had 
offended the widowed Mrs. Stanford, whose fortune had been acquired through the use of 
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Asian immigrant labor to build the controversial and privately-owned Central Pacific 
railway.76 
Ross technically resigned amid the fallout, but by all accounts his resignation 
preceded Mrs. Stanford’s dismissal by the slimmest of margins, although Stanford 
President Jordan refuted allegations the decision was made under pressure of “capital or 
other sinister influence.”77 Little came of the minor backlash over Ross’ departure. Ross’ 
recently appointed departmental colleague, Morton Arnold Aldrich, resigned in protest.78 
No further resignations materialized, despite rumors of simmering discontent among 
Californian scholars. 
 Unlike Ross’s dismissal, the Ely academic freedom case was marked by 
unsubstantiated claims and innuendo, thereby establishing the uncomfortable reality that 
economists would not always be evaluated according to their own words and actions. The 
Ely incident played out in the summer of 1894, shortly following his move from Johns 
Hopkins University to the newly formed History, Political Science and Economics 
department at the University of Wisconsin.79 By that summer, Ely had acquired a 
reputation as a leader of the new economics and a “happy warrior” who openly promoted 
his research among church leaders in an attempt to evoke action.80 He had also made 
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clear that no subject was beyond interest; a point he drove home by attending socialist 
meetings and writing a noted monograph on the subject, Socialism: An Examination of Its 
Nature, Its Strength, and Its Weaknesses, with Suggestions for Social Reform.81    
 The controversy began in July 1894 with a letter from Wisconsin school 
superintendent Oliver E. Wells to the editor of the Nation that accused Ely of threatening 
to take away university business from a non-union printer following the economist’s 
consultation with a labor “agitator” from Kansas City. The conservative Nation had been 
critical of Ely since the 1880s, and Wells’ accusations that the economist had used his 
status in the community to bully a small business owner supported long-standing fears 
about the radical doctrines he was alleged to have espoused.82  Wells’ position as state 
school superintendant seemingly imbued the charges with credibility, and the letter’s 
weight rested in the assertion that the incident in question was merely an illustration of 
what Wells feared was a more serious issue. In addition to bullying local businesses, 
Wells claimed, Ely also engaged in the deliberate and clever manipulation of students’ 
minds. Ely, he claimed, promoted a dangerous doctrine of socialistic utopianism through 
the publication of books full of “glittering generalities and mystical and metaphysical 
statements,” all promoted with University (i.e. public) resources.83 
 The University of Wisconsin’s Board of Regents proved sensitive to the 
accusation that one of the state’s more prominent minds was spreading socialist thought. 
Economics was a touchy subject given that its study often led to criticisms of the status 
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quo. It was easy to cross the line from acceptable discourse into unacceptable 
evangelicizing. The Board’s Executive Committee launched an investigation, and a 
public hearing was held one month after the Nation’s publication of Wells’ accusations. 
The Regents were supportive of Ely from the outset and declared his writings, the 
materials he used in class, and comments made prior to his employment at Wisconsin 
inadmissible.84 Ely, with the support of his students, mustered a strong defense that 
included reference to the works of Smith and Ricardo, letters of support from notable 
figures such as U.S. Commissioner of Labor Carroll Wright, and testimony from past 
students.85 In addition, the investigative committee heard from Walking Delegate Klauk, 
the agitator Ely was alleged to have consulted with prior to threatening the local print 
shop. Klauk denied knowing Ely, let alone conspiring with the professor during a labor 
action.86 
 Nine days after the trial began it ended with humiliation for Wells. Frustrated by 
what he felt was a committee “destitute of power,” Wells declined further participation in 
the trial, thereby ensuring Ely’s acquittal.87 The investigative committee censured Wells 
for the rashness of his accusations, and the incident effectively ended his political 
career.88 The committee members took the opportunity of their final report to openly 
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endorse academic freedom in higher education, concluding that “In all lines of academic 
investigation it is of the utmost importance that the investigator should be absolutely free 
to follow the indications of truth wherever they may lead.”89  
The conclusion of the trial was seemingly a moment of triumph for freedom of 
expression in American higher education, yet appearances are deceiving. In fact, the 
incident highlighted the tension surrounding higher education in general and economics 
in particular. Once the trial had commenced, it was clear that Wells lacked any 
compelling evidence. His accusations were the result of hearsay, as he had never stepped 
foot inside Ely’s classroom. His invocation of Ely’s written work was selective and 
ignored entire sections that explicitly denounced radical socialism and preached reform 
within the existing system. However, despite the obvious hollowness of Wells’ charges, 
the Board of Regents still held a trial, which advertently or not placed the burden of proof 
upon Ely rather than his accuser. 
 The Ely incident also highlighted the relatively narrow band of thought within 
which economists were free to exercise their freedom of speech. Ely survived the ordeal 
and emerged stronger than ever, but only because he successfully proved that his work 
was not only non-socialist, but in fact acted as a bulwark against truly insidious socialist 
thought. Indeed, the basis of Commissioner Wright’s support for Ely was the Professor’s 
ability to draw laborers away from the more radical ideology espoused by less desirable 
intellectuals.90 Wright supported Ely because he was a trusted ally against what Wright 
perceived to be the “seductive” creep of state socialism in the U.S.91 Academic freedom, 
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as with freedom of speech in general, had its limits. Ely was careful to preempt his critics 
in his written work and quick to refute his accuser with a pile of evidence when the time 
came. His persistent refutations of socialist leanings later led to criticism from more 
liberal peers and future historians.92 Less cautious economists who challenged 
mainstream ideas, and indeed collegiate faculty in general whose work evoked 
controversy, risked dismissal. 
The new economists, along with the shifting economy, successfully challenged 
the “final word” of the old orthodoxy. Political economy was no longer a completed 
science, but rather an open debate with numerous lines of inquiry and conclusions. 
However, despite the chaos of economic debate and claims of academic freedom public 
discourse over the pursuit of those numerous conclusions did have implicitly defined 
boundaries. In Ross’s case, he boldly challenged them and paid for the transgression with 
his job.93 Ely’s case proves more compelling because the demonstrated willingness by 
some to act on hearsay raised troubling questions. If second-hand accusations were 
enough to imperil the career of an established scholar such as Ely then junior faculty 
were at even greater risk. Perhaps more troubling was the obvious conclusion that 
economists’ ideas could seemingly be manipulated at will. Professional economists 
staked their social prestige on their ability to demonstrate conclusions through scientific 
inquiry. There was little the discipline could do to stop the public from ignoring the 
inquiry and skipping to the conclusions.   
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Unlike the overt pursuit of accused radicals, or those assumed to be in league with 
radical agitators, the intellectual censorship of women took place in less confrontational, 
everyday ways. Women were not excluded by law from engaging in economic thought in 
the 1880s and 1890s and in fact participated in the vibrant economics debates period to 
some degree. But just as the social and political climate pushed serious consideration of 
socialist solutions to the edges of most debate it also minimized the participation of 
women. 
 It is, of course, no surprise that women were underrepresented in debates over 
economics considering the political and social norms of the era. Women could not vote in 
national elections and were discouraged from working outside the home, barring those in 
working class families that needed the additional income to survive. Increasing numbers 
of middle and upper class women had begun attending colleges and universities, but often 
struggled to find fulfilling employment upon graduation. These norms were changing, to 
be sure, and in time female pioneers successfully translated gendered assumptions into 
rewarding career paths.94 In the meantime, women straddled an awkward middle ground 
in American society. They were legally barred from voting in most states, but not 
excluded from the political process. They were allowed to pursue higher education, but 
discouraged from applying their education to a career outside the home. In a similar vein, 
women engaged with the contemporary debate over economics, but were largely confined 
to the margins of the professional community. 
 Such a claim would have likely draw howls of objection from some economists of 
the day, particularly the new economists who prided themselves on their socially 
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progressive prerogatives. Women published works on economic subjects and lectured to 
the public. One of the more successful economic texts of the time, Political Economy for 
Beginners, which went through ten editions from 1870-1924, was written by British 
suffragette Millicent Fawcett.95 Similarly, Beatrice Webb, the famed British socialist, 
enjoyed widespread recognition through her study of trade unionism and co-founded the 
London School of Economics in 1899. Less celebrated female faculty members taught 
political economy at a handful of colleges in the U.S. – Katherine Coman most notably 
served as Chair of the Economics Department at Wellesley from 1883-1900. The AEA 
recognized the contributions of Amelie Rives Chandler and Claire de Graffenried for 
their work on child labor and women wage earners, respectively, with an award and cash 
prize.96 Anecdotal evidence seemingly suggests a strong female voice in economic debate 
at the close of the century. The numbers, however, demonstrate otherwise.  
Women were not represented during the founding of either the AEA or the 
Political Economy Club, the two preeminent professional economics organizations in the 
U.S. at the time. The Political Economy Club never acquired female members, a fact that 
might be more a result of its short lifespan than organizational policy. The AEA did 
attract female members, but the numbers were small. The first meetings of the 
organization drew only a handful of female participants; two out of thirty seven attendees 
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in 1888 and three out of thirty six in 1890.97 Time did little to address the disparity. By 
the close of the century the AEA only counted 17 women among its nearly 600 
members.98     
Furthermore, the anecdotal evidence that suggested a strong female voice in early 
American professional economics is problematic. Both Fawcett and Webb lived and 
worked in England and although they were certainly important figures, their reputations 
were tied in part to those of their husbands, economists Henry Fawcett and Sidney Webb. 
Additionally, the nature of their work likely minimized their significance by the 1890s. 
Fawcett’s widely circulated textbook was a success, but by no means considered cutting-
edge research. Political Economy for Beginners was never mentioned as anything more 
than an introductory level resource. Fawcett’s contributions to husband Henry’s 1872 
Essays and Lectures on Social and Political Subjects proved more adventurous, but failed 
to establish her reputation as a leading economist in the U.S. Alfred Marshall hinted at 
the second class status of female economists in an article published in Harvard’s 
Quarterly Journal of Economics when he suggested that the elementary role of the 
female economist was vanishing as the discipline professionalized, claiming “Never 
again will a Mrs. Trimmer, a Mrs. Marcet, or a Miss Martineau earn a goodly reputation 
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by throwing them [old economic principles] into the form of a catechism or of simple 
tales…”99 
Beatrice Webb’s work enjoyed a stronger following, owing perhaps in part to her 
pursuit of labor issues that appealed so strongly to new economists in the U.S. Yet 
Webb’s commitment to socialism ultimately limited her influence in American colleges. 
Socialism was a tainted philosophy, regardless of the advocate’s gender, and undeniably 
colored U.S. scholars’ reception of the English economist.  
 Awards aside, women also faced resistance within the AEA despite the 
organization's open membership policy. Businessman and AEA member Stuart Wood 
expressed surprise when he learned the AEA allowed women to participate in the annual 
meetings. In his experience, the presence of women lessened the “seriousness” of 
proceedings.100 Wood’s opinion on the matter was not the AEA’s – that much he 
acknowledged. Yet taken with the lack of female members and the limited number of 
female authors published by the AEA in the first fifteen years of its existence it is clear 
that women held a lower status than men in the community of American professional 
economics.    
It was not much different outside academia. Women’s participation in economics 
often took place outside the classroom and in the same spaces occupied by reformers and 
club women. Political economy was a mainstay of the women’s club circuits and lectures 
on the subject were quite common by the 1890s. The General Federation of Women’s 
Clubs placed political economy alongside English literature, botany, and art work as 
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topics of highest interest.101  An estimated 213 clubs organized expressly to discuss the 
growing field of study.102 Women also joined in on discussions at Chautauqua meetings – 
the summer adult education camps that included lessons on political economy and 
enjoyed the support of consummate promoter Richard T. Ely.103  
As with academic economics, women were awkwardly integrated into the public 
debate over economic issues, however. An article run in the New York Post, and carried 
by the Chicago Tribune, snidely criticized aspiring female economists, noting that they 
now understand the intricacies of the modern economy, yet fail to comprehend a subject 
closer to their established role as a homemaker - plumbing.104 Perhaps if they studied 
plumbing with the same enthusiasm they displayed during their reform efforts, the 
editorialist concluded, they may actually improve their lives.  
Detractors aside, women continued to pursue their study of economics. The study 
of political economy coincided with the general increase in the number of women 
engaged in social reform at the end of the century. Economics spoke to the main causes 
of the day, such as temperance and urban reform, which attracted a large number of 
female reformers. A thorough knowledge of political economy also bolstered women’s 
push for suffrage. As suffragette Ida McIntosh-Dempoy noted in an editorial letter to the 
Chicago Tribune, the study of political economy would provide women with the surest 
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preparation for exercising their voice through the ballot.105 The vote and the study of 
political economy were intertwined. As Helen H. Gardener argued in an article published 
by the progressive Arena magazine, the study of political economy without an outlet for 
political expression was a societal liability. Educated women understood the flaws late 
nineteenth century society, yet lacked a political voice on par with that of their male 
counterparts. It was no wonder, according to Gardener, that women might smash up 
saloons in the name of reform out of frustration over knowing the problem, but being 
prevented from pursuing a solution.106  
 
 
The Amateur Economist 
 
 Professional economists generally do not control the agenda for public debate of 
economic issues, and the early years of professionalization were no exception. The lack 
of focus on agricultural issues best reflects the disconnect between the academy and the 
public. The U.S. was, after all, still a predominantly rural nation. There was little doubt 
that the future of the American economy lay in industrial centers, but not all American’s 
sought such a rapid transformation of American life. The Populist movement – a largely 
rural, agriculturally oriented political movement to preserve America’s rural autonomy 
and integrity – sought to slow the change. The Populists talked political economy, but did 
so outside of the academy. Not surprisingly, those who supported the goals of the 
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reformist movement often looked for ideas outside academia and its institutions. The 
divergence between the focus of the Populist movement and the nascent field of 
professional economics foreshadowed the ever-present challenges economists faced in 
translating their economic theories into economic policy. 
 The Populists believed they did not need academic economists, particularly those 
who focused on industrial issues. To be fair, many economists engaged in the sort of 
research that resulted in a better understanding of the economy as a whole. The 
immediate application to the plight of the farmer and rural merchant was unclear, 
however. In instances where the application was apparent, such as the nature of the 
money supply, the professional economist appeared antagonistic toward the farmer’s 
interest. The conservative economists of the old economy exerted a strong influence on 
the national debate over the nature of the money supply and the desirability of the gold 
standard. J. Laurence Laughlin, most notably, campaigned vigorously for “tight” money, 
and as a result higher interest rates harmed perennial borrowers in rural American.   
Furthermore, many economists engaged with the professionalization of 
economics fixed their attention on problems specific to the industrial economy. Whereas 
conservative, orthodox economists’ sympathies appeared to lie with the institutions that 
funded industrial expansion, new economists preoccupied themselves with the 
relationships between industrial labor, consumers, and capital. The farmer, it seemed, was 
of secondary concern. It was not necessarily that professional economists ignored 
agricultural issues. Scholarly publications featured articles that specifically considered 
the farmer’s situation in the American economy, and the AEA made the “Future of the 
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Farmer” the theme of its ninth annual meeting in 1896.107 But the results of such 
discussion were hardly appealing to Populists. The reformers had some obvious allies 
within the AEA and academia in general, such as C.W. Walker of the Massachusetts 
Agricultural College, who warned of peasant-like conditions and encouraged cooperation 
and education to reverse the backslide. Such assessments were weighed against 
comments that may have given populists the impression that the majority of economists 
were antagonistic to their agrarian interests, however. Wisconsin economist William 
Scott disagreed with Walker’s optimism and foresaw the declining fortunes of farmers as 
a natural decline from an unsustainable bonanza. It was an opinion shared by Edwin 
Seligman of Columbia, who argued those who believe American farms could remain 
profitable and independent were living in a “fool’s paradise.”108  
It is easy to see how such opinions could alienate populists who sought sustained 
prosperity for the small farmer in America’s fields. They certainly clashed with those of 
populist icon and champion of the small farmer, Henry George. No stranger to poverty, 
George stood in sharp contrast to those academics whose opinions, terminology, and 
personal lives differed from those hard-pressed by a changing economy. Although 
George had run several newspapers, he was self-educated and unfamiliar with the 
academic world that provided the recently expanded support and structure for the study 
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of economics. Nevertheless, in 1879 George published one of the most popular books on 
economics in U.S. history, Poverty and Progress.109  
 Its success was such that by the late 1890s George was mentioned alongside Karl 
Marx as a paragon of intellectual influence.110 Poverty and Progress spoke directly to the 
farmers and laborers who comprised the Populist movement and many others who were 
sympathetic to anti-elitist rhetoric. The book was the fruit of George’s thinking on the 
dilemma posed by industrialization. There was no doubting that the rapid economic 
transformation had generated massive wealth, George conceded. Industrialization 
ultimately failed to improve economic stability of the common citizen, however. Worse 
still, George argued, industrialization had robbed the average American of independence. 
The problem stemmed from increases in rent, or the amount of money spent on land from 
which goods could be produced. The increased productivity of an industrial economy, 
George reasoned, had raised the value of land. This increase in the cost of land (rent) left 
little for wages and profits.111  
 In addition to articulating what George saw as the problem of the late nineteenth 
century economy, Poverty and Progress also provided a solution. The answer was 
seductively simple - tax land to lower its value. A single-tax on unimproved land, so-
called because the revenues it generated would be enough to meet all of the government’s 
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expenses, would render land-speculation unprofitable. As a result, the value of land held 
by speculators would plummet, thus making land available to small farmers and workers. 
These average citizens could put the land to work, producing goods and services that 
would stimulate economic growth rather than extracting rents from the economy as 
unproductive land speculators had long done. 
 The popularity of his single-tax solution made George a celebrity and highlighted 
the growing distinction between amateur and professional economists. George enjoyed a 
large following among the public, but failed to win a following among those who made 
economics their life’s pursuit. His misfortunate stemmed in part, as historian Robert V. 
Andelson has noted, from the fact that he came to prominence as an intellectual at the 
same time that doing so without first obtaining the requisite degrees was increasingly 
frowned upon by the educated class.112 The discord was exacerbated by George’s avowed 
contempt for academic economists and the merits of their professional process. In 1877, 
prior to the publication of his most famous work, George had been invited to the 
University of California at Berkeley to present on the subject of political economy. 
According to George’s son and biographer, a strong showing likely would have resulted 
in George’s appointment as the University’s first chaired professor in political 
economics.113 However, George spurned the opportunity and denounced academics for 
their loyalty to the capitalist class that paid their salaries. Regardless of whether George 
consciously sabotaged a shot at academia or his son fashioned the tale to highlight his 
father’s attitude toward intellectuals, the lesson remains the same. George maintained a 
difficult relationship with academic economists for the rest of his life. 
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 George’s theory was met with intense and sustained criticism from professional 
economists.114 Yale’s Francis Walker took George to task for a host of errors in several 
venues, including The North American Review and a series of lectures at Harvard 
throughout the 1880s.115 Hadley had similarly criticized George’s plan as simplistic and 
ill-conceived. Arguments regarding the “land monopoly,” Hadley countered, had grossly 
overstated the role of real estate, which led to the false impression that breaking the 
alleged land monopoly through taxation would resolve economic inequality.116 
Arguably the most famous economic thinker of his day never joined the AEA, nor 
its short-lived rival the PEC. George held a deep-seated skepticism of professional 
economists that showed no sign of diminishment at his participation in the 1890 annual 
meeting of the American Academy of Social Sciences, where he again asserted that as 
members of the property-owning class all professors were opposed to reform.117 Rebuttal 
at the meeting came from Seligman, recently returned from Germany and at the 
beginning stages of his long career as a top tax economist. Seligman’s response laid the 
matter bare: “…the reason why college professors are not counted among his followers is 
not because they are afraid of consequences, but because they utterly repudiate the 
adequacy of his solution.”118 It was the first in a long line of devastating critiques 
Seligman levied against George and his theory over the course of his career.119 Poverty 
and Progress – in particular its promotion of the single-tax as a panacea to the problems 
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caused by the modern economy - failed to meet the developing standards of professional 
economists.  
 What was hailed by “Georgists” as the brilliance of George’s policy 
recommendation, in particular its simplicity and easy-to-follow logic, was criticized in 
academia as ill-conceived. Seligman elaborated on his dislike for the single-tax plan at an 
AEA conference three years later during a discussion of taxation and the farmer, where 
he argued the theory “fail[ed] of equality and uniformity.”120 George’s single-tax may 
have addressed those who amassed fortunes through real estate speculation, but would 
likely fail to appease the populists who similarly lamented fortunes made elsewhere, 
Seligman noted. In his discussion of public versus private ownership, Joseph Lee, in an 
article published by the Quarterly Journal of Economics, dug deeper for his criticism and 
attacked George’s inconsistent stance on natural rights.121   
 Whatever their response to the single-tax plan, professional economists could do 
little to persuade George and his supporters of its shortcomings. The former newspaper 
editor’s commercial success, as well as the popularity of the actions he proposed, was a 
formidable match for the expertise carved out by professional economists in those last 
decades of the century. The frustration expressed by J. Laurence Laughlin in the first 
issue of his department’s economic journal captured the situation well:  
 
Certain it is that expositions by men of high abilities and scholarship have had 
little or no influence on thinking in general. No one in the United States should 
indulge the hope of attempting to reach the great masses of men, or of such 
classes as the working-men, through the usual channels of economic writing. 
Scientific ideas can be disseminated through books and magazines only to a 
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limited circle of intelligent readers. The great working classes can be reached only 
by the literature which comes from within their own ranks.122 
 
 Moving forward, the burden was on professional economists to establish an 
influential place in American society. George was not the only prominent folk economist 
capable of challenging the nascent discipline, as explained through the analysis of 
economic policy histories in subsequent chapters. Professional economists’ social role, 
newly defined and invigorated through strong institutional support in American colleges, 
left them poised before a skeptical yet eager public audience desperate for solutions to 
several pressing “questions.” Additionally, the AEA may have begun to integrate “old” 
and “new” economists into a single professional organization, but it had done little to 
brook arguments over methodology and policy proposals. Nevertheless, the commitment 
of colleges and universities to the advanced study of economics assured progress in the 
comprehension of the economic challenges that accompanied industrialization. 
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The Money Question 
 
 
America’s recently organized professional economists got their first significant 
opportunity to translate their theories into practice during the struggle over monetary 
reform in the 1890s. It was a contentious issue with roots that stretched back several 
decades. In what would become a common struggle for the discipline, professional 
economists fought to simultaneously redefine the study of monetary policy and advise the 
public of viable options for economic reform. The experience highlighted the 
shortcomings of “expertise” and foreshadowed the ambiguous role economists would 
play in debates about American political economy. Professional economists’ status as 
professors at prestigious schools imbued them with a degree of social prestige, but as 
they attempted to advise the public and lawmakers it became clear that their role in the 
policymaking process was anything but certain. Forced to accept a role as passive 
advisors, the discipline’s leading experts largely observed as the political process guided 
the nation toward a strict gold standard that they had warned would prove untenable; a 
prediction made true by the panic of 1907. More broadly, economists’ role in resolving 
the money question serves as the first of several examples that illustrate the struggle to 
wed economic expertise to economic policy in the early twentieth century.  
  
If ever there was an issue that seemingly required the calculating expertise of a 
professional economist, it was the money question. On the surface, the “problem” seemed 
rather straightforward – what sort of monetary standard should the nation adopt in order 
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to assure the appropriate level of growth and stability? The problem was not a simple 
matter of quantitative analysis, however. Indeed, until the late nineteenth century, very 
few Americans, economist or otherwise, conceived of the money issue in purely scientific 
terms.  
For many, the money issue was as much a matter of morals and politics as it was 
statistics. As Cornell economist E. Benjamin Andrews illustrated in an 1889 survey of the 
issue, public discourse regarding the monetary supply often included reference to the 
“sacred moral rights” that accompanied ownership of money.123 Debate did not revolve 
around what level of inflation was appropriate for a developing industrial economy. It 
revolved around the moral obligation of the state to protect and preserve private property. 
The United States was, after all, a nation deeply committed to the values that inspired its 
revolutionary birth, including political philosophies that emphasized the sanctity of 
private property. 
 Andrews and a growing number of economists, including the bulk of those who 
studied abroad and embraced the “new economics,” increasingly rejected this view of 
money question. The money issue had less to do with property rights, Andrews and his 
ilk argued, and more to do with the changing nature of the U.S. economy. As an avowed 
bimetallist, Andrews argued that price fluctuations were an inescapable reality regardless 
of the monetary standard. Gold mines dried up, economic activity expanded, and the 
value of currency adjusted regardless of the established monetary standard.  
The key to addressing the money question therefore lie in acknowledging the 
changing dynamics of the U.S. economy. As Andrews noted, the very nature of economic 
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exchange in the U.S. had undergone a tremendous transformation, the net effect of which 
was to increase the demand for circulating currency.124 Specialization had disbursed the 
production process, increasing the number of accounts that producers had to maintain – 
as well as demand for coin in lieu of credit. Similarly, industrialization continued to 
supplant the barter system through which so many transactions had once been conducted, 
further increasing the demand for coin where credit had previously sufficed. Gold bugs 
and like-minded conservative money men were not wrong to demand a “steady” dollar, 
Andrews concluded, but the realities of modern economy meant that steady value 
depended on careful government regulation.125 Andrews’ overview of the money 
problem, published by the AEA’s then infantile monograph series, concluded with a 
noticeably vague plan of action that was characteristic of most work published in the 
organization’s early years.  
Andrews’ paper appeared to sum-up early AEA members’ sentiments, loose 
though they were. The AEA’s commitment to growing a diverse membership barred the 
possibility of an explicit policy position, but the articles and addresses published by the 
organization clearly demonstrated general support for some degree of monetary reform. 
Harvard economist Frank Taussig’s “The Silver Situation in the United States,” an 
exhaustive review of the nation’s tentative move toward bimetallism, echoed Andrews’ 
sentiments and encouraged the federal government’s further manipulation of the money 
supply. Taussig’s conclusions turned the conservative money men’s arguments against 
bimetallism on their head, concluding that “The expansion of the silver currency has 
followed, and not preceded, the rise in prices, the speculative activity, and the other 
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phenomena which are associated with an increase in the supply of money.”126 While the 
conclusion led Taussig to support the coinage of silver, he fell short of recommending the 
unrestricted or “free” coinage of the metal. Instead, he promoted active management of 
the money supply by freeing the Treasury from “mechanical limitation” while allowing it 
to monitor the nation’s money supply and inject currency into the economy when 
necessary.127 It was precisely the type of recommendation one might expect from an 
expert, as it required specialized knowledge, objective analysis, and an eye for detail.  
Relegating questions of morality to the background of the debate in favor of a 
consideration of technical details was no small task, however. The money question had 
featured in American politics in one form or another since the Declaration of 
Independence, and by 1890 its long legacy of sectional conflict evoked powerful 
emotions in the public. The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864, passed during the 
Civil War to finance the Northern war effort, firmly established the federal government’s 
authority over the nation’s banking system. Although no one seriously challenged the 
federal government’s authority to regulate the circulation of currency following the Civil 
War, many did question the execution of such authority.  
Much disagreement revolved around the volume of currency in circulation. 
“Loose” money advocates, who were predominantly farmers, laborers, and those in 
Western states where large silver deposits had recently been discovered, encouraged the 
federal government to print currency backed by both gold and silver deposits. Advocates 
of this policy argued that allowing the printing of silver-backed bank notes in conjunction 
with the printing of gold-backed bank notes would increase the nation’s money supply 
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and ease the burden on debtors attempting to find the currency necessary to satisfy their 
creditors. Loose-money advocates viewed the tightening of the money supply as 
despotism and the antithesis of democracy. 
Creditors and non-debtors, who largely came from the ranks of finance and 
industry, encouraged a “tight” money supply. They argued that a bi-metallic system 
would increase inflation, which would in turn discourage savings, devalue the currency, 
and destabilize the economy. Large manufacturers and those engaged with foreign trade 
were particularly concerned. High inflation might drive consumption, but it might also 
lead to unpredictable credit markets and disrupt foreign exchange at a time when 
manufacturers were spending vast sums of money on large manufacturing facilities.128 
Tight money policy, in other words, would preserve the real value of profits that derived 
from loans and encourage future saving and lending.  
A series of back-and-forth policies had stoked controversy in the decades 
following the Civil War. The 1873 Coinage Act, later referred to by free silver advocates 
as “The Crime of the Century” because it was passed with little public debate, effectively 
shrank the money supply through the demonetization of silver. In 1878, Congress 
authorized an international conference to discuss among representatives of the world’s 
leading economies the relationship between silver and gold.129 Despite considerable 
enthusiasm from the American delegation, the conference ended with little to show for 
the effort, much less a consensus broad enough to resolve the issue.  
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The 1879 Bland-Allison and 1890 Sherman Silver Purchase Acts both required 
the Treasury to resume purchasing and circulating silver-backed currency in set amounts. 
Both acts stopped short of allowing the unlimited coinage of silver that many bimetallists 
sought, but they still upset tight money advocates who wanted the U.S. treasury to 
maintain a strict gold standard.130 The Sherman Silver Purchase Act in particular 
intensified debate, as the partial coinage of silver seemingly situated the nation in 
between two possible monetary systems. Resting in between a strict gold standard and a 
bimetallic system lent ammunition to both sides of the debate – gold bugs blamed the 
creep of silver as the source of economic woe, while bimetallists claimed that the limited 
purchase of silver held back an economy starving for more currency. In 1893, investors 
challenged the viability of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and began to exchange 
dollars issued through the purchase of silver for gold bullion.  The Treasury, obligated to 
redeem the notes in either silver or gold at the request of the holder, struggled to maintain 
its gold reserves. This, combined with a financial panic caused by the overbuilding of the 
nation’s railroad system, created one of the worse depressions in U.S. history.131 
Despite its coherency and well-articulated foresight, Andrews and Taussig’s 
vision of managed bimetallism failed to gain traction. With the economy in freefall and 
the nation’s gold reserves rapidly evaporating, President Cleveland had little choice but 
to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and call on powerful investment banker J.P. 
Morgan to restore confidence in the markets.132 The incident seemingly settled the matter: 
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increased coinage of silver had produced financial instability. But bimetallists read events 
quite differently, asserting that repeal of the Silver Purchase Act was what had panicked 
investors.133 Given the intensity of the debate, building the social prestige necessary to 
offer definitive conclusions must have at times struck professional economists as an 
impossible task.  
For their part, populist advocates for the free coinage of silver had little trouble 
attracting attention in the early 1890s. Throughout the 1890s, voters – not only in Central 
and Western mining states, but also those in the South and East – rallied around the push 
for free silver despite a notable lack of support from professional economists.134 The free 
silver movement pushed on, undeterred by the lack of professional support. The conflict 
that ensued between the populist movement’s intellectuals and the professional 
economics community reveals how the power of publicity and showmanship subverted 
expertise in the fight over monetary policy. 
 
 
Justifying Free Silver 
 
 
Had the free silver movement gathered significant momentum just 20 years earlier 
it would have found a powerful champion among the ranks of American political 
economists – those “outdated” intellectuals who preceded the emergence of the new 
economist. Henry C. Carey, one of more notable among Lincoln’s economic advisors, 
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had directly addressed the money question.135 In his 1868 book The Finance Minister and 
the Currency, Carey railed against the “financial despotism” of post-Civil War American 
financial system.136 Carey’s criticism derived from his conclusion that, contrary to 
Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch’s assertions, the nation’s money supply was 
dangerously low. An over-reliance on credit in the absence of circulating currency, Carey 
explained, raised interest rates and depressed prices outside of the nation’s financial 
centers in the Northeast and Chicago.  
As it was, Carey’s voice was virtually silent by the 1890s. His death in 1879 
meant that one of the leading American political economists had no hand in the formation 
of the nation’s leading economic associations and was unable to articulate his arguments 
through the letter and journal networks that increasingly defined “expert” economic 
thought. Intellectual justifications for free silver instead derived from a combination of 
politicians and self-taught folk economists who peddled their expertise through 
pamphlets and rousing speeches. Free silver intellectuals did employ pseudo-scientific 
methodologies but tended to rely on narrative tropes that contained the moralistic 
arguments their audience found easily accessible and appealing.  The suggestion that 
there was a conspiracy among the nation’s elites to subvert democracy in the U.S. and 
rule the nation through oligarchic despotism was commonplace. Equally common were 
related rumors of a vaguely defined international cabal’s plan to control the nation’s 
money supply so as to consolidate economic control.  
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 Such arguments were perpetuated by highly respected politicians within the 
mainstream of American politics, most notably William Jennings Bryan – the famed 
lawyer and orator who challenged McKinley for the White House in the dramatic 
Presidential election of 1896. Bryan secured his candidacy with the well-known “Cross 
of Gold” speech in which he compared the economic suffering of Americans to the 
suffering of Jesus on the cross.137 Senators Henry M. Teller (R-CO) and John H. Mitchell 
(R-OR), who broke with their party to protest Republicans’ commitment to the gold 
standard, offered less-widely-known but equally public proclamations.138 In an 1890 
speech, delivered on the Senate floor, Mitchell decried the monetary situation and argued 
that it was clearly a case of one class (the rich) holding down another (the poor) through 
what was likely conspiratorial means.139 Teller voiced similar suspicions throughout the 
1890s, and was unafraid to offer more direct accusations. During the push to repeal the 
Sherman Silver Purchase Act in response to the panic of 1893, Teller pointed his finger 
directly at President Cleveland and at alleged backroom machinations with Wall Street to 
ensure the future of the gold standard.140 Both the Senators and populists were correct, of 
course, in their suspicions of Wall Street’s influence on Congress, but to argue that the 
influence was total and benefitted only Wall Street was an exaggeration that ignored the 
economic exigencies of the time.141 
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 The build-up and maintenance of popular support for the free and unlimited 
coinage of silver required a more clearly articulated vision than could be credibly and 
effectively espoused in such fiery speeches. The speeches, lobbying, and accusations of 
politicians such as Bryan, Teller, and Mitchell were vitally important to the free silver 
movement, but their authority stemmed from popular appeal and their actions only 
carried weight as long as a significant fraction of the voting public rallied behind their 
cause. Expertise was necessary to counter professional economists’ criticisms with 
equally compelling evidence that demonstrated the benefits of free silver policy. Populist 
supporters of free silver likely found opinions in a variety of places – local newspapers, 
public meetings, bars, and similar venues in which late nineteenth century men and 
women openly discussed politics and ideas. These informal gatherings were informed by 
a cottage industry of pamphleteers, newspaper serialists, and amateur book authors that 
sprang up to meet the demand for expert analysis that fed free silverites’ predispositions.  
 The popularity of such works was staggering. George Henry Shibley’s self-
financed The Money Question enjoyed multiple printings and was widely circulated 
among populist voters.142 Shibley was trained as a lawyer but self-taught in the ways of 
money and finance. A bit unwieldy at 723 pages, The Money Question nevertheless 
attracted readers through its easy-to-follow logic and straightforward argument about the 
benefits of the free coinage of silver. Ten Men of Money Island, a more manageable 142-
page treatise written by lawyer and journalist S.F. Norton, was distributed as a pamphlet 
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and serialized in the New York World prior to publication in 1891.143 The book’s 
publisher claimed to have distributed more than 500,000 copies of the promotional 
pamphlet prior to the book’s publication, with still more copies to be translated into 
German, Norwegian, Swedish, French, Bohemian, and Hebrew.144  
William Hope Harvey’s Coin’s Financial School and A Tale of Two Nations were 
even more popular and influential. First published in 1893, both volumes enjoyed enough 
success to ensure multiple printings and to earn its author the nickname “Coin” Harvey. 
Exact figures are elusive, but the Atlanta Constitution placed sales at well over 500,000 
copies, with widespread distribution on both sides of the Mississippi River by 1895. That 
figure likely was surpassed considering that the free silver issue did not peak in relevance 
until after the 1896 presidential election.145 The National Silver party alone sent out an 
additional 125,000 copies in 1896.146 These sales figures presumably included the 
German, Scandinavian, and Bohemian translations of Coin’s Financial School, the 
existence of which offer further testimony to the book’s heavy circulation. As the Atlanta 
Constitution’s review of Harvey’s work noted, Coin’s Financial School’s popularity 
appears to have exceeded that of an earlier best seller that had proven influential in 
American politics – Uncle Tom’s Cabin.147  
 To many Americans, self-taught men such as Shibley and Harvey, rather than 
professionally trained economists, were primary sources of information and authority 
regarding economic policy. The passion and urgency with which advocates like them 
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wrote resonated with the discontent that was integral to the populist movement. Harvey’s 
dedication in Coin’s Financial School illustrates the drama: “To those trying to locate the 
seat of the disease that threatens the life of the nation…”148 Harvey offered a similarly 
dire warning in A Tale of Two Nations, also self-published in 1894.149 Whereas Coin’s 
Financial School used a fictitious lecture hall as the setting for a discussion of monetary 
issues, Nations conveyed a similar pro-free silver message through a fictional story that 
was part romance and part international thriller. Harvey’s second book ended with the 
dire prediction of Western civilization’s collapse at the hands of a British conspiracy – 
barring a shift in monetary policy, of course. Harvey’s antagonist, Victor Rognasner, 
delivers a climactic analysis and declares “Money is the protoplasm of society. Without 
it, civilization is impossible, crime increases, and barbarism is the result.”150 Clearly, 
Harvey possessed a flair for the dramatic.151 
Both Coin’s Financial School and The Money Question contained the sort of 
conspiratorial accusations that were impossible to deny, and therefore an insurmountable 
defense against professional economists’ criticisms. Harvey used allegory to suggest that 
London financiers covertly demonetized silver in 1873 to increase profits from the 
repayment of Civil War debt. Shibley matter-of-factly asserted that an international cabal 
of 600 firms controlled $830,000,000 and actively fought to control the world’s money 
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supply.152 He further stated that the combined strength of the London and New York 
houses of the Rothschilds and Morgans was sufficient enough to overrun American 
interests.153   
President Cleveland’s infamous open “silver letter” of 1895, in which he drew 
“the line of battle” and confronted the growing free silver movement head-on, seemingly 
resolved any lingering doubts about the power of the gold lobby.154 For Chicago 
Bimetallic League secretary George E. Bowen, the letter plainly revealed Cleveland’s 
“harmony” with the nation’s bankers.155 The Toledo-based Commercial editorial staff 
was similarly unsurprised by the declaration, considering Cleveland’s allegedly well-
known association with gold bugs.156 The militaristic language with which Cleveland 
declared his stance on the money question no doubt fed free silverites’ deepest suspicions 
and concerns. With such a powerful policy foe established, amateur economists who 
promoted free silver policies and their audience could effectively challenge contradictory 
evidence and arguments as the product of a massive conspiracy.  
The free silver movement found a degree of professional support abroad, but the 
European free silver movement’s influence in the U.S. was largely limited to a handful of 
newspaper articles. American academic journals were equally silent. Curiously, language 
barriers appear to have played a significant role in limiting the efficacy of a transnational 
silver movement around the same time American graduate students were importing 
European economics on their return from study abroad. American newspaper and 
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publishing houses were void of commentary from or reviews of Europe’s top free silver 
advocates like Baron von Kardoff (Germany), Albert Schäffle, Henri Cernuschi (France), 
and Émile Louis Victor de Laveleye (Belgium).157 Their books and treatises similarly 
failed to cross the Atlantic. It was from the minds of amateur economists, therefore, that 
the free movement derived its intellectual backing. 
Free silverites perceived that the grassroots nature of the movement legitimized 
their arguments in a manner that was fundamentally different from that of the gold 
standard lobby. Whereas the gold standard lobby derived considerable support, both 
logistically and ideologically, from financiers and their “bought” economists, the free 
silver movement’s support emanated from a folkish wisdom and sense of justice. In an 
1895 public debate with New York Weekly Tribune editor Roswell G. Horr, “Coin” 
Harvey went to great lengths to downplay the support of silver miners to the applause of 
the audience.158 Such strenuous denials were commonplace and found in pro-silver 
editorials throughout the country.  
Herein lays a peculiar aspect of the free silver movement: populists maintained 
that free silver advocates’ expertise stemmed from a dual font of intense introspection 
and intellectual independence. This produced a paradox – free silverites would benefit 
from the unlimited coinage of silver, but self-interest was not perceived to be a strong 
motivation free silver intellectuals. Objectivity, or at least the illusion of objectivity, was 
therefore crucial in not only the struggle over monetary policy, but also the legitimacy of 
economic expertise. 
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Of course, the free silver movement did enjoy support from the business 
community, particularly in the Central and Western states. Local organizations of 
businessmen supported the movement through the publication and promotion of 
pamphlets, books, and speeches similar to those produced by men like Harvey and 
Shibley. These organizations gradually expanded from local to national in scope. In 1895, 
three national bimetallic organizations merged into one, forming the American Bimetallic 
Union (ABU) with offices in Chicago, Washington D.C., and San Francisco.159 The 
ABU’s tremendous success played a substantial role in the Democratic Party’s adoption 
of free silver in the 1896 election. 
The free silver movement’s aversion to what could be described as “mainstream” 
analysis of the money question appears to have stemmed from this deep-seated mistrust 
of anyone or any group that challenged the conclusions of free silver intellectuals. 
Newspapers throughout the 1890s occasionally made reference to the “many economists” 
who supported the free silver movement, but there were very few professionally trained 
economists willing to promote the unlimited coinage of silver – Edward Ross being the 
exception that proves the rule. Ross was still employed by Leland Stanford University 
when he publicly agitated for free silver in the mid- to late-1890s. As biographer Sean H. 
McMahon notes, Ross’ whole-hearted support of the free silver movement first alerted 
the administration to his fondness for agitation.160  
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Lacking professional economists of national repute, “Silver clubs” and bi-metallic 
rallies occasionally drew upon local economists to provide keynote addresses, but the list 
of speakers was less than impressive. The Young Men’s Silver Club of St. Louis had to 
settle for an address by Col. A. Ollei, an economist whose professional career failed to 
register far beyond the confines of Litchfield College in Southern Illinois.161 Still, it was 
arguably more impressive than the overwhelming majority of silver club meetings that 
turned to the self-taught for expert testimony.  
Such was the force against which professional economists worked to satisfactorily 
resolve the money issue. The ideas and policy recommendations of university-employed 
economists were dismissed as controlled by the moneyed interests and therefore 
unreliable due to bias.162 Agitation from well-known industrialists like Andrew Carnegie, 
J.P. Morgan, and J.D. Rockefeller, all of whom had a strong interest in price stability, 
seemingly served as additional evidence of the collusion between academic economists 
and their wealthy benefactors.163 Newspapers that carried editorial arguments against free 
silver and published the opinions of non-sympathetic economists were also dismissed as 
biased.164 Free silverites had their own experts and aligned themselves against the 
expertise of professional economists, which they felt lacked credibility. 
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Economists Have Their Say 
 
 
As evidenced by Henry George and his single-tax proposal, professional 
economists did not explicitly conspire to exclude particular groups or ideas in the early 
years of the professionalization process. Despite populist allegations of backroom 
scheming, the lack of free silver advocates among professionally-trained economists was 
in reality the result of rapid changes in the study of economics. By the 1890s, 
professionally trained economists had established a peer review process that quickly 
expanded the chasm between layman and expert. A variety of academic journals and 
bulletins, described in chapter one, had begun to insulate the two worlds. Both lay and 
professional economists pursued the same goal – accurate analysis of economic problems 
with an eye toward offering productive solutions. But while professionally trained 
economists increasingly offered their work to the peer review process in an attempt to 
validate research, lay economists rushed ahead and released their work. The results 
tended to expose a dogmatism that, although certainly not unknown to the professional 
community, seemed to characterize the work of the amateur. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the exposés and grand explanations offered by 
lay economists frequently withered in the face of serious criticism. Such was the case 
with Coin’s Financial School, a revised edition of which had continued to find a large 
audience when Wesleyan economist Willard Fisher reviewed the work in The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics.165 Impressive sales figures aside, the review concluded that the 
book was an intellectual failure. Fisher was not entirely hostile, although he delivered his 
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greatest compliment with the back-handed observation that “This work is just about what 
ought to be expected from an untrained thinker of considerably more than average 
ability.”166  
 Fisher’s criticism of Coin’s Financial School stemmed not only from the 
numerous statistical errors (“in most cases these inaccuracies are due either to 
carelessness or to simple inability to select the proper data”) but also the calculated 
distortion of facts that were central to Harvey’s argument about the wisdom in freely 
minting silver.167 Harvey’s claim that the world’s silver supply was diminishing struck 
Fisher as particularly dogmatic and unsubstantiated.168 Similarly, the body of statistical 
knowledge of the U.S. and world economy in the 1890s was such that Harvey’s claims 
regarding silver’s knock-on effects could only be described as wild guesses, at best.169  
 The gap between amateur and professional was most clearly illustrated by 
Harvey’s terminology and theory. As Fisher noted, poor word selection marred Harvey’s 
conclusions in key passages. By conflating the terms value and price, for example, 
Harvey suggested that inflation increased value across the board.170 The populist icon’s 
fixation with the physical properties of gold bemused Fisher, as did his poor 
understanding of fractional reserve banking.171 In sum, one of the free silver movement’s 
leading experts failed the peer review process. The verdict was striking coming from 
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Fisher, a self-described “cautious radical” who was by no means averse to adopting 
policies designed to help the worker at the expense of Wall Street.172      
 The review, although not as widely circulated as Coin’s Financial School itself, 
could not have helped close the gap between free silverites and the professional 
economics community. Nor did University of Chicago economist J. Laurence Laughlin’s 
campaign to discredit the free silver movement. Although his “attacks” were certainly 
less caustic than those found in titles like Farmer Hayseed in Town or The Closing Days 
of Coin’s Financial School and Coin’s Financial Fraud, Laughlin nevertheless fueled the 
free silverites’ animosity toward professional economists through a public campaign 
against free silver.173 Like most of his peers, Laughlin opposed free silver, although 
unlike most professional economists he wholly embraced a monometallic gold standard. 
He had first articulated his stance while an assistant professor at Harvard, and maintained 
the position after his move to Chicago in 1892.174 Such was his zeal for a strict gold 
standard that many of his fellow economists felt Laughlin’s refutation of the quantity 
theory of money represented a fine example of a scholar fashioning facts to fit a 
conclusion.175 As the debate over money intensified Laughlin became more vocal, and 
was soon in direct conflict with not just his colleagues, but the populist movement as 
well. 
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  Laughlin had earned a reputation for being tolerant of dissenting opinions, 
although he remained outside the AEA throughout the 1890s in defiance of the 
Association’s commitment to government intervention. But he was also known for the 
conviction with which he promoted his most cherished ideals and policy 
recommendations. According to one of his former students, Laughlin “could not forbear 
‘taking sides’ and strongly supporting the ‘side’ to which he had given his conviction.”176 
The conservative co-founder of the Political Economy Club clearly felt a bimetallic 
system, to say nothing of free silver, was untenable. As such, he chose his side and 
pursued the issue intently by engaged in a public campaign to discredit Harvey’s work. 
 Laughlin’s crusade gathered considerable steam in early 1895, starting with an 
article in The Forum that was likely his most hostile treatment of the free silverites. 
Unlike most of Laughlin’s earlier work, “’Coin’s’ Food for the Gullible,” targeted a lay 
audience. In addition to declaring Coin’s Financial School “untrustworthy” and 
“childish,” Laughlin characterized Harvey as a charlatan and opportunist.177 Furthermore, 
he argued that Harvey’s populist audience, to use Laughlin’s analogy, was the ignorant 
soil in which Harvey planted his fallacies. 
 A public debate with Harvey himself, arranged by the Illinois Club, followed just 
one month later. The debate was carefully orchestrated. After some haggling, both 
participants agreed to the debate’s single question: “Is free coinage of silver at the ration 
of 16:1 by the United States, independently of other countries, desirable?”178 Harvey and 
Laughlin each was allowed one hour in which to make his case, including a 15 minute 
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rejoinder. Personal criticisms were expressly forbidden.179 Accounts of the debate, which 
ran in newspapers from New York to Los Angeles, noted the charged atmosphere that 
prevailed throughout the contest. True to form, Harvey suggested an international 
conspiracy to manipulate the currency that involved President Cleveland and the 
Rothschilds, while Laughlin attacked Harvey’s argument as rife with factual inaccuracies. 
Both men received strong support from the enthusiastic audience, although as an editorial 
from the Chicago Tribune noted, it was unlikely anyone changed their opinion as a result 
of the spirited contest.180  
 Laughlin later leveraged his public attack on Harvey with the publication of Facts 
about Money.181 The lengthy volume, written for a lay audience, included a transcript of 
the May debate. In terms of original research, Facts about Money was unimpressive. 
Ironically, it garnered criticism from Fisher in the same article that picked apart Coin’s 
Financial School.182 Despite its deficiencies, as a piece of popular literature, Facts about 
Money successfully pressed Laughlin’s attack on free silver and provided sound money 
advocates with a valuable arrow for their quiver.183  The laymen-oriented volume was 
soon followed by a reprinting of the more scholarly The History of Bimetallism.184  
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 As the 1890s progressed, it became increasingly clear that the money question 
had to be answered. The 1873 Bland-Allison and 1890 Sherman Silver Purchase Acts had 
proven themselves stop-gap compromises at best. The push for a legislative resolution to 
the money question reached a crescendo in the waning years of the nineteenth century, 
and professional economists increased their efforts to provide guidance and sound policy. 
It was clear that professional economists rejected free silver as a legitimate policy option, 
but the discipline was split regarding the remaining options – a monometallic gold 
standard or a bi-metallic standard. The two camps, crudely drawn, consisted of those 
AEA members who long supported bimetallism and their more conservative counterparts 
who remained at arm’s length from the AEA and promoted a strict gold standard. 
Andrews, the above-mentioned President of Brown University, and Francis A. 
Walker, President of MIT, had spoken on the issue throughout their respective careers 
and come to represent the bi-metallic movement among professional economists. Both 
endorsed a controlled move toward a bimetallic money supply and cautioned against the 
adoption of free silver. As noted above, a year before the free silver movement noticeably 
intensified, Andrews’ 1889 An Honest Dollar had inveighed in favor of a controlled 
transition to a bi-metallic system, provided it was done in conjunction with foreign 
nations to ensure the switch was sustainable. He remained in-tune with the ongoing 
debate, as evidenced by his support of the Bimetallist Committee of Boston and New 
England. Not to be confused with the numerous free silver advocacy organizations that 
often placed “bimetallic” in their name, the Bimetallist Committee of Boston and New 
England only supported the coinage of silver provided it was regulated in accordance 
with yet-to-be established international standards. The specifics of such an international 
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agreement, as Andrews reported in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, were vague at 
best.185 Despite decades of agitation, layman, politician, businessman, and economist 
alike were unclear about how to return to silver without allowing free coinage. 
Walker, another expert voice in the silver debate, had also denounced the 1873 
demonetization of silver as an enormous blunder that threatened the national economy, 
and he similarly called for a move toward a bi-metallic monetary system.186 For years he 
had elaborated on his concerns about the insufficient circulation of currency and doubts 
about the ability of credit to replace currency – most recently in papers directed toward 
an academic audience following the 1893 financial panic and repeal of the Sherman 
Purchase Act.187 In 1896, Walker published a series of lectures on the money question 
through Henry Holt Publishers, who no doubt hoped to cash in on one of the hottest 
talking points of the impending Presidential election.188 The book, titled International 
Bimetallism, presumably secured a larger audience than Walker’s academic journal 
articles that had circulated in the low thousands (at best), although estimates are not 
forthcoming.189 The more widely circulated book was nothing new to those familiar with 
Walker’s earlier writings on the subject. Once more, he encouraged the remonetization of 
silver, but cautioned against free coinage. Indeed, he even quoted an emphatic line from 
his 1878 Money, Trade, and Industry: “For us to throw ourselves alone into the breach, 
simply because we think silver ought not to have been demonetized, and ought now to be 
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restored, would be a piece of Quixotism unworthy the sound practical sense of our 
people.”190 
The book was followed by a series of articles in which Walker reiterated his 
stance on the money issue. Shortly after the release of International Bimetallism, Walker 
traveled to England to take part in a meeting of The Bimetallic League of Great Britain. 
The trip, as well as Walker’s comments denouncing free silver and promoting 
bimetallism, was reported on the front page of the San Francisco Chronicle and the 
Detroit Free Press in July of 1896.191 The trip was also less prominently reported by the 
New York Tribune and Chicago Tribune, among others.192     
 Both Andrews and Walker, therefore, were key figures in the public debate over 
the money question. There seems to have been a genuine opportunity for these 
professional economists to leverage their expertise into influence during 1896 
Presidential election, and in doing so, tip the debate in favor of a bimetallic standard. But 
two forces conspired to diminish their influence on the eve of the election. 
 First, the press and free silverites misled the public about the two economists’ 
conclusions. To be fair, this may in part have been the result of genuine confusion. As 
Logan C. McPherson, author of yet another opinion on the money question, noted, by 
1896 the term “bimetallism” had been given so many different meanings that its use 
meant nothing without further explanation.193 Andrews certainly became aware of the 
potential confusion when the Brown Board of Trustees removed him from his post as 
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president following false allegations that he was a free silver advocate. The sensational 
claim that Andrews’ teachings were “out of harmony” with the vast majority of opinions 
at Brown University and the state of Rhode Island in general betrayed the ill-formed 
political nature of the attack.194 Andrews certainly showed greater willingness to accept 
the coinage of silver than many of his colleagues; but he never supported free silver 
outright, as a quick consultation of either his written work or a discussion with one 
Brown’s other economic professors would have confirmed.195  
McPherson’s observation about the ambiguity of “bimetallism” was further 
bolstered by Walker’s experience with the press. On October 8
th
, not long after his return 
from England, Walker’s reputation was invoked in support of free silver at a rally in 
Malden, Massachusetts. The event, according to a Boston Daily reporter who covered the 
story, attracted a capacity crowd of 900 who heard the “free silvery eloquence” of George 
Fred Williams as he mentioned Walker’s support in the struggle for free silver.196  
 The event was an example of the ambiguity of the bimetallist position. By arguing 
for bimetallism, but declining to elaborate on the mechanisms of how such a system 
might be implemented (either by the immediate and unrestricted free coinage of silver or 
otherwise), activists and candidates could effectively hedge their bets. Democratic 
nominee Bryan appeared to do just that on the campaign trail, according to an editorial in 
the San Francisco Chronicle.197 By voicing his support for bimetallism, but avoiding an 
in-depth discussion of the issue, the presidential hopeful likely sought to avoid directly 
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challenging the position of professional economists who endorsed a particular brand of 
bimetallism. 
 By the end of October 1896, Walker apparently had had enough. The by-then oft-
referenced economist refused to allow reporters to hear his views on currency as he 
addressed the Twentieth Century club – unless they agreed not to publish an account. As 
a reporter for the Boston Daily Globe (ironically) reported, “It looked as if Gen. Walker 
intended that whatever he should say would not be used as ammunition in the present 
campaign by the orators of either of the political parties….”198 A later observer noted the 
liberal use of Walker’s ideas in his obituary, noting, “He [Walker] found himself…placed 
in an embarrassing position. Some of his views on bimetallism were published as 
campaign literature by the Populists and free silver Democrats, while other of his views 
were used in the cause of sound money.”199    
 Despite some confusion over professional economists’ exact policy stance on the 
eve of the 1896 election (willful or otherwise), the growing discipline effectively 
undercut the free silver movement’s theoretical underpinnings. Professional economists, 
with the notable exception of Laughlin, generally stood outside either reform movement’s 
propaganda machine, but only the free silver movement attracted significant criticism 
from the ostensibly objective academics. Professional economists’ criticisms of the free 
silver movement likely had little effect on the devout, thanks to their belief that such 
experts were in the pockets of eastern bankers, but such uniform opposition to free 
coinage of silver surely had an effect on the undecided in the months leading up to the 
1896 Presidential election. The journal articles, books, public lectures, and newspaper 
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summaries of the professional economists who urged monetary reform rather than 




Moving on Reform 
 
 
 In November 1896, the money issue took an important turn. Presidential 
campaigning ended and McKinley emerged victorious. The forces of populism, which 
included the agrarian and the laborer, confronted the forces of industrial capitalism and 
lost. On a less dramatic but no less important level, the conclusion of the Presidential race 
also enabled movement on the money question. The electorate had spoken and free silver 
was off the table. The degree to which professional economists were responsible for the 
outcome of the election is difficult to determine. The combination of Laughlin’s public 
feud with “Coin” Harvey as well as less theatrical commentary from the likes of Andrews 
and Walker, despite much confusion, made clear to those willing to read closely that 
professional economists rejected free silver. However, as subsequent events indicate, 
while professional economists may have exerted some influence on the outcome of the 
vote, their influence was contingent and they ultimately accounted for little in the 
legislative process.  
The key question moving forward was the issue of gold monometallism. Although 
free silver was off the table a strict gold standard was far from certain. Immediately 
following his election, McKinley signaled his intent to settle the issue as soon as possible 
by dispatching Walker and bimetallist Colorado Senator Edward O. Walcott to Europe 
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once again to feel out the British regarding a return to international bimetallism.200 
Walker’s unexpected death less than a week after the trip’s announcement left Wolcott as 
the sole representative. The trip, like the 1878 conference, confirmed the difficulty of 
establishing an international agreement to mint both silver and gold. The lone Wolcott 
returned empty handed, and it is unlikely Walker’s presence would have made much of a 
difference. 
Movement on the issue eventually was instigated by the Indianapolis Monetary 
Convention (IMC) – one of several private monetary reform organizations that had 
succeeded in attracting the people and resources necessary to make something happen. 
Several historians have described the IMC as either a minor stepping stone to meaningful 
reform or as evidence of a conspiratorial power grab.201 James Livingston’s assertion that 
the IMC should be considered part of a larger process “in which a corporate business elite 
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began to work out a world view and a program appropriate to its control over and 
leadership of an emergent modern-industrial civilization” is closer to the mark.202 But 
such a view obscures the role of the professional economics community. There is no 
doubt that professional economists lacked the political and social capital to dictate the 
IMC’s activities. The professional economics community in the U.S. was too young and 
unorganized to lead reform efforts, and it was only natural that private interests assumed 
the task. At this crucial juncture, professional economists adopted a role as passive 
advisers despite grand talk about a new era in economic management. That the IMC was 
in position to advance pro-gold standard reform was partly the result of economists’ 
refutation of free silver. Likewise, the AEA’s subsequent endorsement of the IMC’s 
proposed legislation helped move monetary reform efforts forward. Still, it is clear that 
professional economists’ influence was largely confined to the margins. 
The work of the IMC began immediately after McKinley’s victory in November 
1896. Hugh H. Hanna, President of the Indianapolis-based Atlas Engine Works, 
beseeched the Indianapolis Board of Trade to hold a convention on the issue of monetary 
reform. The Board then invited representatives from twelve cities to attend the 
conference, the result of which was a plan for a larger convention the following 
January.203 The mid-January conference (and subsequent activities of the organization) 
attracted support and participation from a broad swath of the American business 
community, including soon-to-be secretary of the treasury, Lyman Gage.204     
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Over the next two years the growing organization engaged in a struggle to 
translate the prerogatives of its broad coalition of businessmen into legislative action. The 
January 1897 meeting resulted in the appointment of an Executive Committee, which in 
turn established a headquarters in Washington, D.C., in order to better lobby for 
Congressional action.205 In July 1897, pro-silver Democrats continued to block movement 
on the issue and denied McKinley’s request for a Congressional Commission to study the 
money question.206 Undeterred, the IMC pushed forward and established an 11-man 
Commission tasked with drafting legislation for Congressional consideration. Congress’ 
refusal to appoint a commission had left room for the IMC to create its own authoritative 
body, and it did so, forming a somewhat diverse body that did not consist solely of 
bankers and financiers.207 The inclusion of J. Laurence Laughlin sent a clear message 
regarding the sort of expertise the IMC would solicit, however. 
Interestingly, Laughlin dissented with the Commission on grounds that would 
have appealed to free silverites’ populist sentiments. The Commission labored from July 
until December 1897, at which point it released its report calling for the legal 
establishment of the monometallic gold standard while avoiding an “injurious 
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contraction” of the nation’s money supply.208 Foreshadowing what was to come, the 
report also expressed support for allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to effectively 
pump money into the economy through the purchase of U.S. bonds.209 Laughlin objected 
to the suggestion on the grounds that it would create a dangerous linkage between the 
government and the banking community. The Chicago economist signed the report – 
below a brief statement noting his objection.210  
The AEA held its 1897 annual meeting just weeks after the completion of the 
IMC’s report and just over a year after McKinley’s election. At the meeting, a committee 
was formed to investigate the possibility of arriving at a consensus regarding currency 
reform. Walker was deceased, and by late 1897 Andrews likely chose to avoid the issue 
in the wake of the free silver scandal at Brown, although archival records shed no light on 
his curious omission.  Still, the AEA’s Currency Committee consisted of an impressive 
list of economists that included Taussig (Harvard), F.M. Taylor (University of Michigan), 
J.W. Jenks (Cornell University), Sidney Sherwood (Johns Hopkins University) and David 
Kinley (University of Illinois).  
Although none of these men played a role as public as Andrews or Walker had in 
the run-up to the Bryan-McKinley election, they were certainly engaged with the money 
question throughout the 1880s and ‘90s. All five endorsed a gold standard, although each 
included in his assessment the need for appropriate “elasticity” to meet the demands of a 
seasonal industrial economy. Taussig, as noted above, had endorsed a sound but flexible 
monetary system in a series of writings geared for an academic audience. Of the men 
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chosen for the Currency Committee, he probably commanded the most public reputation. 
But his writings were nowhere near as popular as those of Harvey or Walker.  
F.M. Taylor, whose greatest fame derived from his work on market socialism, 
similarly endorsed an elastic gold standard. His March 1896 piece published in the 
Political Science Quarterly highlighted Taylor’s conviction that gold elasticity could be 
derived from targeted bond-purchasing programs.211 Sherwood echoed a similar 
sentiment about the desirability of flexible bond purchases, but apparently did not reveal 
this conviction until after his participation on the Currency Committee. Sherwood’s 
stance prior to his participation on the committee is not entirely clear, but his comments 
regarding longstanding elasticity issues throughout American history in a primer on 
economics strongly indicates that he too saw the wisdom in greater monetary elasticity.212 
Kinley’s analysis of the American Independent Treasury displayed a similar concern with 
elasticity.213  
Jenks rounded out the Committee. As with Sherwood and Kinley, his exact stance 
on the issue is less clear than that of Taussig or Taylor. The German-trained economist 
did not factor much in the build-up to the Bryan-McKinley election, and he focused much 
of his attention on the monopoly question throughout the 1890s. Jenks’ commitment to 
the gold standard was confirmed instead by his participation in the IMC and his later 
foray as economic advisor to the Chinese government, where he encouraged the adoption 
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of the gold standard.214 His attitude toward the necessity of greater monetary elasticity 
remains unclear. 
That – with the possible exception of Jenks – each member of the Currency 
Committee promoted an elastic gold standard is crucial to note. Although their answers to 
the money question differed in specifics, each Committee member expressed the 
desirability of a monetary system actively backed and managed by a responsive U.S. 
government.  
 Throughout 1898, therefore, two Commissions actively pursued monetary reform. 
The IMC, a coalition of private businessmen, and the AEA’s Currency Commission, a 
commission of professional economists, pondered and debated for the next year. Despite 
their concomitant work, it is clear that one followed the other in terms of significance. By 
the time the AEA’s Currency Committee was form the IMC already had issued its report. 
Furthermore, the IMC’s resources far outweighed those not only of its Currency 
Commission, but of the entire AEA. Donations from supporters such as J.P. Morgan and 
William E. Dodge ensured the IMC had $50,000 with which it could cover members’ 
transportation costs, acquire research materials, conduct a survey, and publicize its 
efforts.215 The AEA entered the year with $609.40 cash on hand.216 In order to have any 
sort of influence, the AEA Currency Commission would have to work through the IMC. 
In mid-January, the IMC called a second convention so that delegates could 
consider the report of its Commission. Approximately 400 delegates attended the second 
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meeting of the IMC – each a representative of a chamber of commerce, a business 
organization, or a manufacturers’ association from around the country.217 Several 
members of the AEA’s Currency Commission turned out as well, although they attended 
as representatives of local business organizations. Jenks represented the Ithaca Business 
Men’s Association, Taussig the Cambridge Merchants’ Association, and Taylor the Ann 
Arbor Business Men’s Association.218 
The professional economists’ specific contributions to the January 1898 
convention have been obscured by time, but subsequent developments strongly suggest 
they walked away from the meeting satisfied with the role they had played, or at the very 
least convinced that the IMC was moving toward serious action. Jenks thought enough of 
the IMC Committee’s report to pass along Laughlin’s offer to mail a copy to every 
member of the AEA.219 
The AEA Committee’s final report, which represented an attempt to “command 
the assent of economists generally,” was presented at the 11th annual AEA meeting in 
December 1898. The 13 page report followed the lead of the IMC’s reform efforts. It 
offered general support for monetary reform provided that it secured the gold standard 
(“the actual monetary standard is now, and for some time to come will be, gold”) and 
ensured monetary flexibility (“to furnish the sort of elasticity which is needed in a 
panic”).220 The report garnered only a modicum of attention in newspapers throughout the 
country, and although it offered a broad analysis of the money question, it did not present 
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a clear plan of action. The professional economics community had proven adept at 
blocking the reform efforts of the free silverites, but was largely incapable of offering a 
workable alternative. While the economists on the AEA’s Currency Commission agreed 
on the merits of an elastic, gold-backed money supply, they could not settle on a specific 
policy proposal. This was in contrast, of course, to the IMC’s expressed interest in 
directly sponsoring a legislative bill.  
Whereas the AEA Currency Commission’s report received only brief notices, 
newspapers and periodicals across the nation tracked the progress of the IMC as it 
presented its findings and lobbied for legislative action. The report of the IMC’s 
Commission met with the support of delegates, professional economists included. The 
IMC convention ended with a resolution to mail a copy of the Convention’s conclusions 
to members of Congress.221 Progress continued, and in May 1898 Hanna expressed 
enthusiasm for the House Banking Committee’s decision to report the Walker Bill, which 
embodied most of the measures urged by the IMC.222 At that point the Spanish-American 
War consumed the nation’s attention and made serious reform unlikely. Progress resumed 
in February 1899, when Republican House members formed a Committee on Monetary 
Legislation to rally support around IMC-backed McCleary Bill.223 After an additional 
year of negotiating, Congress finally passed the major currency reform sought by the 
IMC and endorsed by the overwhelming majority of professional economists. The Gold 
Standard Act, as it became known, finally achieved the legal maintenance of the gold 
standard. The final section of the Act left open the possibility that the U.S. might 
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someday embrace bimetallism in the unlikely scenario that the world’s leading nation’s 
agreed on an international bimetallic monetary regime. 
Taussig’s post-mortem, “The Currency Act of 1900,” ran in the next edition of 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics.224 It predictably praised the general spirit of the 
Act, but cautioned that Senate floor compromises had left the U.S. financial system 
unnecessarily unpredictable. In particular, Taussig pointed to the clause that allowed the 
Treasury to satisfy outstanding bonds with payment in either silver or gold, which 
essentially established two classes of debt.225 He further criticized the Act’s redemption 
procedures, which required the Treasury to constantly shift gold on hand rather than 
maintaining it in a simple reserve fund in anticipation of future redemptions.226 Taussig 
attributed the flaws he perceived to “uninitiated” senators and temporary fiscal conditions 
that induced the Treasury accept such measures. He also questioned the long-term 
viability of the Act, and in doing so, foreshadowed the Panic of 1907. 
  
 
A Missed Opportunity 
 
 
 The Gold Standard Act appeared to settle the long-running debate over the money 
question. It established a monometallic gold standard. But as the events of 1907 revealed, 
it was ultimately the stop-gap measure Taussig predicted. In the fall of that year, panic 
once again seized the nation’s finances and sent the federal government scrambling for a 
solution. The currency aspect of the money question had been answered, but deep flaws 
in the nation’s banking system remained. When a failed attempt to corner the copper 
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market coincided with the seasonal rush of money from eastern banks to farm 
communities throughout the nation, a collapse ensued.227  
The Aldrich-Vreeland Act, co-sponsored by one of the “uninitiated” senators 
Taussig referred to in his review of the Gold Standard Act seven years prior, temporarily 
restored confidence by granting banks the authority to issue emergency currency backed 
by numerous securities (not just government bonds) on a temporary basis.228 The 
emergency act also provided for the establishment of a government commission to 
explore the possibility of serious banking reform. The National Monetary Commission 
(NMC), established in 1910, consisted of nine Senators and nine Representatives. The 
group labored for two years before delivering its recommendation to Congress, the end 
result of which was the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.229 
 The narrative of the Federal Reserve Act unfolded much like that of the Gold 
Standard Act. Professional economists – most of whom had pushed for Congress to 
affirm the gold standard provided that it was accompanied by a system designed to allow 
monetary elasticity – once more found themselves in a paradoxical position. On the one 
hand, the profession was called on to provide guidance and advice. In the course of its 
work, the NMC called on numerous economists – Joseph French Johnson, Davis R. 
Dewey, O.M.W. Sprague, David Kinley, and E.W. Kemmerer, among others – to provide 
a wealth of information regarding national banking systems from around the world.230 
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The NMC’s efforts were guided, in part, by expert assistant and Harvard economist A. 
Piatt Andrews. Andrews was also responsible for editing the 26 volumes generated by the 
NMC (which included the work of various economists, including those mentioned 
above). Professional economists surely had transcended the influence of the more popular 
folk economists of the late nineteenth century. 
 On the other hand, the expertise of professional economists was weighed against 
both the persuasive powers of the private business community and the prerogatives of 
Washington politicians. In the end, a small group of banking community representatives 
molded the NMC’s recommendations. National City Bank of New York President Frank 
A. Vanderlip, Senior Partner of J.P. Morgan Company Henry P. Davison, President of 
First National Bank of New York Charles D. Norton, Kuhn, Loeb, and Company partner 
Paul M. Warburg, and Senator Nelson Aldrich gathered at a Georgia resort to draft 
legislation for the reform of the nation’s banking system.231 The final product, the Aldrich 
Plan, proved impassable for political purposes. The NMC had been established under a 
Republican administration while Aldrich was at the peak of his political powers, but 
Democratic victories in 1912 shifted the tide in Washington and made the passage of a 
Republican-sponsored bill impossible.232 Just as politics had delayed efforts to act on the 
currency issue in the wake of the 1896 Presidential election, political maneuvering once 
more altered the final product. Upon taking office in March 1913, President Woodrow 
Wilson acted quickly to put an end to the nearly four years of banking reform debate. 
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Enlisting the aid of Senator Carter Glass, Wilson made it clear that any proposed banking 
reform measures were to feature stronger government control than provided for in the 
Aldrich plan.233   
The money question had slowly evolved from a discussion regarding the moral 
merits of two competing monetary systems to a debate regarding the best the best way to 
ensure a healthy economy. As champions of a scientific approach to the problem, 
professional economists found themselves maligned by populist reformers who traded on 
theories of moral struggle. The business community, on the other hand, successfully 
tapped professional economics community for both guidance and credibility. It was a 
victory of sorts, but the discipline still struggled to find its identity and professional 
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On Firm Ground, 1900-1916 
 
 
Although the drawn-out battle over monetary reform demonstrated that the 
application of economic theory to public policy was at best uncertain, by 1900 the growth 
of the professional economics in the United States was not. The complexities of a modern 
industrial economy and its consequent social issues continued to stimulate the study of 
economics. The on-going professionalization of the discipline fostered growth as the 
American Economic Association’s loose membership requirements and recruitment 
drives continued to build institutional support.234 Universities across the country added or 
expanded economics departments (still called departments of political economy at many 
schools). Each new economics faculty member spawned additional economics majors 
and graduate students. By 1890, there were twenty chairs in economics; by 1900 the 
number grew to fifty-one.235 Doctoral candidates alone numbered 94 by 1905 and rose to 
151 just five years later.236 The abandonment of “branch associations” of the AEA in 
1894 had resulted in a temporary dip in membership, but the subsequent direct 
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communication with those who opted to join the main association proved worthwhile.237 
AEA membership correspondingly grew from 706 to 2,301 from 1900 to 1920.238 During 
this period, the ratio of economists per 100,000 Americans grew from .93 to 2.2. 
Two decades of substantial disciplinary growth and professionalization took place 
alongside the continuation of interdisciplinary disagreement, however. Academic 
freedom, one source of the discipline’s success in professionalizing, was also a source of 
continued turmoil. The commitment to academic freedom, albeit a selective and fragile 
freedom, made methodological and ideological consensus impossible. This was, of 
course, the case with most disciplines that professionalized, but would lead to a 
particularly acute credibility problem in economics. The rift between the “new 
economists” and the “old orthodoxy” continued, albeit in modified terms. The ideas of 
the old orthodoxy, more specifically, their appreciation of classical theory and a general 
preference for unrestrained markets, lived on through the students and admirers of 
classical economists who had begun to update their theories in the face of criticism. The 
new economists no longer could legitimately dismiss their intellectual rivals as mere 
holdovers from a bygone era, although that did not stop them from trying. The in-fighting 
gradually exposed the inescapable reality that economics, contrary to the new 
economists’ most sanguine predictions, could not transform itself into an objective 
science capable of providing clear-cut guidance in the policy arena. However, regardless 
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of these doubts and fundamental disagreements, enthusiasm remained high as the AEA 
marked its twenty-fifth anniversary. 
 
 
Growth and Expansion 
 
The perpetuation of intellectual divisions took place against a backdrop of 
increased professional integration. The AEA consciously shed its northeastern bias and 
developed geographic diversity within its ranks from throughout the U.S., and also 
reached out to Europe and Asia.239 Annual meetings from the early 1900s onward 
reflected as much, as the Association increasingly drew members from outside the 
northeast corridor. This expansion was viewed as necessary if the AEA’s claim as the 
nation’s preeminent economics organization was to hold. As then-Secretary T.N. Carver 
noted in a 1909 letter soliciting membership over the more regional American Academy 
of Political and Social Sciences:  “Our organization [AEA] is, as I have stated, first, the 
older organization, and second, it is a more strictly national organization.”240 Regional 
economics associations continued to meet – and indeed continue to do so to this day – but 
care was taken to avoid the geographic fragmentation that might undermine professional 
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cohesion.241 Slowly, over the course of the first two decades of the twentieth century, the 
AEA grew into the professional body its founders had envisioned.  
The growth of the AEA was accompanied by the increased employment of 
professional economists, which in turn led to increased institutional support for the 
discipline through membership dues and a larger audience for economics publications. 
Moving forward, economists turned toward discipline-specific publications, as opposed 
to general periodicals such as the Yale Review or the North American Review.242 The 
number of institutions that subscribed to the AEA’s monograph and periodical series, for 
example, expanded from 116 to 426 within the generation that spanned from 1900-
1920.243 Changes in the composition of subscribing institutions clearly indicate increased 
specialization, while the application of economic science further widened the gap that 
had already emerged between folk and professional economists in the late nineteenth 
century. The number of schools that subscribed to the AEA’s publications, 
overwhelmingly colleges and universities, remained steady at 45 percent of subscribing 
institutions while the percentage of public libraries dropped from 39 to 26 percent. The 
decline as a percentage was made-up by public offices, such as state and federal research 
divisions, and private business, which accounted for 13 and 10 percent of total 
subscriptions in 1900 and 1919, respectively.244 
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Law Firm Public 
Office 
Business Private Club 
1900 39 45 1 3 4 8 
1919 26 45 2 13 10 4 
Net change -13 0 +1 +10 +6 -4 
Figures listed are a percent of total subscribing members of the AEA. Negligible number 
of individual subscribers not included. 
 
A larger subscription base enabled scholarly publications to flourish – a crucial 
requisite for professionalization because economics-specific publications allowed for a 
more consistent and in-depth discussion of economists’ theories. The Harvard-housed 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), which had begun publishing in 1886, continued 
to publish quarterly but ran an average  21.5 articles per year from 1900-1919, up from 
the average of 16.2 articles per year in its first 14 years of existence.245 The University of 
Chicago-housed Journal of Political Economy (JPE) proved more aggressive. From its 
founding in 1892 to 1906, the JPE published on a quarterly basis – each issue typically 
containing 4 academic articles, 4 sets of notes, and 10 book reviews. In 1906, the JPE 
moved to a monthly publication schedule (barring a two month break in August and 
September). The amount of material per issue fluctuated, but output increased from an 
average of 17.4 to 33.2 articles per year following the shift to monthly publication.246 The 
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earliest figures available place circulation of the JPE at 700 in 1905 – an impressive 
figure considering the discipline was still in its adolescence.247  
The two university-run journals were joined by what has since been the AEA’s 
flagship journal, The American Economic Review (AER).248 The AER was the culmination 
of a decade-long effort to establish an American economics journal on par with that of 
the British Economic Association’s The Economic Journal and the American Historical 
Association’s American Historical Magazine.249 Despite the success of the QJE and JPE, 
an AEA report on the desirability of establishing a quarterly journal completed in 1902, 
nevertheless lamented the absence of an “accredited, representative serial in which the 
best and only the best economic thought – lay and academic – of the country as a whole 
may find expression.”250 The AER would differ from the previously establish American 
economic journals in that it relied exclusively on the efforts and support of an 
organization, rather than on a university department. The assumption was that a journal 
backed by a professional organization would be less subject to outside interference than a 
journal managed by an academic department that reported to university officials and 
board members. It was an important distinction for a discipline concerned with 
intellectual neutrality.  
                                                          
247
 Vicky M. Longawa, “Episodes in the History of the Journal of Political Economy,” Journal of Political 
Economy 100, no. 6 (December 1992): 1087–1091. 
248
 C.B Fillebrown, Winthrop More Daniels, and R.M. Breckenridge, “The Recent Celebration of the 
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Founding of the American Economic Association,” Unknown, American 
Economic Association Records, 1886- Box 11, Duke University Rare Book, Manuscript and Special 
Collections Library. Untitled and undated, this document from AEA Secretary Thomas N. Carver’s 
correspondence folder for 1909 appears to be a summary of notable events at the 25
th
 anniversary meeting 
of the AEA . 
249
 “Correspondence Regarding the Proposition for the American Economic Association to Establish an 
Economic Journal,” 1902, 3, American Economic Association Records, 1886- Box 62, Duke University 
Rare Book, Manuscript and Special Collections Library. Bernstein, A Perilous Progress, 20. 
250
 “Correspondence Regarding the Proposition for the American Economic Association to Establish an 
Economic Journal,” 4. 
  
   
109 
 
Proponents of an AEA quarterly journal expressed equal concern over the 
ideological content of the journal, with unanimous agreement that any reputable 
publication ought not favor one school of thought over the other. Neither the QJE nor the 
JPE contained an overt political message, yet suspicions lingered owing to the journals’ 
status as “private” publications, and economists were careful about where they pledged 
their allegiances.251 Both journals published articles written by a diverse array of 
economists who supported competing ideologies and methodologies, yet this fact 
apparently did not preclude the journals’ reputations for being less than completely 
objective. 
The report’s two additional conclusions – that an explosion in the number of 
academic quarterlies threatened to dilute the discipline and that a representative journal 
would boost the discipline’s image in Washington, indicates that the AEA’s executive 
membership continued to envision an expanded role for economists in the policymaking 
process.252 Correspondence between the report’s author, Jacob Hollander, and various 
economists expressed enthusiasm for a scientific journal backed by a representative 
professional organization, although proponents were careful to note that in order to 
maximize the discipline’s influence care must be taken to strike an appropriate balance 
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between economic theory and practical economic affairs. No one noted the inherent 
difficulties in maintaining professional neutrality while influencing economic policy, nor 
did anyone suggest that a journal full of conflicting viewpoints would undoubtedly 
frustrate any policymaker searching for clear and concise advice. 
Financial and logistical considerations forced the AEA to put its publishing 
ambitions on hold until 1908, when the short-lived Economic Bulletin debuted. The 
Bulletin – a quarterly periodical featuring miscellaneous notes and reviews – was 
published alongside the American Economic Association Quarterly – a continuation of 
the monograph series that had run since 1886. The two quarterlies eventually merged in 
1911 to form the highly successful American Economic Review (AER). Hopes that the 
presence of a reputable, non-department-controlled journal might encourage the QJE and 
JPE to either cease publication outright or merge with the AER persisted through 1911, 
but proved unfounded.253 Instead, the three journals competed alongside one another and 
continued to do so into the twenty-first century. 
Together, these three journals formed a solid foundation on which economists 
could continue to build professional economics in the United States. They ensured both 
outlets for new research as well as a base of reference for inexperienced and experienced 
scholars. Indeed, as George Stigler and Claire Friedland note in their quantitative analysis 
of economic journal citations, the article format quickly challenged pamphlets and books 
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as the preferred publication method for cutting-edge research in the early twentieth 
century.254 Gradually, the articles published in these journals began to reflect the growing 
complexity and the development of ideas specific to economics. 
The combination of increased institutional support and intellectual specialization 
allowed economists to gradually drift away from related disciplines. An unnamed 
observer, when asked to reflect on the discipline’s development, noted the departure of 
political scientists and sociologists in the opening years of the twentieth century.255 The 
terrain between economists and their colleagues in related disciplines had certainly 
shifted since W.W. Folwell had argued economics was a sub-discipline of sociology in 
1889. By 1908, AEA Secretary Winthrop M. Daniels could confidently reject overtures 
for a joint meeting from both the American Sociological Association and the Association 
for the Advancement for Social Sciences, declaring “My notion is that the American 
Economic Association is the ‘dog’ and the others are another part of the canine anatomy; 
and I favor the orthodox initiative in the process of wagging.”256 Evidence of continued 
support for the interdisciplinary approach that helped economics flourish in its infancy 
suggests that the discipline’s reputation for academic insularity was still some decades in 
the future, however.257 Herbert Spencer, the famed sociologist, remained a relevant figure 
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in American economics.258 Furthermore, joint meetings between the AEA and ASA were 
still held – such arrangements did have their logistical advantages.  
Tellingly, the greatest opportunity for collaboration between the two disciplines 
largely came to naught. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed an 
explosion in research dedicated to identifying and characterizing different races. Not 
coincidentally, this explosion in research was accompanied by a wave of immigration as 
workers from predominantly Europe and Asia rushed to the U.S. in search of economic 
opportunity. The study of eugenics was largely conducted by sociologists and biologists, 
though there were notable exceptions, such as Wisconsin’s noted labor economist John R. 
Commons, who published a book on the subject in 1907 (although he dropped the issue 
thereafter and opted to ignore the work in his autobiography) and Irving Fisher, who 
never discussed eugenics in his academic work but did lend support to societies and 
scholars who did.259 Workers’ aptitude and behavior could be easily linked to questions of 
economic efficiency. The eugenics movement was intimately intertwined with political 
and social issues, however. By evoking expertise and declaring a position on the validity 
of eugenics an economist risked impugning his or her credibility, and in doing so, the 
credibility of the discipline.   
Unsurprisingly, questions regarding the relevancy of eugenics weighed on some 
within the professional economics community, including James A. Field, then at the 
University of Chicago. Field captured the ambiguity of the issue in a letter to then AEA 
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Secretary Thomas Carver when he commented on a proposed symposium on 
immigration, stating “That ‘Race or Mongrel?’ book seemed to me, when I had occasion 
briefly to review it last year, to be extraordinary nonsense or fanaticism, but I confess that 
nobody knows what is the truth in such matters.”260 Carver concurred with Field’s 
apprehension, but encouraged careful review of the book in question on the grounds that 
there was a “good deal of confusion and a great many conflicting opinions on this 
question [eugenics], and there are doubtless some people who think that such a book as 
‘Race or Mongrel?’  has some scientific basis.”261 Although repulsed by the blatant 
racism of Race or Mongrel?, Field could not deny its potential significance. Professional 
economics in the U.S. was no longer institutionally intertwined with sociology as it was 
just fifteen years earlier, but economists continued to pay attention to developments in the 
sister-discipline that might influence the course of economic thought.   
Field ultimately opted not to review Race or Mongrel? but did write a lengthy 
review of eugenics scholarship that was published in the November, 1911 issue of the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics.262 Focusing primarily on the history of eugenics 
research in England and the U.S., Field’s review largely described the work of biologists 
and eugenics societies that had conducted the initial forays into eugenics research. That 
man could determine hereditary characteristics was amply proven. The question moving 
forward, Field concluded, was what to do with the information. Who could determine the 
most efficient, rational combinations of hereditary characteristics? Enlisting the 
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economist, Field argued, was the next step in translating the benefits of eugenics research 
to U.S. society, though that next step never quite materialized.   
Perhaps owing to its “home” in a different discipline, or its tendency to attract 
controversy, the study of eugenics in particular failed to attract a dedicated following in 
professional economics. It was a stroke of luck, as the AEA’s insistence on distinguishing 
itself from sociology and an insistence on institutional neutrality ensured that the 
controversial subjects failed to sink deep roots within American economic thought. The 
leading American economics journals reviewed books on eugenics and some economists 
published on the subject, but with relatively little fanfare, though William Z. Ripley’s The 
Races of Europe stands as a stark exception to that general rule.263 Numerous prominent 
economists did, to be clear, express interest in the sort of social engineering eugenics 
promised to make possible.264 But in keeping with the disciplinary culture then being 
formed, professional economists were left promote their viewpoints as individuals and 
surprisingly few spent enough time on either issue to consider it central to their 
intellectual legacy (save the aforementioned Fisher and Ripley). The U.S.’s professional 
economics community was largely content with allowing their sociologist colleagues to 
pursue the controversial subject.  
In addition to growing their role within academia, economists also began to 
explore new roles in both government agencies and private businesses. An increase in the 
number of public institutions that subscribed to the American Economic Review, from 4 
to 55 in the first two decades of the twentieth century, reflected the change. Economists’ 
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skill sets made them indispensible to the functions of a growing bureaucratic state, which 
required personnel capable of translating data into intelligible analysis. The range of 
American economists’ activities in the public sector before the second World Was 
suggests they were every bit as active and influential as their post-World War II 
counterparts. Economists applied their training in virtually every department of the 
federal government. The AEA had first recommended advisors to the Census Bureau in 
the late 1880s and continued to do so for the 1900 and 1910 surveys (although declined to 
take on official responsibilities as an organization).265 Charles Neill, who received his 
degree in economics from Johns Hopkins University, took control of the Bureau of Labor 
under Theodore Roosevelt in 1906, following his success as a labor arbitrator, and 
continued as Commissioner through the Taft years until he resigned in 1913. A number 
of trained economists also found work in America’s recently acquired territories. Emory 
Johnson, a former student of Ely’s at Hopkins, served on the Isthmian Canal Commission 
from 1899-1904 while the group attempted to determine the best route for a potential 
canal to link the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.266 Jacob Hollander served as a government 
agent in the Dominican Republic, where his role in the sale of Dominican Republic bonds 
through New York firm Kuhn & Loeb in 1906 led to a hefty commission and a public 
reprimand from the Pujo Commission five years later.267 Princeton’s Edwin Kemmerer, a 
monetary expert known as the “money doctor,” served on the Philippines Commission 
and later traveled throughout Europe dispensing advice on monetary policy to foreign 
                                                          
265
 Thomas N. Carver, “T.N. Carver to Rufus W. Weeks,” October 29, 1909, American Economic 
Association Records, 1886- Box 11, Duke University Rare Book, Manuscript and Special Collections 
Library. 
266
 David Michael Grossman, “Professors and Public Service, 1885-1925: A Chapter in the 
Professionalization of the Social Sciences” (Ph.D Dissertation, Washington University, 1973), 91. 
267
 Ibid., 92. 
  
   
116 
 
governments.268 Professional economists continued to advise and agitate from outside the 
policymaking process, but they increasingly parlayed their expertise into more direct 
roles in the governing process.  
 The role of economists in the private sector remains much more opaque. But 
evidence suggests that private businesses were quicker to realize the skill set of 
professionally trained economists than previously assumed. W.E. Hotchkiss of 
Northwestern University noted, with some surprise, the enthusiasm of his businessmen-
students for theory as a potential guiding rod in their day jobs.269 In addition to plumbing 
the discipline for insights that might help their careers, businessmen also employed 
professional economists. Insurance companies were a natural fit for those trained in both 
statistical methods and inductive logic. Private bureaus and research organizations, which 
had cropped up in an attempt to cater to businesses that sought every advantage in the 
competitive American market, similarly utilized the talents of professional economists. 
Businesses like the Brookmire Economic Chart Company sought to harness the 
tremendous growth in statistical knowledge and economic theory to help produce reliable 
business forecasts on which businesses could make decisions. Founder and promoter 
James H. Brookmire embodied the optimism of those who believed in the power of 
economic analysis to uncover the mysteries of business, as reflected by his 1913 article 
AER article on economic forecasting.270 Publishing in a reputable journal imbued the 
author with notable authority, as Brookmire acknowledged in a letter to AER editor David 
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Dewey, because verification of expertise was valuable in the competitive forecasting 
business.271  
AEA conferences attracted a mixture of academic, private sector, and public 
sector participants in the early twentieth century, further illustrating the connection 
between professional economics and the private sector. The twenty-fifth anniversary 
meeting, held in 1909, featured a panel on “The Valuation of Public Service 
Corporations” that drew Henry C. Adams, then with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, Frederick W. Whitridge, President of the Third Avenue Railway Company, 
corporate lawyer Joseph P. Cotton, and E.B. Whitney of the New York Supreme Court. 
The conference would have featured Andrew Carnegie had the 74-year-old industrialist 
not slipped and fallen in the same storm that had delayed the presence of President 
Taft.272 In these and other ways, professional economics in the U.S., although defined by 
the work of college and university faculty members, had become significantly engaged 
with government and the private sector. 
 
The Methodological and Ideological Battle 
 
The vigorous growth of the profession obscured an equally vigorous struggle over 
theory and ideology. In terms of professionalization, the first two decades of the 
twentieth century were a clear and unmitigated success, but the path of methodological 
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and ideological development was far less clear. Professional economists, primarily those 
who served in leadership positions within the AEA, could work to promote the growth of 
departments, ensure the success of publications, and secure employment so that 
economists could make use of their training. But by design, those presiding at the top of 
the profession’s most influential organization were still limited in their ability to codify 
American economics. Continued emphasis on academic freedom and intellectual 
neutrality negated any attempts to force consensus within American economics. The task 
of “winning” over intellectual rivals was left to those who published, lectured, and 
debated, and as the twenty-fifth anniversary of the AEA came and went, it was clear that 
fundamental disagreements persisted.  
In 1898, well-respected Columbia University economist John Bates Clark 
contemplated the future of economic theory in an article published in the QJE. His 
observations revolved around the struggle to account for what he referred to as “dynamic 
forces,” by which he meant the unpredictable variables that plagued economic 
theorists.273 Since debates over the “static” issues of economics had run their course, 
Clark argued, what remained for professional economics was to reconcile the laws of 
economics with on-the-ground conditions. Clark’s projection into the future reflected 
both keen foresight and hope-induced short-sightedness. On the one hand, he accurately 
identified what has long been the bane of the professional economist – the fact that real 
world conditions rarely reflect abstract modeling or long-run predictions. On the other 
hand, Clark overreached in his rush to confront the future. Far from being resolved, the 
debate over “static” economic theory was as active as it had ever been. Clark and many 
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other economists were ready to declare victory in the debates that had characterized 
American economics in the 1880s and 1890s, although none of the participants in those 
debates had conceded defeat. The struggle to codify economics continued, as economists 
fought over the fundamental theories that drove research and trickled down to their pupils 
and the public. It was soon clear that the ideas of the classical economists, presumably 
shed in the late nineteenth century, were in fact as relevant as ever. 
The two issues that had sparked renewed vigor in American economic thought – 
deductive versus inductive reasoning and the relationship between economics and policy 
reform – were never resolved. The debate over the soul and purpose of economics 
therefore continued, albeit in a modified dialect. On the one side, classicists adopted 
marginal theory utility in an effort to keep rational economic man center stage. They still 
assumed a rational economic man, along with market efficiency and limited state 
intervention. On the other side, the reform-minded new economists remained fixed on 
institutional development, but struggled to translate investigation of the evidence into the 
kind of theoretical order that had served classical economists so well over the previous 
100 years. The debate held significance beyond lecture halls and academic journals. The 
failure to work through fundamental differences left professional economics vulnerable to 
claims of inconsistency and irrelevancy. Moving forward from the debates that 
characterized the founding of professional economics in the U.S., it was still debatable 
what constituted modern economic theory, as well as what role economics would play in 
American society. 
There were some developments pointing toward a potential consensus in 
American economics. The AEA’s survival eventually attracted the most notable 
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conservative hold-out, J. Laurence Laughlin, who had overseen the growth of a respected 
economics department at the University of Chicago in addition to crusading against 
“soft” money. Laughlin was never at risk of being “cut-out” of professional economics 
had he continued to eschew active membership.274 In fact, the considerable influence he 
wielded despite his lack of AEA membership concerned the organization’s leaders 
because they worried he might use his professional clout and the resources of the Chicago 
Department of Economics to discredit their efforts.275 Such fears seem unfounded, given 
subsequent accounts of Laughlin’s commitment to academic freedom, but it is clear that 
despite their proclamations of victory the new economists feared what they would 
characterize as a “back-slide” in American economic thought. 
Laughlin’s membership did not reflect a significant change in thinking. He still 
regretted the reformist impulses that drove the economic theory of his intellectual rivals 
and a segment of the public – a phenomenon he once characterized as “the heart leading 
the head” – and his commitment to laissez-faire classical economics at times acted as a 
wedge between himself and others.276 At the same time his validation of the AEA’s goals 
might have indicated his willingness to move toward a less divided American economics. 
Laughlin’s participation closed one of the glaring gaps in the U.S.’s professional 
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economics network; but it did not signal an end of debate. The Chicago economist’s 
interaction with the AEA remained awkward and limited.277  
There were several ironies in the conflict between the conservative stalwarts and 
their more liberal peers. First, Laughlin’s criticism of the new economists’ evangelicizing 
was matched by his equally zealous commitment to promote what he described as a true, 
scientific form of political economy. The public’s perception of political economy in the 
U.S. was an on-going concern of Laughlin’s and he sought to ensure that the public 
received the proper version – his.278 It was a case of the pot calling the kettle black, as 
neither the reformist new economics nor the laissez-faire Classical School could credibly 
lay claim to a completely neutral understanding of the world in which they worked. 
The second irony was that the conservative old guard in American economics had 
lost the battle over the goals of economic science the minute they began to argue with 
their pro-reform colleagues. By engaging with their reform-minded colleagues, the old 
guard lent credibility to a series of debates that increasingly gave merit to new 
economists’ reformist positions. The classicists had little choice – it was, after all, the 
tenor of the times that pushed them first into the professionalization process, followed 
shortly thereafter by a concerted search for economic policy reform. But by engaging in 
debates over municipalization, labor legislation, protective tariffs, and similar 
interventionist policies, the conservative laissez-faire economists implicitly 
acknowledged the claims to expertise made by their intellectual rivals and ensured a 
place for the reformist impulse within modern American economic thought.  
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 The twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the AEA in 1909 underscored this civil 
contentiousness in American economics. The AEA’s executive committee took pains to 
celebrate the progress of American economics by (in part) inviting prominent European 
economists, influential government figures, and sponsoring a retrospective panel. The 
event was, in fact, a time for celebration, as the discipline had grown tremendously in the 
U.S. since industrial growth and European ideas had sparked a revival in American 
economic thought. Nevertheless, indications that American economics had failed to live 
up to the lofty ambitions of the “young rebels” who had founded the AEA could not be 
ignored. 
Invitations were extended to economists from each of the major European nations 
with which the Americans felt an intellectual affinity – Austria, England, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Holland. Funds were still scarce despite the organization’s 
substantial growth and stability, and invitations were limited to one per nation with an 
honorarium of $500 per attendee. AEA emissaries were dispatched the summer preceding 
the conference with a list of potential attendees, ranked by the AEA executive committee 
in the order of desirability.279 An aversion to winter travel and reluctance to leave their 
homes during the Christmas season led all the leading foreign invitees to decline.280 
James Bonar, Maffeo Pantaleoni, and Henry Higgs did present at the conference and a 
reception for foreign guests suggests there were additional foreign attendees, albeit none 
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of the prominent intellectuals ranked by the executive committee.281 French economists, 
curiously, had remained detached from the intellectual camps of American professional 
economics. That nation lacked an organizational equivalent to the AEA or Royal 
Economic Society and Walter Willcox – the emissary dispatched to ensure the attendance 
of a prominent French economist – found the task quite difficult and eventually gave 
up.282  
 Digging deeper into the executive committee’s rankings reveals that the 
intellectual terrain remained largely unchanged since the intensified importation of 
European economic thought in the 1880s. The German Historical School, despite its 
advocates’ declarations of triumph over the old orthodoxy, certainly did not dominate the 
list of invitees. Invitations were extended to notable Historical School scholars Lujo 
Brentano and Gustav von Schmoller, but the “England” list was similarly topped by 
Classicists Alfred Marshall and William Smart. The Austrian School received its due as 
well, with invitations extended to Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk and Frank Philippovich. 
True to form, the AEA remained committed to an inclusive vision that included space for 
scholars and scholarship of all types. A rough balance was maintained in order to avoid 
the sort of academic disenfranchisement the organization so heartily protested. No one 
school had been buried and all were welcomed to celebrate economic science with their 
American colleagues.  
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 Ely’s commentary on the first 25 years of the AEA, the highlight of the 
conference’s anniversary panel, offered little more than the by-then stale observation that 
the new economics of the historical school had shaken the discipline in the late nineteenth 
century. Arthur Hadley followed Ely’s speech with the suggestion that the new 
economists had in fact gone too far, saying: “The old orthodoxy is gone – too much gone, 
some of us think, who, after helping to break down the fences, are a little astonished by 
the havoc made by the cattle that have come in through the openings.”283    
 Such sentiments, along with the mixed nature of conference participants, made 
clear that disagreement continued to define the profession and that declaration of 
professional harmony often overreached. The tension within professional economics, 
characterized by Frank Fetter as having manifested by the growth of “two wings,” was 
quite noticeable to the all but the most casual observer.284 The mediation of such 
dissension led to practical concerns, such as the handling of the book reviews in peer 
reviewed journals. As University of Missouri economist H.J. Davenport noted to Fetter in 
a fit of frustration, reviews often depended on the intellectual dispositions of the reviewer 
and the reviewed.285 If in ideological agreement, the reviewer praised the work. If 
ideologically opposed, the reviewer rendered a negative judgment. “Reviewing of this 
sort,” Davenport declared, “degenerates into the sheer puffery and jockeying appropriate 
to the level of publishers [sic] announcements.” 
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Editors of the American Economic Review, sensitive to the fact that competing 
schools of thought would thus influence the review of scholarship, established a review 
process designed to mitigate the effects of ideological or personal bias. A “book,” 
reviewers were advised, “should be appraised from the point of view of the school of 
thought to which the author belongs.”286 The AEA’s leadership could only go so far and 
they still allowed that the review guidelines could not “prevent an appraisal of its [the 
reviewed material’s] value judged by what the reviewer considers to be the cannons of 
universal truth.”287 Subsequent disputes over the undue criticism and harshness of 
particular reviews underscore the tension within the community.  
 Disagreement was perhaps sharpest in the significant debate over the development 
of marginal utility theory. In fact, the debate over the relevancy of marginal utility theory 
may be one of the most significant methodological debates in the twentieth century 
considering its eventual success and primacy in Western economic thought. While the 
reform-minded new economists of the late nineteenth century celebrated what they 
perceived as a victory over the musty theory of the old orthodoxy, they ultimately failed 
to translate their success into a coherent methodology capable of taking root as the 
dominant intellectual paradigm in American professional economics. Meanwhile, their 
more conservative rivals continued to adjust classical economic theory in an attempt to 
maintain prominence. Economic historians debate the source of marginalist theory, as 
well as the speed with which is spread among Western economists, but events make clear 
that by the late nineteenth century it had spread to the U.S. where budding neoclassical 
economists, led by John Bates Clark and the imported works of Alfred Marshall, began to 
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embrace the theory.288 Marginalism’s acceptance by equally important figures like Frank 
Fetter, Frank Taussig, Simon Newcomb, and Clark’s son John Maurice Clark added 
credibility to the theory.289 The marginalist theory of value, which states that prices vary 
based on changes in the perceived utility of a product, proved useful to those 
uncomfortable with the German Historical School’s emphasis on historical contingency. 
The theory allowed for the preservation of assumptions about a rational economic man 
while at the same time explaining changes in economic activity. Marginalism could 
address the demand for a more inductive methodology by using data to verify the veracity 
of economic laws determined through deductive reasoning. Thus, neoclassical economics 
was born through evolution, as opposed to the revolution of the new economics, and 
effectively maintained the philosophical roots of classical economic theory in the U.S.  
Although they by no means considered themselves so, those who advocated 
neoclassical economics represented a resurgence of the old orthodoxy that the new 
economists had sought to slay with the formation of the AEA. Opponents of the “old” 
way of thinking in economics were well aware of the continuities and voiced their 
criticisms, which recognized marginalism’s ability to show how prices were determined, 
but also its inability to explain how social conditions ultimately created the conditions 
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that determined value.290 Marginalism contained insufficient predictive powers and little 
recognition of the strides made in psychology and sociology, critics of neoclassical 
economics argued. Despite the evolving school’s shortcomings, it also held significant 
appeal. Marginalism offered a coherent methodology in the sense that its underlying 
assumptions about man as a rational pleasure seeking creature eliminated the need to 
endlessly categorize and qualify conclusions. Marginalism similarly narrowed the 
practitioner’s focus to marketplace transactions – a convenient limitation in a discipline 




The Problem with the “New Economics” 
 
While neoclassicists attempted to rein in economic theory, the new economists 
continued to embrace a growing catalog of considerations that complicated heterodox 
methodology. The intellectual struggles of Robert Hoxie stand as a case-in-point. Hoxie, 
a dedicated new economist, spent the bulk of his career at the University of Chicago, 
where he proudly drew from a host of theories to support his arguments about the merits 
of trade unionism.291 Institutionalist Walton H. Hamilton’s intellectual obituary of Hoxie 
described a complex intellectual development that defied simple categorization. Hoxie 
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was, in turn, influence by the classicism of Laughlin, the American Psychological School 
of Frank Fetter, and the Institutional School of Thorstein Veblen.292 Like many of his 
reform-minded colleagues, Hoxie viewed the social upheaval of the second industrial 
revolution as evidence of the old orthodoxy’s insufficiency. The rational man of the old 
orthodoxy and the equilibrium sought by neoclassical marginalism meant little to Hoxie 
given the rapid and unpredictable manner in which society changed at the turn of the 
century. Understanding economic life, according to Hoxie, required a more accurate 
understanding of elusive and ever-changing human nature. Hamilton concluded that 
Hoxie ultimately failed in his quest and was never able to “add an elaborate piece of work 
to the literature of economics” because of his unfortunate tendency toward perfection.293 
It is equally plausible, although less polite, to argue that Hoxie failed to significantly 
influence American economic theory because he eschewed a coherent theoretical 
framework in favor of a flexible but vague ideology that paradoxically revered economics 
as a reliable science and human behavior as wholly unreliable. 
A brief summary of Hoxie’s career does not, of course, serve as an adequate 
stand-in for the entire body of American heterodox economics – a blanket term used to 
describe non-neoclassical economics in the twentieth century. But it does illustrate the 
degree to which the new economists struggled to replace the old orthodoxy’s intellectual 
foundations. Economic historian Geoffrey Hodgson, in his history of the American 
institutionalism, notes how the failure of the movement’s oft-cited leading thinkers 
Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell failed to produce a “systematic treatise” on 
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institutionalist theory.294 He also cites the demand for mathematical economics during 
World War Two, the influx of European economists fleeing totalitarian regimes post-
World War Two, the chilling effects of McCarthyism, the Great Depression, and the 
rejection of Darwinian ideas in the social sciences as sources of institutionalism’s 
demise.295 All of these factors certainly played a role in the decline of institutional 
economics, but the failure to deliver a “systematic treatise,” strongly suggests the 
American heterodox economists were working on borrowed time. The lack of a clear 
unifying theory around which the American heterodox new economists could rally was 
evident by the end of the First World War. Those opposed to the deductive simplicity of 
neoclassical economics agreed that empirical data, human psychology, the development 
of institutions, and sociology were crucial to a complete understanding of economic 
behavior. How the many facets of the new economics interacted was subject to individual 
interpretation, however. It was a far messier approach to economics that was difficult to 
package and disseminate to students, policymakers, and the general public. 
 American professional economists in the early twentieth century agreed that a 
new era had dawned, but the nature and direction of economics remained unclear. 
Modern economics, despite J.M. Clark’s sanguine claims, was not to be wholly defined 
by the economists’ newly found “sense of solidarity and social-mindedness.”296 Not all 
economists were willing to abandon the rational individualism of the nineteenth century, 
which far from being radical was in fact considered self-evident by a significant number 
of American economists – both professional and amateur. The heterodox economists 
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continued to cite their German-inspired methodology and theoretical shortcoming of 
classical economic thought as justification for leadership within American economics, 
but their continued disharmony gradually undercut their mandate. To suggest that the 
heterodox economics in the U.S. lacked vitality would be misleading. The reform-driven 
heterodox economists enjoyed such strong representation within American economics in 
the first half of the twentieth century that the term “heterodox” may in fact be an 
anachronism of sorts. Even so, a failure to translate this success into a consistent and 
reliable intellectual paradigm ultimately undercut the vitality of their movement. The 
failure of heterodox economics to unseat the old orthodoxy was as much the result of 
what the reformers did wrong as it was a case of what conservative economic thinkers did 
right. 
This problem of increasingly complex theories and methodology within heterodox 
economics was compounded by the loss of connections with religious sensibilities and 
religious communities, which had played a role in the early success of the new 
economics. Several important new economists in the first generation of professional 
economics had moved in religious reform circles. Richard T. Ely had utilized both 
economic and religious justifications in his fight for labor reform in the late nineteenth 
century and routinely called on religious leaders to support his reform efforts.297 Labor 
economist John R. Commons, one of Ely’s most successful recruits at the University of 
Wisconsin, was less engaged with the religious community but had considered himself a 
Christian socialist during his early career.298 Reform drove early heterodox economists, 
and to some degree religious beliefs justified reform efforts and the spirit of the new 
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economics. As the discipline grew, whatever remained of the religious influence in 
professional economics faded. Concerns about academic integrity trumped the early 
moralist impulses that had attracted clergy to professional economics in the late 
nineteenth century. In 1900, AEA membership included 23 clergymen.299 By 1919, clergy 
had disappeared entirely from the membership rolls.300 Religion supplied little in way of 
methodology but it had provided economists on a mission to reform American society an 
immeasurable degree of moral authority. As economist Bradley W. Bateman notes, 
reform-minded economists did continue to interact with the Social Gospel movement up 
to the 1920s, particularly in regards to conducting social surveys.
301
 Still, heterodox 
economics gradually shed both the overt religious impulses of the late nineteenth century. 
Doing so undoubtedly helped new economists’ image as an objective and rational 
thinkers, but at the expense of powerful moral justification.  
The void left by stripping heterodox economics of its ideological justifications 
begged filling. Marxism, or at least broad criticism of American capitalism, clearly 
motivated some new economists in the early twentieth century. The cultural resistance to 
European radicalism discussed in the first chapter persisted, however. The professional 
economics community remained committed to academic freedom and openly discussed 
the issue, but professional economists were ultimately subject to the whims of 
administrators and politicians.302 Commons, like Ely more than a decade earlier, was 
investigated following allegations that he taught subversive ideas. Additionally, whether 
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through public pressure or careful consideration of their viewpoints (the latter being more 
likely), several influential scholars drew back their criticism of American capitalism and 
deprived the Marx-inspired heterodox economists of some key allies. Ely, it was 
remarked, had “softened” in his old age and no longer suggested the American economic 
system needed an overhaul as forcefully as he once had.303 John Bates Clark, perhaps the 
most influential American economist at the turn of the twentieth century, abandoned his 
early flirtations with anti-capitalist thought, wholly embraced American capitalism, and 
became the leading neoclassical economists in the U.S. Those who persisted with radical 
critiques of American capitalism or revolutionary economic reform proposals risked the 
withdrawal of the institutional support necessary to not only carry out their own work, 
but also to support graduate students who could in turn build upon the work of their 
heterodox advisor.304  
Individual personalities may also have also played a role in the limited endurance 
of the heterodoxy. Veblen, one of the brighter critics of American capitalism, was 
notoriously eccentric and difficult to converse with, and Hoxie similarly had difficulties 
working with graduate students from chronic medical issues.305 Shyness, historian Leon 
Fink has suggested, may have limited labor economist Selig Perlman’s ability to expand 
his intellectual legacy (although Perlman still enjoyed significant recognition within labor 
economics).306 
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The failure to confront subjective issues within the discipline compounded the 
dilemma presented by ideological drift. Perhaps the more foreboding tendency for the 
new economics was its symbiosis with powerful yet temporary social movements. A 
commitment to objective, scientific research continued to be the standard that held the 
professional economics community together, yet the professional economist was 
continually compelled to make subjective judgments – such as what constituted “fair,” 
what was an acceptable balance between private property and government intervention, 
and the proper balance between individual and collective responsibility. Classical 
economists, along with their budding progeny neoclassicists, had resolved the fairness 
issue long ago by emphasizing the primacies of personal responsibility and private 
property in their deductive reasoning. Fair, according to the laissez-faire orthodoxy, was 
a relatively free-market in which workers were rewarded according to their ingenuity and 
effort. This is not to say the orthodoxy did not consider issues of income inequality or 
misdistribution of capital. However, such investigations were often conducted from the 
viewpoint that the solution lie in improving productivity rather than engineering social 
equality.   
The new economists had derived a significant portion of their momentum from 
the sudden, but ultimately temporary, social dislocations of the late nineteenth century. 
Laughlin, the ever-present champion of the capitalist orthodoxy, noted the effects of mass 
immigration and growing inequality of wealth in a 1916 defense of capitalism that ran in 
The North American Review.307 Laughlin explicitly targeted socialism – in particular the 
oft-cited observation that capitalism produced two classes of people (employers and 
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employees) as evidence of the desirability of a new economic order. Falling back on a 
time-tested argument, Laughlin appealed to the primacy of the individual and offered a 
hypothetical example involving a young man, early marriage, and a brood of hungry 
children. Compelled to feed his lot but lacking marketable skills, Laughlin concluded, the 
unwise individual decries the American economic system.   
Laughlin’s example – simplistic and rife of nativist undertones – nevertheless 
touched on an important dynamic. As long as the American economic system continued 
to attract unskilled labor, produced significant income inequality, and generated poor 
working conditions, economists who focused on studying social conditions to produce 
recommendations for social reform would find a ready audience. The new economics was 
born in era of historical social upheaval and inequality. Its origins and success was 
inextricably linked with the type of social discontent Laughlin lamented in his The North 
American Review article. The elimination of social conditions that had led to rise of 
heterodox “new economics” in the U.S. would prove a tough test for those economists 
who envisioned a more influential profession that would be directly relevant to the 
policymaking process. 
 
The Growing Gap 
Regardless of inconsistencies and disputes, professional economics in the U.S. 
continued to expand through the first decades of the twentieth century. College level 
textbooks were increasingly common – so much so that Irving Fisher referred to the 
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production of such a text as the “inevitable fate of the economist.”308 Laughlin applauded 
the emergence of useful teaching tools, but also questioned the necessity of so many 
economists laying down their basic economic philosophies.309 His reservations hinted at 
the increasing difficulty of ensuring a consistency in economic instruction in the U.S. that 
would allow for an open and productive discussion of basic economic principles. In 
undergraduate education, American economists struggled to achieve the proper balance 
between the teaching of theoretical economics, which required deep thinking and held the 
promise of breakthrough, and hard economic facts, the basics necessary to comprehend 
the mechanics of commerce.  
The AEA, aware of the problem, organized a panel on the teaching of elementary 
economics for the 1908 annual meeting. The response was overwhelming, and what 
began as a panel grew into a conference hosted by the University of Chicago and a 
subsequent special volume of the Journal of Political Economy in December 1909 that 
featured three papers and additional commentary from twenty-nine economists with 
teaching experience.310 Despite enthusiasm for the topic, neither the conference nor the 
corresponding journal articles yielded significant results. The problems were easy to 
agree on – students entered college with too little background knowledge and left having 
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spent too little time studying economics. Solutions were not as obvious. While some 
rejected the notion that economic theory and “concrete economic facts,” as A.B. Wolfe 
put it, could be separated, a subtle consensus in favor of parsing of the two subjects 
emerged with the reasoning that theory was best reserved for more mature minds in the 
advanced courses that attracted future economists. Conference participants said nothing 
of primary school instruction, nor did the AEA undertake any major campaigns to 
transmit advances in American economic thought to primary school students.  
The limited diffusion of economics was by no means an indicator of explicit 
exclusionist attitudes. American economists continued to welcome the participation of 
non-economist specialists. And the “business man’s point of view” was always welcomed 
and representatives of the business community, as well as government agencies and 
reform association, regularly presented at annual meetings.311 The discipline’s 
commitment to attracting the interest and participation of experts in whichever industry 
they studied dove-tailed with the goal of academic freedom and thorough inquiry. In 
matters deemed relevant, therefore, the discipline was entirely receptive of amateur 
participation. But the combination of increased specialization and limits on how quickly 
and efficiently professional economists could spread economic science continued to 
widen the gap between expert and amateur.312 The need to cultivate the discipline’s 
prestige provided professional economists an incentive to ignore the growing gap 
between amateur and expert. 
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Such necessity helps explain in part why women economists continued to be rare 
within American professional economics. Much like the other professions that coalesced 
in the late nineteenth century, the professional economics community preserved gender 
barriers and continued to define the professional economist as male.313 The minimizing of 
women’s roles in the discipline preserved Victorian notions of propriety and helped build 
the exclusivity necessary to distinguish between professional and amateur. The AEA 
continued to admit women, regardless of the personal opinions of some members, but the 
number of women members grew in proportion with total membership and remained low. 
In 1910, the AEA had grown to 1,205 members, fewer than 100 of whom were women.314 
Women’s participation in American professional economics continued to be the rare 
exception rather than the rule. Women were instead to be served by home economics, 
which had emerged as the natural alternative to economics of a more masculine variety.  
The topics studied and discussed by the two disciplines were quite obviously 
different in a myriad of ways, and the founders of the American Home Economics 
Association were well-aware that “economics” was an awkward descriptor.315 The term 
was chosen at the organization’s inaugural retreat in 1899 because it “most clearly 
positioned the home in relation to the larger polity,” but the subsequent appointment of a 
naming committee indicates a lack of satisfaction with the term.316 The difficulty in 
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naming the new discipline reflected the difficulty in explaining what exactly its 
practitioners hoped to accomplish. Home economics, particularly in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, struggled to develop a coherent identity. Some supporters 
felt the discipline ought to be vocational in nature, with an emphasis on cooking and 
cleaning. Others, including the influential Ellen Richards, envisioned a more complex 
curriculum that blended scientific research with sociology and microeconomics.317 She 
also insisted on breaking the stereotype of home economists as simple housekeepers and 
sought to imbue the field with scientific principles and methodology. In this regard, home 
economists shared in common with professional economists a desire to improve 
Americans’ material conditions by better understanding and managing resources. 
Similarly, both early professional economists and home economists pursued struggled to 
identify the relationship between academic research and civic engagement. 
Still, the professional economics community ignored the discipline. Economic 
journals and conferences were void of either home economists or discussion of prevalent 
issues in home economics, and there was no overlap between the memberships of the two 
groups. There is a lack of evidence to suggest a particular attitude or attitudes economists 
held toward home economics, and vice-versa, but Alfred Marshall’s comment about the 
vanishing role as elementary economist that women once occupied proved prophetic.318 
The rise of the American Home Economics Association and home economics programs 
in schools across the country created an alternative to male-dominated economics that 
was well-suited to Victorian notions regarding gender roles, helping preserve the gender 
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divide in American economic thought for the next several decades.319 The home 
economics community’s comparatively narrow focus on issues pertaining to household 
consumption in the 1920s solidified the barrier between home economics and economic 
theory.320 
Professional economists also paid scant attention to the amateurs who continually 
challenged the tenants of modern American economics, despite the obvious irony that 
professional economics lacked a strong, discipline-wide consensus. Folk economics 
persisted as a powerful force in American public life.321 Many Americans accepted the 
emergence of professional economists with a grain of salt and continued to understand 
the relationship between government, the economy, and themselves in terms that were 
not always compatible with either neoclassical or the heterodox new economists’ 
theories. Henry George’s followers sustained their crusade for land reform despite his 
passing in 1897, much to the annoyance of both professional economists and those who 
disagreed with the politics of the movement. Pro-Georgists organized themselves into 
“single tax” clubs to debate and mobilize political support.322 Reprints of Poverty and 
Progress, along with the efforts of single tax clubs across the nation, kept the populist 
theory alive and well. George’s ideas continued to draw sharp criticism from professional 
economists, and he found himself posthumously engaged in a battle with prominent 
economist Frank Fetter.323 
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Growing difficulties in the relationship between professional economists and the 
general public were increasingly apparent. The openness of the AEA could not guarantee 
that professional economics, as a discipline, would avoid evolving into the arcane and 
irrelevant intellectual hobby of gilded elites. The discipline was certainly aware of its 
potential public image problem. The future of professional economics hinged on the 
projection of expertise and knowledge about the economy as economists fought to 
maintain their image. In 1909, AEA Secretary Thomas Carver expressed his concern, 
noting the competition posed by “the business public,” which he felt was responsible for 
the low esteem in which economists were held in some quarters.324 That the business 
community and academic economists pulled in divergent directions seems self-evident – 
the former was concerned almost exclusively with profit margins, while the latter busied 
itself with a much broader set of concerns, such as efficiency and equitability of 
distribution. The business community, therefore, sought out a particular type of economic 
advice. A 1912 letter from James H. Brookmire, founder of the Brookmire Economic 
Chart Company, highlighted the difference in interest, as he contrasted the business 
community’s fondness for the work of Samuel Benner (an Ohio farmer who published 
price forecasts) with its comparative disinterest in the theoretical work of professional 
economists.325 The development of business cycle theory and subsequent attempts to 
chart economic fluctuations, as exemplified by Harvard’s Economic Service following 
World War I, illustrates economists’ acknowledgment of the business community’s 
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particular interests and a sustained effort by some within the discipline to bridge the gap 
between theoretical and applied economics.326 
Professional economics had to be careful. If it ranged too far afield from the 
interests and prerogatives of the business community, the discipline risked appearing 
aloof and irrelevant. Yet seeming too closely aligned with the business community could 
be equally damaging. Ely, in a letter to Charles S. Hull discussing possible speakers for 
the 1901 annual meeting, cited such concerns about public appearances.327 Another letter 
from an Ithica businessman accused the professional economists of having fallen under 
the influence of powerful business interests. The Department of Economics at the 
University of Chicago, which was established along with the rest of the University 
through donations by J.D. Rockefeller, continued to draw accusations that its faculty was 
swayed by money, although Laughlin quite convincingly revealed the ridiculousness of 
the charge in an open letter.328 The department was remarkably diverse, and specific 
accusations of influence-peddling never panned out. The letter likely found little audience 
outside the professional economics community, however, because it was published in the 
Journal of Political Economy. 
 Accusations of impropriety aside, economists continued to publicly insert 
themselves into the policymaking process in a wholly unorganized fashion that was 
contingent upon individual personalities and prerogatives. English economist James 
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Bonar remarked that the country was overflowing with students of the science.329 The 
discipline’s ability to create and maintain the aura of professional expertise hinged on the 
maintenance of high academic standards and the use of an increasingly specialized 
terminology and methodology, but such exclusionary necessities had their unfortunate 
side-effects. For starters, such requirements made it difficult to appeal to the general 
public. Translating cutting edge economic theory into digestible prose for the non-expert 
was an increasingly difficult task for economists. Frank W. Noxon, Secretary of the 
Railway Business Association, hinted at the growing gap between professional 
economics and the general public in a letter sent to Thomas Carver to congratulate the 
Harvard economist on the success of The Distribution of Wealth. Noxon wrote, long 
before the emergence of mathematical models notoriously altered the discipline,  
…you[Carver] employ, in the main, language well calculated to make difficult 
economic conceptions clear to minds not accustomed to close analytical thinking. It 
would seem as if economic compositions held down to the ground in point of 
substance and treated with such clearness and simplicity would tend in the long run to 
diffuse as never before knowledge of economic principles, and to encourage political 
predilections correspondingly enlightened.330    
 
 Not all professional economists were as adept at measuring their prose, nor were 
they all sympathetic to the necessity of such efforts. Columbia’s Wesley C. Mitchell’s 
showed little sympathy for attempts to speak more plainly for lay audiences in a scathing 
review of Northwestern economist E.D. Howard’s Money and Banking (1910) – a book 
intended to transmit expert theory to the general public. In his response to concerns that 
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his review had been too harsh, Mitchell insisted that Howard “deserved to have his 
feelings hurt” for producing such slovenly prose.331   
The discipline was, in fact, becoming more insular. It was a byproduct of the 
professionalization of economics throughout the Western world. Specialized terminology 
allowed professional economists to more accurately communicate complex concepts, but 
increasingly even some professional economists felt uneasy with the proliferation of 
opaque language. William Warrand Carlile echoed Noxon’s sentiment with charges that 
neoclassical economists in particular were guilty of unnecessary abstruseness, noting 
“…the science [economics] has become every day more encumbered with a mass of 
phraseology altogether unknown to our fathers.”332  
 Professional economics in the U.S. was very much in a period of transition. The 
organization was no longer a beleaguered minority within academia that struggled to be 
heard. Nor was the discipline yet an incredibly complex and arcane subject that 
inadvertently discouraged outside participation, although it was moving in that direction. 
The AEA clearly cherished academic freedom and believed in the preservation of 
divergent opinions among its professional members. But as the discipline grew in every 
respect, it continued to erect barriers between itself, the public, and fellow academics. 
This intellectual insulation, a requirement of professionalization, would eventually dog 
the discipline when a lack of understanding translated into criticism and doubt over the 
professional economist’s value. The paradox – a lasting feature of the discipline, as time 
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would reveal – is striking. Economists in the U.S. had successfully built a professional 
network that ensured the discipline’s place on practically every college campus but still 
struggled to tie their expertise to the economic policymaking process. 
As we will see, such criticism and doubt already was apparent in the long-running 
debate over the labor question, which had proven to be the most combustible of the 
economic issues that faced turn of the century America. Labor reform was a hard fought 
issue that reflected the interdisciplinary struggle over the form and content of American 
economics. The rapid growth of professional economics ensured that the discipline was 
present throughout reformers’ attempts to reshape American labor relations. At the same 
time, the inability to develop stricter methodological and ethical guidelines left policy 
recommendations to the individual economist, which continued the uncertain relationship 
between expertise and public policy. Economists were free to enter the policymaking 
process, where their professional training and accreditation solicited growing respect, but 
the connection between their professional status and their growing role as components of 
American economic policymaking remained unclear. The inability to arrive at an 
intellectual consensus ultimately limited the professional economists’ efficacy in the 


















Chapter Four  
 
Economists and the Search for Industrial Order 
 
By 1900, the professional economics community had made little progress toward 
a concrete consensus on a constellation of economic questions that continued to perplex 
workers, employers, consumers, and politicians alike. Whereas professional consensus 
had provided a general agreement in regards to management of the money supply and the 
tariff legislation, professional economists remained sharply divided over what constituted 
proper industrial and labor policy. Conflict between employers and employees had been a 
pressing issue in America throughout the second wave of industrialization and garnered 
significant attention given its potential to split communities and end in violent 
confrontation. Fifteen years had passed since the formation of the American Economic 
Association and the corresponding increase in the number of institutions and personnel 
dedicated to the study of issues such as labor relations. But the ideological disagreements 
that characterized the formation of the AEA persisted, showing no sign of diminishing. 
At the same time professional economists’ failure to form a consensus on straightforward 
issues such as the role of labor unions or the need for worker’s compensation laws was 
initially obscured by the tremendous success of progressive reformers at the time.  
 Given the momentum with which the reform-minded new economists entered the 
century it is hardly surprising that they enjoyed some success in directly influencing labor 
reform. The new economists had pitched their ideas as the solution to the ill effects of 
industrialization, and conducted their research campaigns to root out poverty and 
eliminate industrial excess with enthusiasm. The department of economics at the 
University of Wisconsin provided a guiding light for pro-reform economists and played a 
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large role in the growth of the discipline throughout the Progressive Era. Professional 
economists’ involvement in the economic policymaking process continued to grow 
during the early twentieth century despite the discipline’s internal disagreements and at 
times it appeared the new economists’ most optimistic goals involving informed 
governance guided by objective expertise were within reach.  
Still, gauging professional economists’ influence in the fight over the labor and 
monopoly questions is difficult because there was no clear goal or belief behind which a 
majority of economists rallied. The discipline had developed the institutional support 
necessary to study labor and monopoly problems, but there was no mechanism for 
establishing a stance on policy. The AEA continued to abide by its commitment to avoid 
propagandizing. The executive committee, under Jeremiah Jenks’ presidency, sent 
representatives to the National Peace Conference in 1907, but that would be the exception 
that proved the rule.333 Subsequent requests for the organization’s cooperation from other 
interests were declined on the basis that mere involvement might be misconstrued as 
organizational sympathy and tarnish the profession’s reputation as an objective authority. 
The AEA stuck to its principles and even turned down requests to support anti-child labor 
legislation.334 The AEA’s refusal to pursue any form of disciplinary consensus ensured 
that there were no uniform goals in regards to the labor and monopoly questions.  
Those were complex, volatile issues and the decision to avoid jeopardizing the 
discipline’s future by attempting to forge a professional consensus was likely necessary 
to preserve the professional community. As with the money question, the labor and 
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monopoly questions were more than an academic exercise. Industrial relations, as the 
1912 Commission on Industrial Relations declared in its final report, dictated the pace 
and quality of life for millions of Americans.335 Furthermore, the labor question evoked 
questions about American identity and citizenship. The ability to secure economic 
independence through work was a prerequisite for active citizenship and the fluidity of 
the labor market that accompanied industrialization and increased immigration raised the 
specter of a much more diversified and unpredictable American society.  
The monopoly question was equally fraught with implications. Long concerned 
with the security of the democratic process, Americans feared that the large businesses 
that grew out of second wave industrialization might subvert the economic independence 
necessary for a healthy republic. Louis D. Brandeis, the well-know progressive attorney 
and Supreme Court judge, captured the sentiment well when he declared “We may have 
democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have 
both.”336 The unrestrained power of large businesses, whose resources dwarfed those of 
the federal government, was perceived by some Americans to be simply immoral. 
Journalists, novelists, and attorneys alike built careers on the public condemnation of 
unsavory business practices.  
 The stakes were quite clear, as were the challenges. To fulfill the potential 
expounded upon by the new economists, members of the recently organized economics 
profession had to provide concrete solutions to the everyday problems faced by 
Americans. As those committed to economic reform discovered, they had to do so 
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without the sort of institutional support that may have made the task much easier. The 
AEA’s decision to continuing eschewing controversy left economists as merely an 
additional voice in the policymaking process. Professional economists’ training did 
imbue them with a degree of social prestige that granted them direct access to the 
policymaking process. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the discipline’s influence in the 
Progressive era debates over labor and monopoly reform was mitigated by continued 
public skepticism, interdisciplinary strife, and ambiguity about the relationship between 
expertise and governance in a democratic society.  
 
The Wisconsin School 
 
 Although professional economists’ attempts to forge a response to the labor and 
monopoly questions began on the east coast, by the turn of the twentieth century the 
University of Wisconsin emerged as the center for reform-minded economics. Both labor 
and economic historians have long noted the significant influence of the Wisconsin 
School in the development of American labor economics.337 However, the discrepancy 
between the Wisconsin School’s influence at the state and federal levels warrants further 
consideration owing to its ability to shed light on the factors that enhanced or diminished 
economists’ influence over economic policy. Wisconsin School economists played a 
direct role in transforming Wisconsin into one of the more labor and consumer friendly 
states of the Progressive Era. Translating that success to the national level proved a 
difficult and untimely process – many of the Wisconsin School’s recommendations for 
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economic reform were not implemented until the economic crisis of the 1930s forced 
federal reform nearly 20 years later. The discrepancy in influence, as this chapter 
explains, was a product of differences between Wisconsin and national politics. The 
Wisconsin economists’ pro-labor activism cultivated powerful allies within the state 
community, but marked them as untrustworthy of un-American in national politics. 
 Members of the Wisconsin School were eventually labeled “institutionalists” on 
account of their tendency to emphasize the influence of public and private institutions on 
economic conditions. But for the first several decades of the Department’s existence the 
most observable unifying theme was a dual commitment to the German Historical 
School-inspired new economics and the progressive reform movement of the early 
twentieth century. Richard T. Ely and his equally prolific colleague and successor, John 
R. Commons, built the first economics department in the U.S. that not only taught a 
particular approach to the discipline but also instilled the belief that academic training 
ought to be applied to practical problems. As such, it represented the first and likeliest 
center of economic thought in the U.S. to have a direct influence on economic policy. 
 Ely’s appointment as head of the economics program by the University of 
Wisconsin’s Board of Regents proved to be a shrewd decision, despite the professor’s 
aforementioned brush with public controversy shortly after his arrival in 1892. The 
“socialism” controversy did little to curb Ely’s enthusiasm for the new economics and he 
continued to advocate for economic reform. The same year he faced Wells’ accusations, 
Ely published “On Natural Monopolies and the Workingman in America” in the North 
American Review, in which he sketched the rationale behind the interventionist economic 
policy that the Wisconsin School came to promote. The succinct article, written for a lay 
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audience, eschewed both private ownership and regulation in favor of public ownership 
of several key industries that had emerged during the late nineteenth century (namely 
railroad, telegraph, and gas networks).338 Ely justified his position by arguing that these 
industries in particular were natural monopolies – for which duplicate network 
construction was enormously wasteful – and their privatization had led to “unearned 
income” for those who presided over the new, large industrial corporations that had come 
to dominate American business.339  
 Ely went on to yolk the issue of labor rights to that of private ownership, arguing 
“The monopolist is not likely to be a good employer of labor. His power is so great, and 
that of a single wage-earner so small in comparison, that the former is exposed to the 
danger of becoming an arbitrary and arrogant employer.”340 Public ownership, Ely again 
suggested, would resolve the most explosive labor disputes because representative 
government by its nature is more responsive to workers’ demands than private owners. 
From 1894 onward, Ely committed his energy to building Wisconsin’s economics 
program around these principles. 
 It was a perfect fit for a state led by the progressive icon Robert La Follette. 
“Fighting Bob’s” career, which included two terms as governor of Wisconsin (1901-
1906) followed by three full terms in the U.S. Senate (1906- 1925), overlapped with the 
peak of the Wisconsin School’s influence over state economic policy.341 Undeterred by 
the often-harsh criticism from his conservative opponents, La Follette sought out 
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academic experts to study the state’s problems and recommend policy solutions. Such a 
system could only work provided the proper civil servants and policy experts were in 
place and in the early 1900s Wisconsin was one of the few states that could boast such a 
resource. 
The idea of calling on knowledgeable professionals to help craft economic policy, 
dubbed the “Wisconsin Idea” by legislative librarian Charles McCarthy in The Wisconsin 
Idea, was by McCarthy’s account not as much a rigid philosophy as an ethos.342 
McCarthy himself was an interesting character. Prior to his time in Wisconsin he had 
worked as a shoemaker and sailor, obtained a bachelor’s degree from Brown University, 
then coached the University of Georgia’s football team to pay his way through law 
school.343  While at Georgia, McCarthy studied economics and the power dynamics of 
slavery, at which point he saw the issue of economic control in a new light.344 Attracted to 
Ely’s new economics, he headed north in 1899 to enroll at the University of Wisconsin, 
where he obtained a Ph. D. in history in 1901. Advocates of the Wisconsin Idea, 
McCarthy explained, sought to use the state to temper the power of big business and 
ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth. Achieving this goal required state leaders 
to tap into the community’s collective knowledge and resources in order to become 
“efficiency experts.”345 The professional economists at the state’s flagship university, 
naturally, loomed large in such a system. 
Wisconsin was neither the first nor the only state to view its school system as a 
potential driver of civic improvement. The first colleges in America were prized for their 
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ability to produce a steady stream of clergy whose instruction would uplift the 
communities in which they preached. State assemblies and the founders of numerous 
post-secondary schools  in the nineteenth century had spoken of  more direct bonds 
between education and civic activism, though such lofty ambitions never moved beyond 
the theoretical.
 346 Several factors converged to set Wisconsin apart. In addition to La 
Follette’s support from his position of power, the state capital stood literally down the 
street from the University campus. This geographic proximity put Wisconsin legislators 
in direct contact with the academic experts who figured so largely in the Wisconsin Idea. 
The establishment of a legislative library in 1901 helped cement the connection. The 
legislative library, founded by McCarthy shortly after his graduation, served as a non-
partisan resource for lawmakers engaged in the process of drafting legislation.
347
 Spotting 
an opportunity to apply the training he received under Ely to the economic problems of 
the state, McCarthy heavily encourage both the library’s use and its expansion over the 
succeeding twenty years.348  
  The library was housed in the state capital and made use of contributions from 
University of Wisconsin faculty who frequented the capital building and provided 
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lawmakers with up-to-date information on a host of topics.349 In addition to aiding the 
library’s reference center, the Wisconsin economists and their students promoted and 
delivered lectures in the Assembly chamber, bringing the two houses of state government 
together to hear lectures from experts on state issues as often as three times a week at the 
height of involvement in 1911.350 The state assembly members, labor economist Selig 
Perlman later recalled, “were so friendly to the university experts. They appreciated the 
aid which they got from such men as Commons and others and, of course, we must not 
overlook the great role played by Dr. Charles McCarthy who was, well, who was really 
the lobbyist for the people.”351 
The Wisconsin Idea also derived considerable support from a constituency of 
farmers and industrial workers of German and Scandinavian extraction, whose thick 
accents colored the Assembly’s meetings and left a strong impression on Perlman, who 
was then working as Commons’ graduate assistant.352 Wisconsin’s demographics were of 
great consequence. The state’s ethnic composition was such that McCarthy referred to it 
as “fundamentally a German state” in 1912 – a point he unscientifically, yet convincingly 
demonstrated by referencing the last names in the University of Wisconsin’s student and 
faculty directory.353 The political traditions of the German and Scandinavian immigrants 
that flowed into the state throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries lent 
                                                          
349
 Marion Casey, “Charles McCarthy’s‘ Idea’: A Library to Change Government,” The Library Quarterly 
44, no. 1 (January 1974): 29–41. 
350
 Selig Perlman, “Tape No. 1,” April 13, 1950, 10, Papers, circa 1909-1998, Wisconsin Historical 
Society. 
351
 Ibid., 11. 
352
Jørn Brøndal, Ethnic Leadership and Midwestern Politics: Scandinavian Americans and the Progressive 
Movement in Wisconsin, 1890-1914 (Northfield, MN; Urbana and Chicago: Norwegian-American 
Historical Association; Distributed by the University of Illinois Press, 2004). Jørn Brøndal, “The Ethnic 
and Racial Side of Robert M. La Follette Sr.,” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 10, no. 3 
(2011): 340–353. Perlman, “Tape No. 1,” 10.   
353
 McCarthy, The Wisconsin Idea, 20. 
  
   
154 
 
valuable popular support to the push for increased state involvement in economic affairs. 
It was a reciprocal relationship and the University’s economics faculty helped Wisconsin 
political activists sharpen their impulses into more specific ideas. This dynamic helped 
make Wisconsin an especially liberal, pro-labor state, lending electoral support to pro-
government ideas of the sort articulated by new economists at the University.354  
The Wisconsin Idea benefitted not only from committed political leadership, 
research resources, and an amenable electorate, but also from the continued growth and 
success of the University’s economics program. By the time La Follette assumed the 
governorship in 1901, Ely already had more than 15 years of teaching, research, and 
public service under his belt – more than enough to market himself as an expert advisor.  
The Wisconsin Idea received an additional boost with Commons’ arrival in 1904. 
Together, Ely and Commons built a unique department that embodied the University’s 
commitment not only to teaching, but also to community outreach.355 Commons’ 
appointment proved as shrewd as that of Ely. The Distribution of Wealth (1893), 
Commons’ first contribution to American economics, hinted at enthusiasm for the sort of 
economic activism practiced by his mentors at Johns Hopkins University (where he had 
studied under Ely and Sidney Sherwood).356 Commons had downplayed the significance 
of marginal utility theory and echoed the belief that particular industries in a modern 
economy tended toward monopolization and required public ownership. Yet The 
Distribution of Wealth was a largely dry effort directed at the professional economics 
community. Social Reform and the Church, published one year later with an enthusiastic 
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forward from Ely, better demonstrated Commons’ strong commitment to social activism 
rooted in religious principles.357 Furthermore, Commons’ second effort was a 
combination of lectures delivered to lay audiences, thus reflecting his desire to extend his 
influence beyond academia. The tone and arguments of Social Reform and the Church 
remove any doubts about Commons’ intellectual disposition left by The Distribution of 
Wealth. Commons was among the first generation of American economists trained by 
those who had studied in Germany at the peak of the late nineteenth century boom in 
economic thought, and he supported the project to remake American economic 
relationships through reform.   
After brief stints teaching at Oberlin College and the University of Indiana, 
Commons had moved to Syracuse and taught at the University until 1899, when his 
unconventional opinions about Sunday activities ran afoul of the school’s more pious 
boosters and led to his dismissal.358 Unemployed and unsure of where to go, Commons 
was offered a position at the Bureau of Economic Research by George H. Shibley – the 
self-taught lawyer who had appealed to populists with his call for free silver, as described 
in chapter two.359 Shibley persuaded Commons to head the Bureau, which was Shibley’s 
project to acquire and disseminate statistical data on commodities prices. But the 
arrangement was short-lived and Commons soon found himself unemployed once more. 
The situation was quickly remedied by an offer from E. Dana Durand, Commons’ former 
student at Oberlin College and the Secretary to the United States Industrial Commission. 
Durand enlisted Commons to complete a report on Immigration. This work was followed 
by a stint as assistant to Ralph M. Easly, the then secretary of the National Civic 
                                                          
357
 John R. Commons, Social Reform and the Church (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 1894). 
358
 Commons, Myself: The Autobiography of John R. Commons, 57–59. 
359
 Ibid., 63. 
  
   
156 
 
Federation. This series of academic and practical training, combined with Commons’ 
enthusiasm for reformist economist, made him a perfect candidate to join the faculty at 
Wisconsin and Ely secured a position for his former student in 1904. 
Like Ely, Commons helped pioneer labor economics in the U.S. and attempted to 
transform the discipline from an intellectual movement based on moral convictions to a 
movement more grounded in empirical science. Within several years of Commons’ 
arrival, the state’s reputation as a liberal laboratory had stretched across the nation. 
Newspapers and journals made note of the phenomenon and attracted sympathetic 
intellectuals, including the aforementioned Perlman, who described the following 
decades as “the golden age of Wisconsin, both intellectually and politically.”360   
To be effective, the Wisconsin Idea required a bureaucracy staffed by researchers 
and assistants versed in the skills necessary for gathering and processing large amounts of 
information. To meet the demand, Ely and Commons trained students who embodied 
both the public-mindedness and technical know-how necessary to pursue progressive 
legislation. From 1893 to 1920, the department of economics conferred 65 doctorate 
degrees, an average of 2.4 per year.361 Of those degrees, nearly half listed Ely, Commons 
or William A. Scott an advisor. Twenty-eight did not list a major professor, which leaves 
one to assume some combination of Ely, Commons, or Scott advised the student, 
although not enough to earn mention as a primary advisor.  
Doctoral students accounted for only a fraction of total students trained in 
economics by Ely, Commons, Scott, and their successors, of course. Exact figures are 
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elusive, but it is safe to conclude that the department conferred approximately 75 
undergraduate degrees in economics in 1902 with the number per year rising gradually to 
231 in 1920.362 Graduates of the department went on to promote the Wisconsin Idea 
through teaching, research, and public service. Among the most influential graduates 
were Helen Sumners Woodbury, who worked for a series of federal agencies on a 
contract basis before accepting a position with the Children’s Bureau, and John B. 
Andrews, who founded the American Association for Labor Legislation – an organization 
whose influence one-time AEA president and AER editor Davis Dewey claimed was on 
par with that of the AEA’s activities or Laughlin’s efforts to maintain the gold 
standard.363 Andrews also ran the organization’s journal, the American Labor Legislation 
Review, and throughout his career pursued progressive federal labor legislation.  
 Additional graduates included John Fitch, who worked for the New York 
Department of Labor and edited the social workers’ magazine Survey following his 
contribution to Paul Kellogg’s landmark study of steel workers in Pittsburgh, The 
Pittsburgh Survey; Henry C. Taylor and John D. Black, both of whom went on to 
promote policy reform to prop up the agricultural industry; and Selig Perlman, Frederick 
S. Deibler, Ezekiel H. Downey, Warren M. Persons, all of whom enjoyed long careers as 
academic economists.364 The Wisconsin School also produced key economists of the 
generation that were to help oversee the creation and implementation of New Deal 
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programs, such as Edwin Witte, “the father of social security.”365 These men and women 
carried on the spirit of the new economics and public service so ingrained at Wisconsin, 
and in doing so, pressed professional economics farther into the policymaking process at 
both the state and federal levels. 
With the support of a strong research staff, Commons coordinated closely with 
the La Follette faction in Wisconsin politics in order to promote economic reform 
through legislation. The list of reforms, many of them either firsts or among the first of 
their kind, included a public utilities law, workmen’s compensation, progressive taxation, 
unemployment compensation, employer’s liability law, and railway rate regulation. The 
Wisconsin School was also instrumental in the formation and operation of the Industrial 
Commission of Wisconsin, which served the interests of state reformers and passed 
numerous regulations for businesses in the state. 366 
 
The Wisconsin Idea Goes National 
 
The Wisconsin School’s influence was not limited to state matters, and it was 
their attempt to translate the Wisconsin Idea’s principles to the national level that 
highlights the contentious nature of professional economists’ influence during the early 
twentieth century. In addition to serving as an exemplar of state economic reform for 
progressives throughout the nation, Commons and his team of research assistants 
intervened in national matters on two fronts. On the academic front, Commons oversaw 
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the research and writing of A Documentary History of American Industrial Society, a 
landmark study in labor economics. On the applied economics front, Commons and his 
graduate assistants played a significant role in the work of the 1912 Commission on 
Industrial Relations, better known as the Walsh Commission. Neither endeavor was 
without its successes, but both efforts made clear that the influence of the Wisconsin 
School was exceptional and that professional economists would remain an unpredictable 
variable in the policymaking process.     
Writing and editing A Documentary History of American Industrial Society 
occupied the economists of Wisconsin well before the Walsh Commission demanded 
their attention. The ten-volume project was housed at the University of Wisconsin, but 
backed by more than $30,000 in funding from the American Bureau of Industrial 
Research (ABIR) and a mixture of industrialists with whom Ely and Commons were 
acquainted.367 The project also received notable support from the Carnegie Institution’s 
labor history project following the death former U.S. Commissioner of Labor Carroll 
Wright, who had overseen the project.368 All of this made Documentary History one of 
the nation’s most generously funded projects of its kind. 
The series was a culmination of several decades’ work that stretched back to the 
publication of Ely’s The Labor Movement in America (1886).369 Frustrated by what he 
saw as a lack of appreciation for economic records, Ely had endeavored to gather as 
many primary sources on the labor movement as possible. His personal collection, at 
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times, had struck his colleagues as peculiar and unnecessary, but Ely had finally realized 
his scholarly vision through the formation of the ABIR and the publication of its most 
prominent series. The series was important in itself, but it also represented a larger 
commitment to creating a depository of source material from which future economists 
could reliably draw evidence – a national legislative library of sorts.   
True to the form of the German Historical School that had inspired Commons, A 
Documentary History of American Industrial Society was intended to provide solutions to 
America’s labor dilemma through methodological analysis of how the American 
economy had developed over the previous century (the previous two centuries in the case 
of the South).370 Labor was indeed the central focus of the series despite its more 
inclusive title. The series relied on noted Southern historian Ulrich B. Phillips to describe 
plantation culture and the frontier.371 The eight remaining volumes of the series were 
organized by Commons and his assistants from the ABIR, and contained documents 
relevant to labor conspiracy cases and labor movements from 1806-1842 and 1820-1880, 
respectively. Ely’s preface conveyed the conviction, by that time ingrained in American 
new economics, that overcoming the challenges of industrialization was largely a matter 
of research, education, and action. The Documentary History, it was hoped, fulfilled two 
of the prerequisites for reform. 
The series’ positive reception reinforced the Wisconsin economists’ recognized 
status among professional economists as leading experts on the issue of labor relations. 
The University of Pennsylvania’s Emory R. Johnson’s declared “This ‘Documentary 
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History’ …outranks all other publications upon American labor, both because of the 
value of the documents to students of history, and because of the illuminating economic 
analyses...”372  University of Illinois economist Ernest L. Bogart met the release of the 
first two volumes with a similarly effusive review in The Economic Bulletin, where he 
declared the series a “significant event in the history of economics in the United 
States.”373 Naturally, there were minor quibbles. Bogart’s review of later volumes noted 
skepticism regarding Commons’ interpretation of labor’s role in securing homestead 
legislation in the mid-nineteenth century.374 Johnson also criticized the last four volumes 
of the series on account of Commons’ obvious interest in Horace Greely and subsequent 
narrow reading of the mid-nineteenth century labor movement.375 
The series failed to garner much attention outside the professional economics 
community, however. Newspaper coverage of the ABIR accomplishment was limited to a 
handful of publication notices and short reviews. The project was a distinctly academic 
endeavor and would serve as a valuable resource for researchers in the years to come, but 
the editors’ failure to recommend policy reform, the lack of a clear narrative, and its 
length placed the series beyond the reach of all but the most dedicated public officials. 
The limited influence of the series points to the general dilemma of public recognition 
that economists began to face with growing regularity. Such endeavors were necessary to 
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build disciplinary expertise, but academic research was also a costly process that 
typically produced a specialized product tailored to the professional economics 
community, which surely lent merit to charges that the discipline was slowly becoming 
an arcane field of inquiry. The publication of the documentary series was a notable 
achievement. It marked the completion of a major research project that culminated in the 
creation of a valuable resource for the discipline, not just in the form of the published 
series, but also the catalogued archive from which documents in the published series had 
been gathered. Translating this accomplishment into economic policy that would 
satisfactorily address the labor question was another matter. 
On the applied economics front, the Wisconsin economists found themselves in a 
position to affect national change, though conditions proved unfavorable to the national 
emulation of the Wisconsin Idea. Theodore Roosevelt’s glowing praise of Wisconsin’s 
economic policies in his introduction to McCarthy’s The Wisconsin Idea – a system he 
described as the practical application of “sane radicalism” – reflected not only the success 
of the Wisconsin School, but also his growing interest in harnessing the power of experts 
to engineer economic reform.376 In 1913, members of the American Political Science 
Association’s Committee on Practical Training, in conjunction with representatives from 
the American Economic Association, compiled a report to analyze how the recent 
enthusiasm for expertise was being applied across the country.  The report’s authors 
identified a growing belief that the knowledge accumulated by economists and political 
scientists ought to be applied to public policy, noting:  
The scientific student has well equipped laboratories provided for him, and 
considerable laboratory work required of all students of the natural sciences, even 
in elementary courses. The student of geology has his field excursions to make 
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surveys…The student of astronomy has his observatory…Engineering students 
have their summer camps and their assignment to business establishments…Thus, 
the college and university has long recognized, in several departments of learning, 
the need for personal contact with actual problems of the various fields of 
experience.377  
 
A handful of university-supported research bureaus sprang up in the years following the 
establishment of the Wisconsin reference library, although not enough to suggest that the 
push to meld academic expertise with public governance was ubiquitous. The 
committee’s report identified nine reference bureaus with university ties. In addition to 
Wisconsin, the Universities of Oregon, Texas, Washington, California, Cincinnati, and 
Iowa had each moved to provided reference services for public. Harvard University 
established two such institutions – one dedicated to municipal research and the other 
business research (both of which preceded the creation of the Harvard Economic Service 
in 1917).378  
Professional economists’ lack of formal procedure and passive role in the 
policymaking process meant that there was little chance of them exerting a strong, 
consistent influence on the policymaking process in most states. The idea behind 
reference libraries and bureaus of research was to support the democratic process by 
providing the information necessary to make sound decisions when crafting policy. In 
Wisconsin, state legislators often consulted with professional economists owing to a 
combination of geographic convenience, political culture, and assertive leadership within 
the department of economics at the University of Wisconsin. Outside Wisconsin, 
arrangements were less clear. In his 1914 survey of reference libraries in the United 
States, librarian Jon B. Kaiser noted an emerging tendency to place reference work 
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“directly under the control of university authorities,” or at least to coordinate with such 
experts. But the movement to establish such institutions was carried out simultaneously 
by public librarians and cities without university support.379  
Kaiser’s observation dove-tailed with the sentiments of a report issued by the joint 
APSA-AEA Committee on Practical Training. “The New Democracy,” the report’s 
authors concluded, required public servants versed in the details of governance and 
capable of supplementing elected officials.380  The report’s authors were unable to deliver 
clear recommendations for how to translate ideals into action, however. The report only 
vaguely described the criteria that defined reliable public servants, and made no 
recommendation for the standardization of course work. Hands-on experience, it was 
assumed, made the expert. The vagueness of professional economists’ role in the 
policymaking process, underscored from the beginning by the fact that the report was the 
initiative of American Political Science Association, was further illustrated by the fact 
that research bureaus employed a mixture of social scientists.  
That economists were recognized as necessary but vaguely relevant and certainly 
not privileged components of the policymaking process was echoed by Commons’ 
experience with the Walsh Commission, which began its work in 1912.381 The 
Commission was formed following President Howard Taft’s call for an investigation of 
the on-going conflict between labor and capital – a conflict underscored by the bombing 
of the Los Angeles Times’ offices in response to their perceived antipathy toward labor. 
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The Walsh Commission (named after Commission Chairman and labor lawyer Frank P. 
Walsh), held the potential to place professional economists on the national stage and 
demonstrate the usefulness of economic expertise to lawmakers and to the public. 
Although it was tasked with purely investigative powers, the Commission provided a 
national platform and the ample resources to support careful investigation of the labor 
problem. Over the course of its two-year investigation, the Commission interviewed 
Commons’ former students and by-then-established professional economists John. B. 
Andrews, John A. Fitch, and William M. Leiserson, in addition to Charles McCarthy and 
members of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission. McCarthy and Perlman also served on 
the Commission as support personnel.382 The Commission’s research staff, headed by 
Commons and McCarthy, commissioned studies by economists George E. Barnett, D.A. 
McCabe, Leo Wolman, Sumner Slichter, Henry Hoagland, Robert Hoxie, and Carl 
Hookstadt.383 
What began as a great opportunity, both in terms of Commons’ career and the 
discipline as a whole, gradually lapsed into great disappointment. Commons later recalled 
his work with the Commission as one of the “tragic events” in his academic life.384 
Perlman recalled in a similarly frustrated manner how Commons’ involvement with the 
Walsh Commission “robbed him of him of his sleep and peace of mind” and how “he 
really grieved over the whole business.”385  
The sources of Commons’ grief lie in Walsh’s decision to ignore his opinion, 
which also happened to be the majority opinion of the Commission’s board. By June 
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1915, the Commission had interviewed more than 700 witnesses and was ready to 
complete its investigation into the sources of industrial unrest.386 The Commission had 
polarized opinions with its at times aggressive investigative techniques – particularly 
Walsh’s cross-examination of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., following the Ludlow Massacre in 
April 1914. The Commission adopted an increasingly confrontational tone that 
undoubtedly polarized those who followed the Commission’s progress, which in turn 
placed the professional economists involved with the Commission’s work in an awkward 
position. Ostensibly tapped as neutral specialists, the economists interviewed and 
employed by the Commission, as with any expert eyewitness, could be easily dismissed 
as either socialist radicals or “bought men” working on behalf of moneyed interests.   
The Commission’s investigative strategy failed to take full advantage of the 
investigative abilities of its professional economists on staff. Of the 740 witnesses called, 
only 20 were economists or sociologists. Rather than utilizing the testimony of the 
Commission’s economic experts, who were listed in the final report as “non-affiliated” 
witnesses, Walsh relied on sensational testimony to underscore the severity of labor 
discord. Commons, meanwhile, led the Commission’s private research staff and observed 
the public hearings from a distance.387 These differences in temperament and 
methodology led Walsh and Commons to two very different conclusions, which clashed 
in the summer of 1915 when Commission members began drafting a report for Congress. 
To Commons’ frustration, Walsh rejected the respected economist’s report, opting 
instead to submit a report drafted by a staff member and signed by a minority of the 
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Commission’s members. To work around the fact that Commons’ report had attracted the 
signature of five Commission members and was, in fact, the majority report, Walsh 
referred to his as the “staff” report and insisted on its supremacy. The difference between 
the two reports was stark, as evidenced by the introduction to Commons’ “minority 
report” which stated: 
We find ourselves unable to agree with other recommendations and resolutions 
for legislation that would be enforceable, or because they are directed to making a 
few individuals scapegoats, where what is needed is serious attentions to the 
system that produces the demand for scapegoats, and with it the breakdown of 
labor legislation in this country.388 
 
Walsh’s “majority” report pulled no punches in its criticism of the nation’s 
industrial and financial elite, citing the uneven distribution of wealth and poor working 
conditions as the root of labor turmoil. The conclusions were largely well-founded, but 
the tone evoked a strong negative reaction in conservative circles. The sharpest criticism 
portrayed the report as hopelessly biased. Former President Taft chastised Walsh for his 
lack of “judicial poise,” while the Los Angeles. Times decried the call for a national 
minimum wage and legalization of sympathy strikes.389 Most papers chose to focus on the 
Commission’s lack of consensus, which implicitly undercut the influence of its work.  
Commons’ report agreed with the “majority” report’s findings with regard to the 
abuses that required addressing. But rather than calling for the restructuring of American 
industrial relations and the redistribution of wealth, he called for the establishment of 
federal agencies capable of investigating labor relations and enforcing the laws and codes 
already on the books; he reasoned dramatic reform was unlikely and that the failure to 
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enforce existing labor laws was as harmful to labor relations as any other concern. Later, 
in his autobiography, Commons described the difference in opinion, reflecting, “I 
thought, at that time, that the three labor representatives were being misled by the general 
labor unrest into throwing their movement into politics. I wanted them to avoid 
politics…” and instead focus on setting up federal labor boards so as to meet employers 
at the bargaining table.390 
Commons’ recommendations were, both logistically and politically, more 
practical than Walsh’s and reflected his expertise and experience with crafting policy in 
Wisconsin. Additionally, Commons’ insistence on the establishment of federal agencies – 
staffed by neutral experts as well as labor and employer representatives – was a 
reasonable proposal that had worked in Wisconsin. But Commons’ standing as the 
board’s only economic expert carried little weight and his recommendation was 
consequently ignored. The Commission successfully exposed labor conflict, but failed to 
take the next step toward action. 
 
 
Obstacles to Influence  
  
 The Wisconsin School’s failure to translate its success to the national stage raises 
questions about the efficacy of economic expertise in general during the Progressive Era. 
It is tempting to dismiss the Walsh Commission as an exceptional incident and to focus 
instead on the continued diffusion of professional economists throughout government 
agencies as evidence of the discipline’s increased influence. But Commons’ experience 
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demonstrates that presence did not necessarily translate to influence. As Perlman 
reflected, the disappointment about missed opportunities and unfulfilled visions that he 
and others endured in Wisconsin redounded in other states that tried to import the 
Wisconsin Idea and make use of expertise in the policymaking process. Policymaker’s 
reluctance or unwillingness to accept the input of professional economists likely stemmed 
from institutional inertia and political expediency. The economic expert was still a 
relatively new concept and it would take time to work such figures into the policymaking 
process. 
Additionally, the public’s concerns regarding political bias and subjectivity 
continued to be powerful factors and help account for the reluctance to accept 
professional input. It is clear that accusations from conservative Americans concerning 
the Wisconsin School’s political leanings hounded the profession in general and made it 
difficult to refine and export the Wisconsin Idea. Wisconsin School members and their 
colleagues were burdened by accusations of ideological extremism. The issues of 
academic freedom and public animosity toward anything that so much as hinted toward 
socialist origins continued to weigh on the minds of heterodox economists. The 
Wisconsin crowd kept close tabs on cases of academic censure, as evidenced by the 
collection of materials related to freedom of speech cases maintained by Ely, Commons, 
John Fitch, and Helen Woodbury Summers throughout their careers. Periodic incidents 
did little to assuage public fears about the connection between radicalism and heterodox 
economic thought. Socialist candidates for office boasted of their study of political 
economy as a qualification.391 Political economics professors endorsed socialist 
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candidates.392 Even some political assassins cited their study of political economy as a 
moment of awakening.393 To counter the fall-out the Wisconsin crowd became adept at 
distancing itself from the hot-headed activists who invoked political economic theory as 
justification for their view and actions.  
Throughout the early twentieth century the Wisconsin School economists were 
careful to avoid overt sympathy with the socialist cause. Following his brush with 
controversy Ely made sure to espouse the virtues of American democracy and freedom, 
perhaps in an effort to expunge from the public’s mind any recollection of his association 
with socialism. His caution was such that the impression emerged, according to Perlman, 
that Ely had turned conservative by the 1910s.394 There is no evidence that Ely’s 
dismissal of communist and socialist solutions was anything but genuine, nor that he 
eschewed his earlier progressive ideology. Ely ensured that his students studied and 
understood Marx, but encouraged the rejection of Marxist solutions to American labor 
issues. Marx’s Communist Manifesto was common reading for graduate students at 
Wisconsin. Student responses are difficult to determine, but a critique of the Communist 
Manifesto prepared under Ely by John Fitch, then a new graduate student with strong 
populist leanings, speaks volumes.395 Fitch agreed with Engels and Marx’s general 
assessment of the problems posed by industrialization, but rejected the prophetic 
warnings of a vanishing middle class that invoked a need for radical reform. When 
accusations of socialist-leanings dogged David Saposs during his tenure as chief 
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economist on the National Labor Relations Board, his supporters balked at the notion and 
insisted that the Wisconsin-trained economist came from a tradition of “old-line 
Wisconsin liberals” who had fought communists at the state level for some time.396 
Not every new economist pulled back from controversy. At Wisconsin alone, 
several high-profile economists courted trouble. Commons’ decision to invite 
controversial anarchist activist Emma Goldman to speak to his class in 1910 raised 
eyebrows, and concerns.397 Commons did not condone Goldman’s views and, like Ely, 
stridently opposed socialism as a political movement, yet felt the need to grant Goldman 
an audience. Edward Ross – the controversial sociologist who had been dismissed from 
Stanford for controversial statements regarding railroad and Asian labor – actively 
supported Goldman’s visit by introducing her at a socialist gathering following a tour of 
the campus. Ross was censured by the Board of Regents for giving the impression that he 
condoned radicalism.398 Curiously, Commons avoided a reprimand from University 
authorities, and his autobiographical account of Goldman’s visit is the only one that 
suggests the economist played more than an informed spectator’s role in the whole affair. 
In this instance, the leader of the Wisconsin School may have overstated his role as an 
iconoclast. 
Helen Sumner Woodbury, a frequent collaborator of Commons’ and a well-
known labor economist in her own right, believed the study of economics was 
intertwined with the pursuit of broader social justice, particularly when it came to child 
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labor and women’s issues. Woodbury supported the defense of Lucifer the Light-Bearer, 
an anarchist periodical that ran afoul of highly restrictive indecency laws in 1905, and 
demonstrated a similar commitment to progressive causes through donations to the 
Sanger Defense Fund ten years later.399 Fitch, for his part, publicly supported the League 
of Free Nations Association’s efforts in to reinstate a New York Assembly member that 
had been ousted in 1920 because of his socialist convictions.400 
The Wharton School’s 1915 dismissal of Scott Nearing, a young and promising 
economist who enjoyed the support of his former teacher and highly respected colleague 
Simon P. Patten, reinforced what most reform-minded new economists understood. 
Addressing the labor question was more than simply an academic exercise. Debates over 
the proper relationship between the state and labor evoked powerful emotions from all 
parties involved. Nor could the labor question easily be separated from broader debates 
over the character and conduct of state and federal government in general. Reform 
required public sympathy, and the new economists’ reputation as radicals, warranted or 
not, rendered it difficult to gather the broad support necessary translate their expertise 
into progressive economic policies at the national level. Just as economists who engaged 
in debate about monetary policy were dogged by suspicions about their motivations many 
of those who sought labor and anti-monopoly legislation were subject to dismissal as 
hopelessly biased sources.  
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 It is beyond question that both labor and anti-monopoly legislation were 
strengthened from 1900 to 1917. Likewise, it is clear that professional economists exerted 
some measure of influence over the public policymaking process in select states and at 
the federal level. The work of the Wisconsin School economists was, despite its 
impressive scope, only a fraction of the work done by professional economists at the state 
and federal level during the period in question. From 1900 onward, state and federal 
politicians and agencies increasingly found it necessary to call on trained economists to 
both advise and to serve within the growing state bureaucracy. 
Yet as close examination of the Wisconsin School’s early twentieth century 
efforts makes clear, the degree of influence economists exerted on the policymaking 
process was limited by concerns over the integrity and ability of the profession. The 
voting public and policymakers alike turned to professional economists in the most 
sparing of fashions by invoking economists’ expertise when convenient and ignoring it 
when it was expedient. The discipline’s refusal to establish specific goals or endorse 
economic policies was perhaps necessary in a culture that claimed to prize freedom of 
expression and the open exchange of thought. But it also encouraged the proliferation of 
opinions regarding proper economic policy. As with the money issue, it quickly became 
clear the Congress’ failure to heed the advice of Commons and his “minority” report 
represented a missed opportunity. The leading labor economist of the time watched in 
frustration as the nation turned away from his proposed solution of government mediated 
collective bargaining at a time when its speedy adoption seemed an eminently reasonable 
and rational solution to ongoing economic problems.401 
 
                                                          
401
 Commons, Myself: The Autobiography of John R. Commons, 174–175. 
  







Obscured Irrelevance: Economists in the Boom Years, 1917-1929 
 
 
John R. Commons’ failure to exert influence on Walsh Commission revealed the 
vagaries of professional economists’ influence. The passive approach to reform on which 
so many economists relied, which depended on lawmakers to tap recognized experts for 
advice while crafting economic policy, assumed that lawmakers’ desire to deliver sound 
policy would trump political pressure. Leading economists’ continued support for the 
American Economic Association’s role as a passive facilitator of the exchange of 
economic thought reflected a noble commitment to democratic ideals, but left the 
discipline’s relevance to the American economic policymaking process uncertain at best.  
This systemic barrier was often obscured by signs of success. Even though 
professional economists in the U.S. now were a generation removed from the explosion 
in economic thought that had established economics programs in school across the 
country, the discipline continued to grow. Woodrow Wilson’s presidency and the 
exigencies of World War I temporarily masked the tenuous connection between 
economic experience and economic policy and suggested that, set-backs aside, the new 
economists’ vision of a technocratic democracy eventually would be fulfilled. However, 
the events of the 1920s make clear that even as the discipline reached advanced stages of 
professionalization the connection between professional economics and economic policy 
remained unclear. Thus a paradox emerged: professional economics in the U.S. matured 
as a distinct discipline with a strong institutional foundation, yet professional economists 
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struggled to see their rough consensus on key issues translated into economic policy in a 




Wilson owed his rise to the White House in 1912 in part to his reputation as an 
academic in tune with the progressivism advocated by the new economists. The discourse 
surrounding the 1912 Presidential campaign indicated that Americans acknowledged 
“Professor Wilson’s” academic credentials and, by extension, those of professional 
economists he had learned from and consulted with. Wilson’s training in political 
economy and political science at Johns Hopkins University was noted from the outset of 
the race and used to distinguish him from the other candidates. In his second year of 
graduate studies, Richard T. Ely invited Wilson and future progressive intellectual John 
Dewey to join him in writing a textbook on the history of political economy in the United 
States.402 Although the book was never published, Wilson did produce his portion of the 
manuscript, which biographer Henry Bragdon notes for its clear embrace of state 
intervention and sense of economic progressivism.403 Following short terms teaching 
political economy and political science at Bryn Mawr College and Wesleyan University, 
Wilson accepted a position at Princeton University and eventually assumed the 
presidency. As president of the university, he instituted reforms to modernize the 
curriculum that were not unlike those his former teacher Ely had encouraged decades 
prior at Hopkins. The combination of his intellectual heritage and support of Ely’s 
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“radical” first draft of the AEA’s constitution left no doubt that Wilson was sympathetic 
to the ideas of the new economists.  
While previous U.S. presidents had called on economic advisors in the past, 
Wilson was the first to fully harness the social prestige of professional economics. His 
public persona rested on the notion that he was in league with experts in the discipline 
who pursued reform for the sake of the public’s welfare. Wilson’s academic training, 
although a justification for derision in the eyes of his opponents, inspired confidence 
among his supporters. As the The Baltimore Sun noted, “In the early days of the republic 
men like Thomas Jefferson retired from the Presidency to become college presidents. 
Wilson resigned the presidency of Princeton to go into politics.”404 It seemed as if 
Americans were slowly warming to the idea of academic expertise driving government. 
Wilson’s rise to the White House suggested a bright future for professional economists. 
Americans apparently saw some benefit in electing a political leader familiar with the 
expertise of trained economists. His presidency, to be clear, was not the first sign that 
modern economists’ ideas had an influence on federal economic policy. Rather, Wilson’s 
election served as a symbolic victory and suggested missed opportunities such as the 
Indianapolis Monetary Commission’s failure to endorse a centralized banking system or 
the Walsh Commission’s rejection of federal arbitration boards – both prescient ideas that 
were recommended by economic advisors - might soon be a failure of the past.  
After some political maneuvering to avoid credit falling to the Republicans, one 
of Wilson’s first acts in office was to sign the Federal Reserve Act that had emanated 
from the efforts of the bankers and economic advisors on the National Monetary 
Commission. The establishment of the Federal Reserve System was not without its critics 
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within the professional economics community. But Congress and the Administration did 
finally deliver a central banking system not unlike those the majority of economists 
called for during the “Battle of the Standards” fifteen years prior. The Federal Reserve 
Act was followed by a series of other legislative measures that built on recommendations 
by professional economists. The Revenue Act of 1913, which is best known for imposing 
a federal income tax, also dramatically lowered tariffs. The move toward freer trade 
reflected the general consensus of the discipline, as most economists had abandoned the 
protectionist impulses of Henry Carey by the 1880s. The Clayton Anti-Trust Act (1914) 
strengthened federal anti-monopoly laws and exempted unions from anti-trust 
regulations. The passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) established the 
infrastructure necessary to ensure the federal government could actually enforce the rules 
laid out by the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and formed yet another federal agency in need of 
professional economists’ expertise. Labor economists had further reason to celebrate 
following passage of the Keating-Owen Act (1916), which sought to eliminate child 
labor, although the law was deemed unconstitutional in 1918.  
The drift toward economic management accelerated rapidly during Wilson’s 
second term, as war mobilization drew hundreds of professional economists to 
Washington, D.C. The rush to organize the American economy in support of the war 
effort suggested unlimited possibilities and The New Republic, over-estimating the 
enthusiasm for heavy government intervention in the economy, went so far as to call for 
the rejection of the profit motive and complete government coordination.405 Such extreme 
measures were never taken, but the nation did catch a glimpse of what a planned 
economy managed by professional economists and business leaders might look like. By 
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the end of the war, federal officials had taken over the operation of the nation’s railroads 
and shipbuilding, as well as the distribution of commodities deemed essential to the war 
effort. Business leaders dominated the War Industries Boards that managed these take 
overs but economists played an important role, too. 
Unlike Britain, where the small number of economists meant marginal 
contributions to the war effort, by 1917 the U.S. had a substantial pool of trained 
economists.406 The AEA, having shaken out interlopers through increased dues and 
membership drives that focused on the academic community, counted nearly 2,500 
members.407 Irving Fisher estimated that no fewer than 120 members of the AEA worked 
in Washington, D.C. during the conflict, to say nothing of those who contributed from 
afar at the state level.408 Professional economists consulted and served on numerous 
committees and commissions, including the Federal Trade Commission, the War Savings 
Section of the Treasury Department, the War Industries Board, and the Food 
Administration.  
But the most noteworthy wartime development for professional economists was 
the temporary shift in how they viewed the discipline and its role in American society. 
For the first time, the AEA mobilized as a bloc and attempted to rally its members, and in 
effect the professional economics community, behind a specific goal. There was, after all, 
no guarantee that the professional economics community would pull together to support 
the war. The conflict evoked a strong response from pacifists and isolationists and 
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certainly qualified as the kind of partisan issue that the AEA typically avoided at all 
costs. But the Association worked hard toward consensus in this case, thanks to its strong 
sense of patriotism, the leadership of Irving Fisher, and the economic ramifications of the 
conflict.   
World War I proved to be a war of attrition not only in terms of manpower, but 
also financial resources. The conflict stressed European markets, and economists clearly 
understood that U.S. entry would necessitate a massive financial commitment. The 
warring nations’ reliance on financing through debt was particularly troubling to 
economists and to the financial community.409 Both groups feared that over-reliance on 
borrowing would raise inflation to dangerous levels, as had been the case in England, 
although professional economists had extra cause for concern. Historical precedent, in 
particular Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase’s attempt to finance the Civil War 
through short-term loans, was a worrying reminder that proper policy was crucial.410 
General sympathy with the views of Hume, Smith, Ricardo, and Mill, all of whom 
preferred taxation over borrowing to finance a war effort, imbued the community with 
additional concerns.411 The potential for economic catastrophe pushed a significant 
portion of the professional economics community to abandon their reservations and lobby 
as a group. 
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The U.S. officially entered the war on April 6
th
, 1917. Three days later the 
Treasury Department approached Congress with a request to raise $5 billion through the 
sale of government bonds. With great speed, economists organized under E. Dana 
Durand, chair of the Department of Economics at the University of Minnesota, to draft a 
memorandum. The “Minnesota Memorial,” as it came to be known, implicitly rebuked 
the Treasury’s request to sell bonds and argued in favor of financing the war through 
taxation. It warned that ruinous inflation would accompany reliance on bonds to cover 
wartime spending. In addition to avoiding inflation, the Memorial asserted, taxation 
would force greater industrial efficiency and provide a sense of social justice. Nearly 250 
economists at 43 schools – including Harvard, Yale, Cornell, and the Universities of 
Chicago, Minnesota, and Illinois – signed the document. In addition to furnishing copies 
at a press conference, Durand sent the Memorial to every member of Congress as well as 
to the president and his cabinet.412  
 Although not every economist supported the Memorials plan to fund the war 
through taxation, resistance was moderate and limited to the argument that bond issues 
would be necessary at some point to cover the gap between tax revenues and war 
expenses – a point acknowledged in the memorial itself and by Durand in a later journal 
article.413 The chief “opponent” to the taxation policy, Columbia University’s Edwin 
Seligman, agreed that financing the war exclusively through bonds was “short-
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sighted.”414 His criticism of the Minnesota Memorial rested on the belief that war 
expenditures would simply outstrip tax revenues more quickly than the pro-tax crowd 
realized. Even so, Seligman did not object to the principle of steeply increased war-time 
taxes to mitigate inflation. Such concerns were echoed during a roundtable discussion on 
war finance at the annual AEA meeting in 1916, where criticism of the “pay as you go” 
policy also rested on concerns that tax revenue may not be able to cover total expenses.415 
Conservative economists one might expect to object to increased taxes and to the 
expansion of government largess were notably silent. Overwhelmingly, the professional 
economics community supported steep tax increases to fund as much of the war effort as 
possible. 
 The public declaration was an even more notable departure because it cut across 
political lines and delivered clear economic advice on an issue that held the potential to 
divide the nation. The Democratic Party had fought a difficult battle to increase tax 
revenue from the outset of the conflict in an effort to offset aid to European allies, likely 
owing to the fact that a war bond drive was not politically viable while Wilson 
campaigned on a policy of neutrality. The Wilson administration’s earlier push for a large 
bond drive raised the possibility that the war would need to be financed on credit after all. 
Within a month of the Minnesota Memorial’s distribution Wilson and Secretary of the 
Treasury William McAdoo began to promote the “fifty-fifty theory,” which proposed to 
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meet war expenditures through equal parts tax revenue and loans.416 At the very least, the 
Memorial and any subsequent commentary or lobbying from its signatories generated 
political leverage for those seeking to raise taxes. Seligman, it appears, agreed: his post-
mortem of the war financing effort referred to the Memorial and Wilson’s plan in 
conjunction.417    
Another example of the AEA’s eroding policy neutrality came in December 1917, 
when the Committee on the Economic Problems of the War and the Committee on the 
Purchasing Power of Money were formed at a meeting of the executive committee. Irving 
Fisher, who assumed the Presidency of the AEA in 1918, encouraged the organization to 
do its “bit” for the war effort. Fisher’s enthusiasm for public lobbying and his willingness 
to risk controversy in the name of promotion promised an active leadership willing to 
side-step the organization’s traditional reluctance to directly promote action. Indeed, it 
was Fisher’s lament of the discipline’s lack of influence in 1902 that helped start the 
process of establishing a flagship journal for the AEA.418 And as biographer Robert Allen 
notes, Fisher took control of the AEA immediately proceeding the years of his career that 
were marked less by economics than by activism.419 A Yale graduate, where he went on 
as professor of political economy, Fisher built a multi-faceted career as an academic 
reformer. His promotion of eugenics-inspired legislation and efforts to regulate 
Americans’ diets were well-known throughout the country. Unlike many of his 
colleagues, Fisher eschewed government commission work, but nevertheless believed in 
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the discipline’s ability to change society for the better. His leadership ensured the AEA’s 
support of the war effort in the form of committee work and one-off measures such as 
using the organization’s mailing list to encourage members “as individuals” to promote 
the purchasing of savings stamps.420 The AEA’s leadership authorized committees on the 
“Economic Problems of the War” and “Purchasing Power” in addition to committees 
charged with carrying out investigations in “War Finance,” “Foreign Trade,” “Price 
Fixing,” “Marketing,” and “Labor.” It is unclear how many AEA members studied 
mobilization through these new committees. To avoid duplication and help coordinate 
these efforts Walton Hamilton urged the creation of a disciplinary clearing house. But the 
war concluded before any such work could be completed.421  
The discipline had shown a willingness and ability to help manage the economic 
response to the war, but at a little more than one and a half years the conflict was too 
short to muster a more substantive response, as reflected in the AEA’s committee reports 
several months following the cessation of hostilities. Anticipating a brief war, Fisher’s 
Committee on Purchasing Power had restricted its actions to the dissemination of 
information to encourage reduced consumption and increased production.422 The 
Committees on War Finance and Price-Fixing, similarly recognizing time constraints, 
adapted their work to include an analysis of appropriate post-war policies.423  
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As it was, economists’ wartime roles were limited to those associated with 
technical expertise. By staffing commissions and boards established to coordinate 
mobilization, economists were essentially charged with managing resources, a task for 
which they were well-trained. In fact, economists’ data and statistical analysis had proven 
so valuable during mobilization that Harvard economist Edwin Gay managed to solicit 
support from the charitable Commonwealth Fund in order to establish the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)  in 1919. The NBER went on to develop “gross 




Although their suggestions percolated up to decision-makers, such an 
arrangement was a far cry from the sort of preventative influence the new economists had 
envisioned. Professional economists did well to demonstrate their value in solving 
problems by assisting in the management of programs such as the Liberty Bond drive or 
the Food Administration’s purchasing program, but had little success in conveying broad, 
systemic principles that could prevent problems in the first place. As Allyn A. Young 
noted in his AEA presidential address years after the war, most Americans still conceived 
of war as a natural function of economics.425 The perception that nations would engage in 
armed conflict as a matter of economic self-interest struck Young and most of his fellow 
economists as odd, considering the cost of war ultimately detracted from a nations’ net 
wealth. Yet economic necessity continued to be a popular explanation for the cause of the 
War. Interestingly, H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen’s Merchants of Death, the 
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popular anti-war exposé that fed isolationist settlement, failed to garner significant 
attention from the professional economics community when it was released  a little over a 
decade later.
426
 Engelbrecht  and Hanighen’s charge that economic incentives drove 
certain industries to encourage global conflict would have presumably piqued the interest 
of the nation’s economic experts, yet no economics journal reviewed the work and there 
is no evidence that economists engaged with the thesis in the public sphere. Far from 
evolving into sages and society builders, economists found themselves cast as technicians 
called on to solve problems rather than prevent them.427  
Professional economists’ involvement with the peace process further highlighted 
the dynamic. Economists from around Europe and the U.S. were included in peace talks 
in the hope that their advice might help ensure that economic conditions were conducive 
to long-term stability – a hope that gradually disappeared, as recorded by British 
economist John Maynard Keynes in the oft-referenced The Economic Consequences of 
Peace.428 Like Keynes, Harvard economist and tariff specialist Frank Taussig advised his 
government as a member of the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris, where his 
frustrations with the political maneuvering came through in his correspondence.429 
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Taussig’s statements regarding tariffs and his review of Keynes’ famous critique of the 
terms of peace make clear that he encouraged generous terms of peace on the grounds 
that economic isolationism and uncertainty regarding Germany’s ability to handle 
exorbitant reparations would crash the global economy and harm already fragile 
relations.430 The treaty that was subsequently negotiated failed to take into account such 
concerns.   
Despite his reservations, Taussig offered support for the terms of peace as a 
member of the AEA’s Committee on Foreign Trade. The AEA executive committee 
supported the Treaty of Versailles from an early date, including its call for a League of 
Nations, and had created the Committee on Foreign Trade as part of its inquiry into the 
economic basis of peace.431 The first report of its Committee on Foreign Trade, printed in 
March 1919, emphasized the need for a measured peace process to restore economic 
balance.432 The Committee’s second report, written and released after the terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles had been set, concurred that the economic necessities of peace called 
for a “league of nations of some sort.”433  
 Entry into the League of Nations proved to be a contentious proposition in the 
U.S. owing to the return of isolationist sentiment. Rejection of the Treaty of Versailles 
threatened the viability of the League of Nations since U.S. entry depended on its 
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recognition. Both Taussig and the AEA executive committee were silent on the issue 
after the release of the Committee on Foreign Trade’s second report, which left Irving 
Fisher as the de facto representative of American professional economists on the issue.434 
As a lecturer for the League of Nations Association of New York, Fisher argued that U.S. 
support for the League was necessary to ensure the political and economic conditions 
conducive to peace. Fisher’s claim that recently deceased President Harding secretly had 
confided in him his support for the League led to a brief uproar that damaged what little 
persuasive powers Fisher held in the debate.435 Underwhelmed and unmoved by the 
professional economist community’s largely invisible support for the League of Nations 
and content with isolationist policy, the American public closed the door on economic 
cooperation and never ratified the Treaty of Versailles.  
The First World War capped an ambiguous few years for professional economists 
in the U.S. Wilson’s election and the changes in federal economic policy that followed, in 
addition to mobilization, offered signs that the new economists and their vision of a more 
closely managed economy were ascendant. The rapid mobilization created a hinge, to 
borrow a term from sociologist Andrew Abbott, between the professional economics 
community and government.
436
 Economists benefitted from supporting mobilization 
because it granted them greater access to the policymaking process and allowed the 
discipline to better demonstrate its abilities. Government officials benefitted from the 
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good will generated by the more efficient management of public resources during a 
particularly difficult time. This mutually beneficial hinge certainly suggested there was 
much more room for mutually beneficial collaboration between professional economists 
and government agencies in the coming years. 
But economists’ newfound willingness to lobby for specific policy as a discipline, 
in this case financing the war through taxation, produced ambiguous outcomes at best. 
Seligman’s doubts about the ability of tax revenues to keep pace with war expenditures 
proved well-founded. Despite dramatic income and luxury tax increases, tax revenues 
covered less than one-third of the costs associated with fighting the war and the heavily 
promoted Liberty bond drive proved vital.437 The report of the AEA’s War Finance 
Committee noted the “laudable effort…to secure as large a revenue as possible from 
taxation,” but did not dwell on the claims of so many AEA members that such revenues 
could offset total costs.438 In these and other ways, the economists’ public “stand” was a 
double-edged sword. On the one edge, a large body of professional economists organized 
and used their social prestige as economic experts to help sway public policy in a direct 
manner. On the other edge, they asserted that taxation would address most of the nation’s 
financing needs during the war – and they were wrong. Worse yet, neither the AEA nor 
any other body of professional economists followed the Minnesota Memorial with a 
similar effort during the peace process. Economic policy advocacy continued to be a 
contentious process in which consensus-building was elusive and intellectual camps 
thrived.  
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A New Era with Old Dilemmas 
 
 The public zeal for reform that had slowly grown during the Progressive Era and 
the more recent turn to economic management during World War I faded quickly. 
Republican Presidential candidate Warren G. Harding’s popular 1920 campaign slogan, 
which called for a “Return to Normalcy,” alluded to a popular desire to unravel the sort 
of changes new economists had sought. Enthusiasm for progressive reform, although 
never entirely dormant, was weakened in the decade that followed and illustrated how the 
institutions that professional economists had established were vulnerable to shifts in 
public sentiment. While the new economists faced further challenges to their influence, in 
the 1920s their more conservative colleagues and folk economists continued to build on 
traditional cultural values and on the classical intellectual heritage. The Red Scare that 
followed the war intensified attacks on those economists perceived to threaten the 
economic order and placed new economists under particularly sharp scrutiny.  
The perennial problem of academic censure garnered renewed attention during 
and after the war. In 1913, Edwin Seligman was named head of an AEA committee to 
“examine and report upon the present situation in American education institutions as to 
liberty of thought, freedom of speech, and security of tenure for teachers of 
economics…” The Committee quickly evolved into a joint committee with members 
from the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Society, and 
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eventually committee from the newly formed American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP).439  
 The immediate impetus to form a committee on academic freedom in December 
1913 is unclear. The controversy surrounding Emma Goldman’s visit to the University of 
Wisconsin campus had died down several years prior, and no significant cases regarding 
any scholars, let alone an economist, was drawing national attention. The Committee’ 
final report was an abstract discussion of the merits of academic freedom – including its 
section on “practical proposals” that offered general guidelines for institutional 
conduct.440  The report provided a starting point for discussion at the inaugural meeting of 
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in January of 1915, but 
failed to garner public notice despite the Committee’s professed interest in publicizing 
the public benefits of academic freedom. The AEA, having conducted its joint report and 
expressed support for the AAUP, stepped back from the issue of academic freedom in the 
study of economics just as the pressure on scholars, including economists, was set to 
increase.  
Irving Fisher’s presidential address at the annual AEA meeting in December 1918 
underscored the conservative turn.441 Concurring with the “radical” assertion that 
economists ought to serve someone, Fisher focused on the question of “whom.” It was in 
answering this question that Fisher decried the German influence on the new economics, 
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declaring that American heterodox economists’ admiration for the German Historical 
School was unforgivable given that German academics had “prostituted their professional 
services to serve Germany’s criminal purposes.” Fisher went on to combine German 
responsibility for the war with the Bolshevik uprising in Russia, cautioning economists 
against the impulse to wave the “red flag of class war” and against getting carried away 
by the interests of America’s laborers. He reserved his harshest criticism for economists 
who acted as “champions or apologists” for trade unionism, socialism, Bolshevism, 
syndicalism, and I.W.W-ism (the latter referring to the Industrial Workers of the World). 
Of course, neither Fisher’s speech nor public outcry forced the new economists 
“underground.” Most new economists preached what they considered minor adjustments 
to the American free market system – collective bargaining rights, municipalization of 
select utilities, or farm subsidies for beleaguered communities – all of which were 
assumed to strengthen democracy and private property rights rather than ushering in a 
new system of socialistic governance. Relatively few professional economists fit the 
stereotype of the wild-eyed revolutionary. But they had reason for concern because past 
experience had demonstrated the public’s tendency to render judgment based on a 
mistaken understanding of economists’ ideas.  
The tightening intellectual climate undoubtedly narrowed the discipline and 
discouraged overt challenges to the status quo. Thorstein Veblen, no stranger to public 
pressure, noted his concern in The Higher Learning in America (1918). His criticism 
focused on the trustee system, which Veblen lamented for granting control to non-
academic board members whom he believed inevitably conformed to the views of the 
nation’s business class, thus restricting the economists’ ability to pursue broader 
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knowledge. The book elicited a mixture of condemnation and praise. Administrators at 
the University of Chicago, a prominent target in Veblen’s critique, dismissed the book as 
both satire and bolshevism.442 Academic reviews were generally positive, although 
cautioned against taking too seriously Veblen’s charges regarding the business 
community’s influence over higher education.443 Popular social critic Upton Sinclair 
offered a more widely-circulated critique in The Goose-Step: A Study of American 
Education, which similarly suggested that the nation’s universities were beholden to 
corporate donors. Reviews of The Goose-Step, both in academic and popular 
publications, charged Sinclair with oversimplifying academia, but acknowledged the 
dilemma posed by academic censure.
 444 As one commenter noted, by focusing 
exclusively on the top-down authority Sinclair ignored the fact that “Faculties dominated 
by men fighting for their own survival afford examples of suppression by means of a 
community terror and a tyranny of opinion as flagrant as can be found on the part of 
president and trustees.”445 Subject to such social pressures, economists’ hope that the 
discipline might follow an unhindered path of development seemed overly optimistic.    
By continuing as an affiliate of the AAUP, the AEA effectively outsourced its 
commitment to academic freedom. None of the three leading American economics 
journals reviewed Veblen’s The Higher Learning in America or Sinclair’s The Goose-
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Step, nor did they publish any articles on academic censure from 1917 to 1930. To be 
sure, the type of administrative backlash against radical economic theory Veblen and 
Sinclair warned about had peaked by the mid-1920s. But lessons about socially 
controlled limits on the form and conclusions of economic study persisted. As 
individuals, U.S. economists were vehemently opposed to academic censure and sensitive 
to the harm it might cause. As a discipline, they did little to explore how external pressure 
might shape the evolution of economic thought. 
 
 
Defining the Indefinable 
 
 In addition to pressure from a more politically conservative society, the new 
economists struggled to move past criticism of classical economics and offer a model of 
economic theory that rivaled the simplicity and neatness of neoclassical theory. In 1919, 
Walton H. Hamilton, Robert Hoxie’s aforementioned eulogist and an economist at 
Amherst, attempted to organize the new economics in an AER article that outlined the 
American “institutional approach.”446 He bluntly rejected neoclassical theory on the 
grounds that its practitioners failed to concern themselves with social customs and 
conventions. Instead he offered a five-plank platform that asserted 1) Economic theory 
should unify economic science; 2) Economic theory should be relevant to the modern 
problem of control; 3) The proper subject matter of economic theory is institutions; 4) 
                                                          
446
 Walton H. Hamilton, “The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory,” The American Economic 
Review 9, no. 1 (March 1919): 309–318. 
  
   
194 
 
Economic theory is concerned with matters of process; and 5) Economic theory must be 
based on an acceptable theory of human behavior. 
It was yet another declaration of intent, similar in spirit to Ely and the “young 
rebels’” call for a more practical and scientific economics in 1885. The underlying causes 
of their continued failure to forge a new, historically and culturally aware chapter in 
American economic thought remained, however. The search for a unifying economic 
science was wildly optimistic at best considering the fact that the longstanding gap 
between orthodox and heterodox camps in American economics and the assertion that 
economics ought to concern itself with the problem of control flew in the face of laissez-
faire tradition, which remained strong in both American politics and economics. The 
success of neoclassical economics defied Hamilton’s claim that institutions were the only 
“proper” subject matter for economists. 
The new economists’ assumption of constant change in both economic processes 
and human behavior rendered it impossible to deliver definite conclusions. The argument 
that people and customs change over time rang true. Indeed, that was in part why 
heterodox economics enjoyed such broad support in the wake of changes wrought by the 
second industrial revolution. But stating that change has taken place and explaining how 
such changes should affect economic regulation proved much more difficult. Hamilton 
was upfront about the challenge, noting “…it is doubtful whether at this time a general 
description of the economic order can be given. It may require a decade or more for a 
process of trial and error to produce a relatively consistent body of [Institutionalist] 
thought.”447 Historical revision has since allowed for envisioning a coherent American 
Institutionalist School of economic thought. But as economic historian Marc Blaug notes, 
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the founders of American Institutionalist School made strange bedfellows.448 The 
American heterodoxy – now defined by Institutionalists and their still-diffuse focus – 
remained relevant but lacked the coherency and direction of neoclassicism.  
 It was not that the newly-labeled Institutionalists were incompetent or 
fundamentally wrong in their analysis of the economy. Rather, their difficulty in 
establishing Institutionalism stemmed from their lack of galvanizing intellectual 
leadership and poor marketability. Unlike their neoclassical colleagues, who could 
continue to use the classical cannon as a foundation for agreement on baseline economic 
philosophies, the Institutionalists struggled to establish a compelling intellectual heritage. 
A combination of the conservative social climate and academic competitiveness made it 
difficult for a scholar or small cohort of scholars to emerge as an appealing alternative to 
neoclassicism and its respected icons. Furthermore, new economists’ decision to eschew 
economic laws and advocate for the use of case studies, psychology and sociology to 
analyze economic problems made it difficult to establish principles on which 
Institutionalism could be built. Such an approach held the promise of delivering specific 
policy recommendations, but could also appear highly subjective and unreliable. The new 
economists’ attention to detail and a commitment to interdisciplinary research proved to 
be both Institutionalisms strength and its weakness. 
The neoclassical school, having continued to focus on the “classical line” of 
inquiry, continued to build-out the assumptions of the classical masters and adapted old 
theory to new practice. Unlike the Institutionalist School, its members pronounced no 
dramatic declarations of a neoclassical resurgence, nor did they call for a systematic re-
imagining of what neoclassical economics might offer society. The neoclassicists simply 
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continued with their focus on marginal utility, distribution, and measuring efficiency. 
Although they were not as provocative as their Institutionalist colleagues, neoclassical 
economists’ ideas and arguments remained well within the accepted norms of American 
political economy and they maintained their influence over the discipline. 
Heterodox economists’ attempts to force a breakthrough regarding economic 
theory became wearying and increasingly futile. The AEA executive committee rejected 
a proposal to establish a committee to once more act as a clearing house for economic 
definitions, citing as the reason a likely lack of agreement.449 Many economists’ 
excitement regarding the status and future of theory was high, but the enthusiasm 
frustrated those within the discipline who saw the ongoing debates as fruitless.450 After a 
decade of gestation, the discipline took stock of the Institutionalist movement through a 
series of conference panels and journal articles. Commons’ assessment reflected the on-
going ambiguity of Institutionalism.451 As he noted, “The difficulty in defining a field for 
the so-called institutional economics is the uncertainty of meaning of an institution.”452 In 
yet another attempt to forge some sort of order, Commons argued somewhat vaguely that 
“Institutional economics is the assets and liabilities of concerns, contrasted with Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations.”453 Commons called for the further investigation of human 
psychology – the continued pursuit of the sort of elusive concepts that continually 
invoked disagreement and placed Institutional economics beyond the pale for many 
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Americans. A roundtable on economic theory at the AEA’s forty-fourth annual meeting 
and subsequent responses furthered the feeling that Institutionalism had failed to develop 
a coherent identity. Cornell’s Paul T. Homan dismissed the field outright, declaring that 
“a distinguishable body of economic knowledge or theory properly to be called 
institutional is an intellectual fiction.”454 Undeterred, Institutionalists responded to their 
critics and persisted in their mission to reshape the way Americans approached economic 
problems.455 Ultimately, their failure to deliver a theory as simple and consistent as that of 
the neoclassical school ensured that classical thought in American economics would 
persist to a degree unimaginable to the new economists of the late nineteenth century. 
Despite the fears of some, professional economists in the U.S. were largely 
divided by methodology rather than ideology. The distinction was ignored at times and 
rather than presenting a unified front by building on general consensus regarding issues 
such as free trade or the necessity of a central bank, the discipline remained divided. 
Neoclassical and heterodox economists’ tendency to drift apart and engage in academic 
debates damaged the discipline’s authority in the public sphere, as it made economists 
seem as subjective as the politicians to whom they offered advice. It became clear that 
without concerted effort, such as commission work, or an emergency response brought on 
by financial panic or war, economists would continue to focus on differences as a matter 
of academic discourse. As a result, professional economics retained the appearance of a 
confused and highly subjective discipline. 
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Amateurs and Businessmen Siphon Prestige 
 
Continued conflict among professional economists implicitly legitimized fringe 
economists – both professional and amateur. As a result, folk economists continued to 
play a role in shaping American economic thought and economic policy, likely unaware 
of the intellectual battles within academia beyond the observation that the discipline 
could not seem to agree on much. For many Americans, access to formal education 
remained beyond reach and economic theory was scoffed at as the unnecessary 
obfuscation of simple truths. Public discourse continued to shape widespread opinions 
about proper economic policy, and as memories of Wilson’s Presidency faded so did any 
illusions that Americans readily understood or recognized the distinction between 
professional and amateur economist. 
The gap between trained, professional economists and amateur theorists had 
indeed continued to widen. AEA membership in the 1920s grew mainly through new 
economics graduate students and junior faculty members, a trend encouraged by the 
Membership Committee following the observation that lasting members were those 
“whose interests are intimately tied to economic work of some kind.”456 AEA 
membership reached 3,746 by 1926 and the organization was justifiably confident in 
continued growth.457 A 1929 report on the overlapping between the four main social 
science organizations in the U.S. – the AEA, American Political Science Association, 
American Sociological Society, and American Statistical Association – affirmed 
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economists’ position at the top of the social sciences in terms of membership and draw. 
The organizational overlap indicated that economists played a leading role in the social 
sciences, though there was no guarantee that expansion within the academy would 
translate into recognition in the public sphere.458 
The insulation that had begun with the alienation of clergy in the early 1900s 
continued with the gradual estrangement of businessmen and amateur economists. E.S. 
Cowdrick, an employee of Colorado Fuel & Iron, relayed the mutual concerns he and a 
business associate harbored about the reception of non-professional economists at the 
annual meetings, stating “The attitude of the representatives of industry whom I knew 
seemed to be that it was the professors’ party and that it was good policy to stay out of 
the discussions.”459 Secretary Frank Deibler received the criticism with grace and 
promised to bring the matter to the attention of the Program Committee, but denied its 
merit.460 Deibler’s denial notwithstanding, regardless of how often the AEA and its 
academic members insisted on their openness, to create an intellectual domain they 
would need to separate expert from non-expert. 
Despite the very real distinction between amateur and professional, those in 
positions of power could simply claim the title of economist. Such was the case with 
Deputy-Secretary of the Nebraskan Department of Agriculture Grant Shumway, who 
declined an invitation to join the AEA, declaring  
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I have practiced “economics” so long as I can remember and the last three years 
just a little bit more than all other previous years. In fact I feel like a practical and 
economical man at the present time, so much so that the fees indicated would be 
one of the deterring influences in becoming a member of the Association unless I 
were convinced of its benefits.461  
 
Shumway could wear an economist’s credentials with no real consequences. The AEA 
would never refute the claim and the public seemed unlikely to note the distinction 
between a trained economist and a politician in charge of economic policy.  
 Professional economists had consolidated their intellectual turf within academia 
and the AEA, but folk economists and business leaders continued to exert influence over 
the policymaking process. The Georgist movement of the late nineteenth century proved 
to pose a particularly resilient challenge to the professional economics community, as 
populist clamoring for an economic panacea showed no sign of diminishing. In the 
aftermath of World War I it was clear that the U.S. was the industrial powerhouse of the 
world, and populists sought to elevate small businesses (along with independent farmers) 
as the virtuous economic building blocks of American society. This served to update 
George’s single tax theory, which continued to resonate with many Americans owing to 
its simplicity and perceived benefit to small entrepreneurs.  
Promoters and pamphlets touting the “single tax solution” were commonplace. 
Single tax advocates’ enthusiasm and penchant for monopolizing discussion wore on 
some academic economists – including Royal Meeker, who, in a letter to Edwin 
Kemmerer, declared he was “frankly afraid of cranks in general and S.T.’s [single-taxers] 
in particular.”462 Still, the movement enjoyed several supporters within the U.S. 
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professional economics community, namely M.I.T.-trained Stuart Chase and Yale’s 
Harry Gunnison Brown. The mixture of populist support, a handful of academic 
champions, and victories at the local level of government encouraged many within the 
single tax movement that theirs was an unstoppable cause driven by logic and the laws of 
economics.463 
Despite this modicum of legitimacy, the single tax movement remained at arm’s 
length from the professional economics community, mainly because its most vocal 
advocates persisted in presenting their cause as the only logical conclusion of economic 
reasoning. Their unyielding commitment to a national single tax policy as a universally 
beneficial policy meant that the group found little sympathy within the professional 
economics community. Interest groups routinely contacted the AEA in the hope of 
attracting professional economists’ support through the aegis of academic inquiry. But 
single tax organizations were unable to build such a relationship because of their 
reputation as propagandists – a point made clear by Frank Deibler in response to the 
Henry George Foundation’s request for AEA associate status.464  Such rebuttals 
encouraged the long-held opinion among single-taxers that the AEA represented “vested 
interests” committed to obfuscating economic truths. To Americans skeptical of authority 
or resentful toward the educated class from which they felt excluded, folk economists 
continued to be an alternative source for economic policy proposals. Undeterred by its 
rejection, the Henry George Foundation and similar organizations both outside of and on 
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the fringes of academia continued to promote George’s message through lectures and 
conferences.465  
 The Manufacturers and Merchants Federal Tax League, in contrast, adopted more 
confrontational tactics, turning the quest for single tax policy into a shrill attack in what 
became a repeat of the populist crusade against professional economics in the late 
nineteenth century. Ironically, Richard T. Ely became the center of the group’s attention 
in 1924 as a result of his work on the Institute for Research in Land Economics and 
Public Utilities. Once decried as a socialist bent on abolishing private property, Ely was 
painted as a front-man for monopolies bent on punishing the working class. 
The Institute, a research institution devoted to the “study of the economic 
relationships arising from the ownership and use of land and the administration and 
regulation of public utilities,” eschewed individual research in favor of a collective 
approach, which Ely felt was in line with the trend established by the reputable the 
Harvard Bureau of Business Research and the National Bureau of Economic Research.466 
The decision to form the Institute in 1920 – one year after the Federal Tax League began 
campaigning for federal tax reform – proved to be unfortunate timing because it fed fears 
that “landed interests” had mobilized to counter the single tax movement.467 
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The Federal Tax League seized on the Institute’s private funding and Ely’s 
rejection of a single tax solution.468 The 30,000-member-strong organization circulated 
the accusations of Emil O. Jorgensen (the group’s Bureau of Information director) in its 
newsletter and disseminated a pamphlet titled “Prof. Richard T. Ely Exposed!” In both 
instances, Jorgenson purported to show how a “gigantic, nation-wide scheme” had been 
erected to deceive the public regarding the “right solution” to the nation’s economic 
problems.469 As with the populists’ criticisms of professional economists during the 
“Battle of the Standards,” Jorgensen’s charges rested on a small degree of fact bolstered 
by unsubstantiated conjecture. The underlying assumption of his claims was that actual 
evidence of wrong-doing was unobtainable owing to the inherent secrecy of such cabals – 
an argument virtually impossible to refute.  
There is little doubt that the Institute possessed the same integrity as any other 
academic research organization of the era. Correspondence between Ely and Henry C. 
Taylor, a noted agricultural economist and the Institute’s first Secretary, illustrates 
concerns about maintaining a balanced staff and research program.470 Furthermore, 
contrary to being a well-funded front for the public utilities and land speculators, the 
Institute struggled to find and maintain financial support throughout its first decade.471 If 
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Ely and the Institute’s widely respected staff was bought, then their price was 
exceptionally low. As Jorgenson correctly noted in his attack pamphlet, the Institute 
secured annual funding of around $50,000, but this sum had to cover the costs of ten staff 
members, administrative staff, and the publication of monographs and the Institute’s 
journal. The financial strain was such that Ely and the Institute had to move from the 
University of Wisconsin to Northwestern University in 1925 for the promise of stable 
funding (where continued difficulties eventually led Ely to move the Institute to New 
York).472 
 Despite the tenuousness of the charges – a point John R. Commons took the time 
to illustrate in a letter to Jorgensen following his initial charges in late 1924 – the Federal 
Tax League continued to publicly attack Ely and the Institute.473 Department of 
Agriculture economist S.W. Mendum reviewed a book-length version of Jorgensen’s 
accusations in the Journal of Farm Economics, but Mendum’s attempt to establish a 
productive scholarly dialogue was an exercise in futility.474 The Federal Tax League’s 
rigid prerogatives and personal attacks soured the potential for a meaningful discussion 
between the single tax movement and the professional economics community. The 
Federal Tax League presented the AEA with a formal appeal to assemble a special 
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committee to investigate Ely and the Institute, but the AEA refused to get involved. The 
Executive Committee declined “on the grounds that such an investigation would lie 
outside the function of this organization.”475 Although technically true, the AEA’s refusal 
to publicly confront The Federal Tax League for its bullying tactics represented another 
missed opportunity to act as an authoritative body on economic policy. 
The Federal Tax League’s campaign against Ely, although certainly never 
significant enough to threaten either his job or the Institute’s existence, was not entirely 
superfluous. Members of the American Teacher’s Federation seized on the accusations, 
arguing that the Institute’s stance on decreased land taxes placed it at odds with the 
interests of laborers who would be forced to assume a higher burden when the taxation of 
goods inevitably rose instead. The ATF, a member of the larger American Federation of 
Labor, went so far as to call for a ban on Ely’s textbooks in classroom at the AFL’s 
convention in 1927, although the measure failed following a heated debate on the floor.476 
The fringe Federal Tax League had successfully carved out a place in American 
economic thought, however marginal, and in doing so challenged the authority of 
professional economists. 
Ironically, the campaign to discredit Ely likely hurt the single tax movement in 
the long run. Ely and the Institute promised to renew interest in land as a unique factor in 
economic theory at a time when many professional economists were gradually treating it 
as synonymous with capital. Had the various groups that comprised the single tax 
movement directed their resources toward engaging in a dialogue with the Institute and 
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with the academic community in general it is conceivable that George’s ideas may have 
found traction within mainstream economic theory at a crucial period for federal farm 
and housing policy. As it was, the Georgists’ continued to campaign as an alternative to 
professional economists and were thus relegated to stoking dissent and suspicion. 
They were joined by a potpourri of businessmen and business organizations of 
varying motives and degrees of efficacy. In a decade when many found the “gospel of 
business” appealing, the opinions of those who carried the cachet of being a successful 
businessman warranted attention. Such faith was not without reason. In many cases, 
business leaders demonstrated an understanding that was in line with the prevailing 
principles of modern economic theory. But not all business leaders seemed to grasp the 
challenges of modern economic theory in relation to public policy.  
The simplicity of business leaders’ policy proposals could be astounding, as 
demonstrated by Thomas Edison or Henry Ford when they spoke on monetary policy. 
The two warned of the perils of a gold standard in the early 1920s, when the debate over 
post-war monetary policy evolved into a general debate about growth policies. Edison 
dismissed the precious metal as wholly unsuited for its assigned task as a standard of 
value. He preferred instead a system of barter based on fixed-price commodities.477 Ford 
demonstrated a similarly simplistic understanding of the issue when he urged the federal 
government to print money outright, reasoning that it made little sense for the 
government to issue bonds and incur the cost of interest since they were the original 
source of money from the outset.478 John R. Commons, having shifted from his traditional 
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focus on labor issues to serve as president of a pro-gold standard lobbying group, the 
National Monetary Association, visited both men in an attempt to change their opinions – 
with little success.479 The two business leaders were joined by W.H. Coin Harvey, author 
of Coin’s Financial School and the prominent figure in the populist push for free silver in 
the 1880s and ‘90s.480 The National Honest Money Association seized on Ford’s and 
Edison’s public comments to lend credibility to their renewed efforts at overturning the 
U.S. monetary status-quo. Perhaps understanding that an anachronistic cry for “free 
silver” might eliminate the already-marginal organization’s appeal, the group instead 
expressed an interest in a national currency backed by bonds.481  
 This is not to suggest that cranks, charlatans, or the unjustifiably confident 
represented the only challenge to professional economists’ reputation as the nation’s 
economic advisors. If such were the case, then identifying the line between expert and 
amateur would have been easy. Rather, the line between professional and non-
professional economist proved genuinely permeable. Paul Warburg, a successful banker 
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and advocate of the Federal Reserve Act, routinely promoted positions within the realm 
of reason according to most professional economists. His stance on war finance, his work 
as advisor of to the Federal Reserve, and his work with the Institute of Economics (later 
named the Brookings Institute) reflected a deep interest in the work of the discipline.482 
Likewise, Warburg was engaged in an active dialogue with academic economists – 
publishing several books and articles in the AAPSS regarding his experiences with and 
opinions on banking and monetary policy.483 Frank Vanderlip, William McKinnley’s 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and President of the National City Bank of New 
York, similarly managed meaningful engagement with the professional economics 
community throughout his career. In addition to publishing in scholarly journals, 
Vanderlip maintained an active membership in the AEA and served as Vice-President of 
the organization in 1918.  It was certainly possible for a non-academically trained 
economist to not only find acceptance within the realm of professional economics, but 
also to find a genuine understanding of the discipline and its nuances. 
The increasing sophistication of business groups that exerted pressure on 
lawmakers and public opinion further complicated the process of identifying expertise in 
the policymaking process. Historians have noted the rise and influence of public relations 
and advertising campaigns, both of which enhanced business leaders’ ability to mount 
campaigns in favor of desired policy to sway voters and politicians. Meanwhile, growing 
numbers of economists were employed in the private sector, which also complicates any 
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attempt to parse academic versus “business” economics. The National Industrial 
Conference Board, an umbrella organization for major trade organizations, solicited 
recommendations from the AEA to staff its economic research staff.
 484 Trade 
associations continued to participate in the annual AEA meetings, often sending 
representatives to present alongside labor representatives and professional economists. 
Increased corporate and trade association employment of professional economists began 
to further blur the line between the archtype dispassionate economic experts that early 
professionalizers had hoped to create and the sort of “bought economist” the public had 
long decried.  
 Such challenges to the authority and expertise of professional economists 
presented the public and policymakers with a difficult situation as they sought to identify 
and employ expertise in a consistently contentious field. Even though by this time 
professional economics was a firmly entrenched fact of the American intellectual 
landscape, the discipline was already locked into a frustratingly ancillary role in the 
economic policymaking process. The public, it seemed, lacked a clear understanding of 
what the discipline could offer, in part because professional economists themselves were 
still uncertain after forty years of organizing. 
 Despite these shortcomings, professional economics in the U.S. appears to have 
reached maturity. Significant changes loomed in the future, to be sure. The discipline 
would continue to expand in size and scope as more men and women attended college 
and pursued advanced degrees in the discipline. The methodological toolkit of these later 
generations also would expand greatly and lead to mathematical models so complex that 
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they stretched the gap between professional and layman further than early twentieth 
century economists feared possible.
485
 At the same time, the creation of federal agencies 
and advisory groups would seemingly draw professional economists and the nation’s 
lawmakers closer together.  
 Yet much of what gives professional economics its professional veneer was 
firmly in place by the end of the 1920s. The discipline’s leading organization, the AEA, 
its top journals, and the nation’s leading economic departments were well-entrenched by 
the end of the decade. These institutions arguably fulfilled their duties as well in 1925 as 
at any other time in the twentieth century. They enhanced communication among 
economists, distinguished economics from its sister disciplines, and allowed economists 
and non-economists alike to distinguish between trained professionals and untrained 
laymen. Yet although these key institutions maintained the discipline’s contours, they 
could not eliminate internal dissent or the external criticism that made it difficult for 
professional economists to successfully influence economic policy. These shortcomings 
were not a sign of the discipline’s immaturity, but rather stemmed from the fact that the 
majority of U.S. economists continued to believe that the discipline must necessarily limit 
its role to that of the neutral advisor in order to maintain respectability within the 
relatively democratic American system. 
 In his Presidential Address at the AEA’s 1926 meeting, Edwin Kemmerer – the 
“money doctor” who had famously travelled the world to advise foreign governments on 
monetary policy – decried the “widely accepted economic fallacies” he had encountered, 
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particularly in “economically new countries.”486 His speech suggested that the U.S., 
unlike those upstart nations, had overcome anachronistic approaches to policymaking. 
The irony in Kemmerer’s speech became abundantly clear a short decade later when 
strict U.S. adherence to the gold standard – the sort of monetary policy Kemmerer was 
promoting abroad – lengthened and deepened the Great Depression worldwide.487 More 
striking is the false dichotomy Kemmerer portrayed between developing nations that 
ignored professional economists’ advice and industrial powerhouses like the U.S., which, 
he argued, prospered through the adoption of such advice. 
In fact, as the United States moved through the generally prosperous 1920s 
politicians continued to employ economic theory in a haphazard and makeshift fashion. 
Americans and those engaged in the economic policymaking process recognized social 
prestige of professional economists, but did not necessarily understand how to act on the 
discipline’s consensus, when one emerged. Continued disagreement within the discipline, 
as well as continued challenges to academic freedom, often undercut the image of 
academically trained economists as authoritative and objective guides in the 
policymaking process. At the same time, the illusion emerged that the realm of commerce 
had been tamed through the application of economic science, but professional economists 
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Stuck in the Middle: Economists, Agricultural Reform, and the Road to Crisis 1917-1935  
 
 
 For many, prosperity in the manufacturing and finance sectors fed the illusion that 
Americans had managed to translate economic expertise into effective economic policy. 
The confidence Edwin Kemmerer expressed in his presidential address at the American 
Economic Association’s annual gathering in 1927 suggested that the sort of systemic 
market failures that had plagued nineteenth century America and given rise to 
professional economics were a thing of the past.488 Agricultural economists, farmers, and 
those who depended on the agricultural sector knew otherwise. The growth of the U.S. 
economy over the course of the decade masked a slow burning disaster in rural 
communities. As wartime mobilization wound down, America’s professional economists 
began to worry about how farmers would adjust to unprecedented productivity in the face 
of declines in the value of agricultural commodities. The course of professionalization 
that the discipline had undertaken left it subject to the vagaries of politics, however. 
Professional economists’ influence remained sporadic and incomplete, as politicians and 
the public alike continued to question the wisdom of America’s leading economic 
experts.  
The fight over agricultural reform echoed the “Battle of the Standards” that had 
given professional economists their first taste of the policymaking process in the 1890s. 
Price-guarantees replaced free silver as the rallying cry of folk economists throughout 
                                                          
488
 Kemmerer, “Economic Advisory Work for Governments.” 
  
   
213 
 
rural America, and professional economists struggled to discourage lawmakers from 
pursuing such schemes. Misinformation and misunderstanding once more occluded 
debate, as agricultural economists found themselves pushed and pulled between Farm 
Bloc Democrats and Hooverite Republicans as each side attempted to gain support for 
their cause. The professional economics community, in a repeat of earlier shortcomings, 
delivered consistent criticism of price-guaranty proposals, but failed to rally behind a 
clear alternative in a timely fashion. As with the money, labor, and monopoly questions, 
professional economists identified and attempted to address the issue of declining rural 
standards of living through a passive program of research and advising. Once more, they 
found that applying economic expertise to on-the-ground problems in a timely manner 
proved to be extremely difficult. The three maladies that had undercut effective economic 
reform since 1885 – the public’s skepticism of economic expertise, the discipline’s 
insularity and internal dissent, and networking – combined to delay agricultural reform at 
a crucial point in America’s economic development. As the battle to restructure 
American farming demonstrated, U.S. agricultural policymakers failed to prevent 




The State of Agricultural Economics 
 
 
 The groundwork for a robust economic sub-field devoted to the economic issues 
of farming had been laid in the decades preceding the 1920s price-level crisis. The 
Morrell Land-Grant Act’s emphasis on practical education ensured that state colleges 
pursued agricultural sciences as early as the 1860s, although such work typically focused 
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on what is better described as crop and livestock management than agricultural 
economics. The rise of agricultural economics in the U.S. (as it was known in the 1920s) 
came several decades later, when the discipline as a whole expanded rapidly.489 Although 
there was always a degree of interest in agricultural issues, professional economists in the 
1880s and 90s seemed interested in farmers as a subplot in the larger story of industrial 
expansion. However, by 1907 a handful of economists had laid the foundation of what 
was gradually recognized as agricultural economics. Henry C. Taylor taught the subject 
within the Wisconsin Department of Political Economy. George F. Warren (Cornell), 
Andrew Boss (Minnesota), and Thomas F. Hunt (Pennsylvania State) similarly lectured 
on farm management and rural economics.490 In 1909, the University of Wisconsin 
established the nation’s first department of agricultural economics and placed Taylor in 
charge. Public and private universities soon responded in kind – Cornell and Minnesota 
most notably. 
Passage of the Smith-Lever Act in 1914 ensured federal funding for state-level 
farm bureaus, which supported “country agents” tasked with distributing information to 
and organizing farmers.491 The agents provided crucial statistical information for the 
discipline and additional employment opportunities for agricultural economists who 
emerged from the nascent graduate programs. The state bureaus were organized under the 
American Farm Bureau Federation in 1919, adding to the growing number of farmers’ 
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groups that had opened offices in Washington, D.C., during the War.492 In that same year, 
the American Farm Management Association merged with the American Association of 
Agricultural Economists and established the Journal of Farm Economics. Although never 
as prestigious as the leading U.S. economics journals, the Journal of Farm Economics 
served as an additional scholarly forum for agricultural economists. The development of 
the sub-field was noticeable and, as economist Edwin Nourse noted at the time, the 
growth of agricultural economics had evolved as a product of necessity.493 Agricultural 
economists had carved out a space for those interested in focusing on the rural economy 
and therefore stood in a position to weigh in on the debate by the end of the First World 
War. 
 The confluence of professional economists’ research and the growing demand for 
government support led to the creation of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE). 
As a branch within the Department of Agriculture, the BAE consolidated the Bureaus of 
Crop Estimates and Markets, as well as the Office of Farm Management and Farm 
Economics.494 The work of its agricultural economists and sociologists was directed by 
Taylor, who continued the Wisconsin economists’ tradition of pursuing public service 
work. Taylor, in turn, reported to Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace, whose 
reputation as editor of Wallaces’ Farmer made him popular with Mid-Western farmers in 
particular. The BAE’s 1,800 employees received in-service training on economics and 
statistics, in effect turning the service into a graduate research program of sorts. Under 
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Taylor’s guidance, the BAE established its role as an aggregator and processor of the 
information obtained by state agricultural researchers. Its purpose, as Taylor later noted 
in his history of agricultural economics, “was to give information and render service 
which would enable farmers to see the fabric of economic life of which they are a part 
and to adjust their production and marketing accordingly” – an ideal of passive 
persuasion that echoed that of his former advisor, John R. Commons.495  
Under Taylor, the BAE refined its system of collecting from farm communities 
nationwide real-time information, which was in theory then used to inform federal 
agricultural policy. The BAE tasked researchers not only with collecting data on crop 
production, but also with producing comprehensive “quality of life” reports by utilizing 
the “door-to-door” techniques Taylor had pioneered as a graduate student with the help of 
the newly arrived Model-T ten years earlier.496 The agency utilized a standardized 
questionnaire book, although researchers were given considerable autonomy. Topics of 
inquiry included the measurement of price levels in farm communities and fluctuations in 
farm property prices. This loose research methodology, in conjunction with the Bureau’s 
field researchers from across the country, provided the Department of Agriculture with a 
flexible and educated research staff.  
 Public sector agricultural economists were supplemented in 1917 by the formation 
of the American Association for Agricultural Legislation, which sought to organize and 
make available information regarding agricultural reform. Once more, Richard T. Ely 
exerted his influence over American economics, in this case as co-founder of the AAAL 
                                                          
495
 Taylor and Taylor, The Story of Agricultural Economics in the United States, 1840-1932, 605. 
496
 National Archives. Records of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1876-1959. Entry 151, Box 1-5. 
Taylor, “1907 Automobile Tour Transcript.” 
  
   
217 
 
alongside Elwood Mead, Taylor, and Cornell’s George F. Warren.497 In typical fashion, 
under Ely’s guidance the organization appealed to notions of progress through research 
and declared that it was high-time that that the nation’s farmers paid attention to scientific 
and economic thought to resolve their growing crisis.498  
 
 
Defining the Problem 
 
 
 With resources mobilized, it was possible to address the growing farm crisis. The 
immediate source of the farmer’s troubles was clear. Agricultural commodity prices had 
dropped as a result of overproduction in the wake of World War I, squeezing farmers and 
rural communities that relied on their income. Secretary of Agriculture Edwin Meredith’s 
annual report for 1920 succinctly captured the dilemma - American farmers had increased 
crop production, yet could expect 2.7 billion dollars less than they had received for the 
previous year’s smaller crop – a decline of 17 percent.499 At the same time, the prices of 
industrial products that farmers required remained steady. The net result was a transfer of 
wealth from rural to urban America.  
Beyond this simple observation were broader questions about equality and 
national identity that would impassion both sides of the impending debate over farm 
policy reform. The allure of cities, which attracted growing numbers of Americans 
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seeking economic opportunity upended the demographic scales; in 1920, for the first 
time, the number of urban Americans exceeded the number living in communities of 
5,000 or fewer (which the U.S. census then defined as rural). This demographic shift, 
combined with the long-standing tendency to think of society as being comprised of 
Manichean halves – the placid rural and chaotic urban – fueled concern about the future 
of American society throughout the early twentieth century, as noted by sociologist Louis 
Wirth in his landmark studies of the issue.500 The countryside was still perceived as the 
simpler stabilizing force of American life, built on irreplaceable kinship ties and tradition, 
and it was unclear how the transition from a rural to urban society might affect future 
generations. Although some considered agriculture merely a “means to industrial 
greatness,” others held fast to an idealized notion of rural life. These subjective cultural 
issues emerged in the work of professional economists.501   In his assessment of post-war 
problems, Warren cautioned that an unbalanced economy would push talent from farms 
to factories, the knock-on effect of which he argued would be a gradual decline in 
national talent because farm families were larger than those in city.502  
Warrens’ concern may strike modern readers as clearly flawed, but such thoughts 
nevertheless shaped debates about agricultural policy, as sympathy for a romanticized 
notion of rural laborers, as well as sentiments held by the farmers themselves, made 
agricultural reform an issue of national character as much as economic prosperity. It was 
not unreasonable to ask, as Nourse did, whether the nation would “show herself capable 
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of formulating a policy for the epoch upon whose threshold we now stand, which shall 
rest upon the impartial judgments of a sound social economy and not be the partisan 
program of commercial or agrarian or manufacturing interests.”503    
The nation’s professional economists, with agricultural economists naturally at 
the forefront, attempted to confront the issue of declining rural fortunes and to deliver the 
impartial policies Nourse had hoped for. There was some disagreement not only about the 
appropriate cure, but also about the best diagnosis. Economists provided a host of 
explanations that included increased global competition, excessive transportation costs, 
and a lack of credit. By 1925, the Department of Agriculture’s Charles J. Brand could 
identify eighteen factors that had been cited as contributing to the decline of agricultural 
prices.504 That many causes made it difficult to offer definite solutions since each problem 
demanded its own unique response.  
Despite the potential for crippling confusion, the debate quickly focused on the 
desirability of direct government intervention and the discipline proved reasonably 
consistent in its conclusions. Immediately after the war, some raised question about the 
viability of reinstituting federally imposed price controls; they had, after all, prevented 
predatory trade during mobilization. The professional economics community was aware 
of the potential pitfalls associated with such schemes, having participated in and 
discussed the relatively successful price-control programs (then called price fixing) 
during mobilization.505 But the government’s haphazard approach to controlling prices 
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and the brevity of the war made gauging the long-term viability of such schemes difficult, 
although it was clear the programs had contained inherent flaws.  
In essence, economists’ arguments against price-fixing programs rested on long-
standing classical theory arguments against government intervention, particularly in light 
of the dynamic nature of the agricultural sector. The University of Minnesota’s John D. 
Black noted regional differences and disparities in the economics of individual crops that 
made blanket principles exceedingly difficult.506 Furthermore, conditions on individual 
farms and the desires of individual farmers varied greatly, defying efforts to craft a “one-
size-fits-all” policy.507 John D. Willard, an agricultural economist at the Massachusetts 
Agricultural College who had served on the Massachusetts Food Commission during the 
war, was familiar with the challenges of price-fixing.508 His experiences led him to 
conclude that a policy as direct as price-fixing all but guaranteed disaster, which in turn 
led him to endorse the push for self-regulating reform through research and education.  
Economists raised additional questions regarding the sustainability of price-fixing 
schemes in the face of political pressure. In theory, administrators could regulate prices 
toward an equitable balance between the interests of the producer (farmers) and the 
consumer (urban workers). Yet how to determine what constituted an equitable balance? 
The question raised a host of political and social issues that made professional 
economists uneasy. Because the very premise of price-fixing flew in the face of basic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a Price-Fixer,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 33, no. 2 (February 1919): 205–241. Edwin G. Nourse 
and W.F. Gephart, “Price-Fixing Discussion,” The American Economic Review 9, no. 1 (March 1919): 
272–279. George F. Warren, “Some Purposes and Results of Price Fixing,” The American Economic 
Review 9, no. 1 (March 1919): 233–245. Thomas N. Carver, “The Possibilities of Price Fixing in Time of 
Peace,” The American Economic Review 9, no. 1 (March 1919): 246–251. 
506
 John D. Black, “The Role of Public Agencies in the Internal Readjustments of the Farm,” Journal of 
Farm Economics 7, no. 2 (April 1925): 153–175. 
507
 Ibid., 166. 
508
 John D. Willard and H.C.M. Case, “Agriculture and Prices,” Journal of Farm Economics 2, no. 2 (April 
1920): 70–82. 
  
   
221 
 
supply-and-demand logic, any such proposal was unlikely to attract the support of more 
than a few heterodox economists – a point highlighted by Walton H. Hamilton’s failure 
to rally support for a price-fixing scheme later in the decade.509 
In keeping with marginal theory, which continued to appeal to a majority of 
professional economists in the U.S, the farm crisis was best understood in terms of supply 
and demand. America’s farmers simply produced more than consumers demanded, and 
until the two reached equilibrium economic suffering was bound to persist. “Adjustment” 
and “readjustment” – buzz words used to describe painful economic contractions in the 
years following the war – were readily employed to explain the agricultural crisis.
 510 The 
terms succinctly conveyed the argument that agriculture production and consumption 
simply were out of balance as a result of abnormally high war-time demand and of the 
structural shifts that had followed industrialization over the previous decades.  
The first critical step, professional economists determined, lie in the accumulation 
of better data that could in turn be presented to farmers and government agencies, then 
translated into action. As director of the BAE, Taylor had seized on this principle and 
pushed the agency to provide the sort of economic overview necessary to allow farmers 
to better understand and react to shifting markets. Cooperative marketing agencies were 
widely touted for their potential to help farmers apply economic theory to practice. 
Willard’s analysis of milk prices in New England illustrated this kind of non-
interventionist solution to the agricultural crisis that would enjoy widespread support. In 
the case of the New England dairy farmers, cooperative sorting and storage facilities 
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allowed the farmers to withhold their goods from market until favorable prices returned. 
Willard also argued that proper price forecasting could theoretically reveal the ideal time 
to bring their milk to market. By this method, the dramatic expansion of agricultural 
markets that had previously worked against farmers could be exploited. But, Willard also 
recognized that cooperative selling raised additional issues that needed addressing, and 
disciplinary consensus on a definite plan was elusive and not aggressively pursued. 
Excessive railroad rates still threatened to undercut any increase in profits, and there was 
always the threat that a producers’ cooperative might engage in price-fixing or otherwise 
bully small members of the association.  
The prospect of adjusting unfavorable tariffs, long a sore subject for farmers who 
were forced to sell on the open international market and buy in a protected domestic 
market, was cited as one potential solution.511 Opinions were decidedly mixed, however. 
Nourse cited an imbalanced tariff policy as problematic in his analysis of agriculture in 
an industrial society, but seemed unsure of the proper solution. He both cautioned against 
and suggested a need for protective tariffs, citing England’s mercantilist policies in both 
cases.512 But as tariff expert Jacob Viner noted, engaging in tariff manipulation would 
ultimately fail to address the excessive prices of manufactured goods that had cut into 
farmers’ profits. An international tariff was also impractical for commodities produced in 
surplus of domestic demand, as was the case with many American-produced farm goods, 
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because lack of demand rather than foreign competition drove prices downward.513 
Warren suggested a potpourri of programs to directly improve rural living standards; 
building hospitals, schools, and transportation networks, for instance, might better close 
the gap between the rural and urban populations.514 Anything, he urged, that would make 
the farmer’s life more appealing to the growing number of men and women flocking to 
cities in search of higher pay was worth considering. 
Rather than proposing simple panaceas, professional economists offered a frank 
and thorough assessment of the agricultural crisis. They identified a number of factors 
that conspired to drive down farmers’ income, overproduction being the most notable. 
The general solution was clear – since price fixing and tariffs would inevitably fail, a 
combination of cooperative marketing and voluntary adjustment was necessary to resolve 
the crisis. And yet the complexity and depth of the problem combined with divergent 
opinions about state intervention to produce a confused mass of well-informed opinions 
regarding specifics. Economists’ failure to rally around a particular plan early in the 
decade left policymakers searching for a workable solution. 
 
     
 
A Half-Baked Solution 
 
 
 The gulf between the discipline’s reasoning and the farmers’ desires was captured 
by the disparity of opinions John D. Black encountered while polling agricultural college 
presidents and state commissioners of agriculture. The responses, he concluded, fell into 
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two general camps: those who embraced laissez-faire policies that focused on education; 
and those who believed a mercantilist approach that regulated production was a more 
appropriate solution.515 As with the money, labor and monopoly questions, the nation was 
split.  
By 1922, the crisis had deepened. Farm commodity prices continued to fall and 
the foreclosure rate on farms had begun to creep upward. Whereas the period from 1913 
to 1920 saw a farm foreclosure rate of 3.2 per 1,000, from 1921 to 1926 the number 
increased to 10.7 per 1,000, with Western states accounting for an alarmingly high 
percentage of the increase.516 Eager to reverse the situation, Secretary Wallace obtained 
permission from President Harding to hold a National Agricultural Conference. The 
conference, which lasted four days, was organized by Taylor and the staff of the BAE. Of 
the 336 participants, only six were identified as economists: Theodore Price, Warren, Ely, 
Nourse, Alexander E. Cance (Massachusetts Agricultural College), H.C Filley 
(University of Nebraska) and Wesley C. Mitchell (National Bureau of Economic 
Research). An additional 25 participants were identified as delegates from agricultural 
colleges who straddled the fence between agricultural economics and fields such as 
animal husbandry or dairy science.517  
On the surface, the conference appeared to be a repeat of the Indianapolis 
Monetary Commission at which economists were in the overwhelming minority and their 
input was largely secondary to that of the business community (although in the case of 
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the IMC, the interests of both communities’ dovetailed in the end). However, unlike the 
IMC, or the Walsh Commission for that matter, the National Agricultural Commission 
was organized by Taylor and his staff of professional economists with input from Ely, 
Commons, Mitchell, and Warren. Professional economists clearly played a larger role 
than in previous conferences of a similar nature. Of the six economists in attendance, all 
but Mitchell served on one of the Conference’s twelve committees. Furthermore, the 
relatively few economists who attended played significant roles in organizing discussion. 
Ely, Mitchell, and Warren delivered three of the conference’s 24 presentations, and 
Nourse served as secretary for the Committee on Costs, Prices, and Readjustments.518 An 
additional paper on finance was presented by Eugene Meyer, Jr., a well-to-do financier 
whose profession, long-term membership in the AEA, and position as head of the War 
Finance Corporation placed him closer to the professional economics community than 
most. Taylor was made “available for consultation at all times” and therefore played an 
ambiguous but undoubtedly instrumental role beyond that of conference organizer.519 For 
arguably the first time ever, the professional economics community had a significant 
presence at a state-sponsored economic conference. 
 Those in the agricultural sector watched the conference with interest as farmers, 
farm officials, and farm business group leaders met under the guidance of professional 
economists and attempted to forge a plan to rescue the agricultural sector. The resulting 
recommendations were straight out of the leading economics journals. Delegates called 
for improvements in the collection of agricultural statistics, reductions in transportation 
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costs, and short-term financing for struggling farmers. Farmers were also encourage to 
reduce overhead costs, diversify their crops, and “adjust farm operations to market 
demands.”520    
 The “Farm Bloc” in Congress and its constituents – already skeptical of the 
conference and convinced the endeavor was a political ploy to delay real action – 
criticized the recommendations as insufficient.521 Denunciations from key conference 
participants like William Jennings Bryan and Samuel Gompers fueled suspicions that the 
conference was political showmanship, its conclusions nothing more than the desires of 
the urban Republican elite.522 Ely’s adamant stand against price-fixing solutions during 
his speech on land use no doubt added to suspicions that the event was “rigged.”523 Less 
than a week after the Conference concluded, reports began to circulate that, despite a lack 
of endorsement in the conference’s final report, a guaranty bill (i.e. price-fixing bill) 
would soon be floated.524 
 These reports proved accurate. Among the conference delegates unsatisfied with 
the final recommendations was George N. Peek, president of the Moline Plow Company. 
Like many businessmen before and since, Peek attempted to leverage his experience as a 
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businessman into qualification as an economic policymaker.525 His concern about the 
farm crisis had been aroused by the realization that sales of his company’s farm 
implements were in peril as a result of farmers’ declining incomes. Unsatisfied with the 
results of the National Agricultural Conference, Peek and his colleague Hugh S. Johnson 
approached Taylor with a plan to guarantee price levels through government subsidies. 
Unsure of such a solution, but willing to play the role of the dispassionate economic 
expert at the disposal of policymakers, Taylor reviewed Peek’s proposal and offered 
feedback.  
Peek and Johnson, who as part of their campaign had co-authored a book on 
agricultural reform, sought out additional support for a price guaranty program. In 
February, 1922, Secretary Wallace hosted a conference to discuss the merits of such a 
plan.526 The Peek-Johnson plan proposed to raise the purchasing power of agricultural 
commodities to pre-war levels by establishing two markets for crops – one a domestic 
market protected by a tariff, the other an export market managed by a government 
agency. Key to the plan was an excise tax (alternatively described by Johnson as an 
“assessment”) on growers and processors, which would in theory offset the loss incurred 
by the government agency when exported crops were sold at lower than domestic prices.    
The conference ended without a concrete plan of action, but the seed had been 
planted. Over the course of the next year, the Peek-Johnson plan spread throughout farm 
communities as its authors continued to search for support of their proposal. Taylor soon 
found himself tied to the growing agitation for a price guaranty program, much to his 
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surprise.527 He had expressed cautious optimism about the plan’s ability to address root 
causes of farmers’ problems, but was hardly a vocal or consistent champion of the 
measure.528 As Taylor traveled through the West in an attempt to better understand the 
“wheat problem,” agitation for a price-guaranty program mounted in Washington. The 
White House was soon convinced that Taylor’s fact-finding mission had evolved into a 
campaign trip for the Peek-Johnson plan. Taylor had in fact remained skeptical of any 
such scheme, and continued to promote readjustment through farmers’ cooperatives, 
education, and low-cost financing.529 The strongest evidence of Taylor’s support for 
McNary-Haugen – a 1922 internal report in which Taylor tentatively approved of a 
program to raise prices – hardly is compelling evidence of endorsement.530 The diary of 
assistant chief of the BAE Niles Olsen further contradicts the notion that McNary-
Haugen enjoyed widespread support among agricultural economists. Olsen did not record 
any run-ins with pro-MacNary-Haugen economists until the 1930s, at which point he 
identified Taylor as a supporter, while also noting Charles J. Brand’s comment that 
Taylor would not publicly acknowledge his support for the measure.531 Nonetheless, by 
1923 the Peek-Johnson plan had taken on a life of its own, secured support in Congress, 
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and become the McNary-Haugen plan.532 McNary-Haugen dominated the debate over 
agricultural reform for the next four years and delayed meaningful relief.  
 The discipline found itself in a bind. Virtually every professional economist who 
bothered to contemplate the farm crisis acknowledged that action was necessary to 
stabilize farm communities. Yet the direct assistance programs and indirect tariff 
manipulations urged by the farm lobby and outlined in McNary-Haugen were clearly at 
odds with basic, dominant economic theory on supply-and-demand. The price-fixing 
mechanism that defined McNary-Haugen worried professional economists because it 
proposed to implement in peacetime a program of stabilization that had just barely 
worked during the war.533 Price supports would undoubtedly relieve pressure on farmers 
by raising the prices paid for their crops; but overproduction would continue, and 
inevitably overwhelm the purchasing agency, without an incentive for farmers to stop 
growing. Similarly, tariffs might offer short-term relief, but such hopes were speculative 
at best, and fighting one bad policy (industrial tariffs) with yet another struck professional 
economists as shortsighted. The principle supporter for either solution within the 
professional economics community, Warren, proved to be a rather soft advocate. In his 
1924 account of the agricultural situation, Warren neither dismissed the principles of 
McNary-Haugen nor endorsed the measure.534 Likewise, Warren’s public lobbying was 
sparse, rendering his voice of relative dissent unheard.  
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Scholars have previously noted the business community’s resistance to McNary-
Haugen. The marginal and reluctant support of the professional economics community 
arguably is more noteworthy. Whereas resistance from urban business groups was to be 
expected, lack of support within the professional economics community revealed both the 
raw political motivation behind the bill and the powerful Farm Bloc’s outright dismissal 
of reasonably non-vested experts.  
Barring a collapse in non-U.S. production, or a dramatic uptick in consumption, 
the American farm crisis could only be solved through a reduction in production. There 
was little hope that European production would drop to war-time levels; and it was 
equally hard to conceive of already well-fed urbanites suddenly consuming far more than 
necessary. No one – least of all the agricultural economists who worked with rural 
communities – was eager to tell farmers that the boom was over and it was time to adjust 
expectations. But the professional economists’ weak enthusiasm for McNary-Haugen was 
revealing.  
 
Pursuing the Panacea 
 
Many rural Americans had either little faith in or little patience for the 
cooperative marketing schemes professional economists endorsed, despite their potential. 
The allure of price-guaranties, which promised parity with urban communities without 
dramatic changes at home, was powerful. The findings of a National Bureau of Economic 
Research study noted that although 30 percent of Americans worked in agriculture, the 
industry received only 17 percent of the national income and each year brought additional 
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evidence of the inequity that undoubtedly stoked farmer resentment and frustration.535 It 
did not help that the Wall Street Journal, the popular organ of eastern financial elites, 
routinely invoked economists’ opinions when criticizing the bill.536 Worse still was the 
public criticism of Benjamin N. Anderson, Jr., an economist at Chase National Bank, 
whose employment at one of the leading eastern financial institutions automatically 
rendered him suspect in the eyes of rural America.537 
 From the introduction of the McNary-Haugen bill onward professional 
economists’ voices were drowned out by politicians, lobbyists, editors, farmers, and 
business groups. The American Association for Agricultural Legislation, which Ely and 
his colleagues had started with so much optimism six years prior, had failed to make 
much of a mark. Ely biographer Benjamin Rader suggests that the AAAL may have 
influenced federal farm policy during World War I, and provides several convincing 
quotations from politicians to demonstrate as much. However, references to the AAAL 
and its activities were quite rare at the time, and accounts of the group’s contributions to 
the debate over farm policy in the early 1920s are non-existent.538 The organization had 
issued a handful of bulletins and met in conjunction with the much larger AEA several 
times, but lacked any recognizable public influence. The AAAL merged with the 
American Farm Economic Association (AFEA) in 1924, which meant that the only non-
governmental agency staffed by economic experts and dedicated to translating the lessons 
of economic research into policy reform ceased operation just as McNary-Haugen was 
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presented to Congress. The AFEA, like the AEA, operated under a constitution that 
limited its activities to research and education.539 The decision affirmed early economists’ 
faith in the belief that the free exchange of ideas would inevitably lead policymakers to 
the correct policy solutions, but as previously noted such an approach required an 
understanding between professional economists, policymakers, and the American public 
that had proven difficult to achieve. 
Farm reform remained firmly an issue of political gamesmanship. The economist 
as an abstract concept was still conspicuously present, however. In what would be a 
shining example of the problems associated with identifying and acknowledging 
economic expertise, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover cultivated his image as a 
technocratic leader who was not only in tune with cutting edge economic theory, but also 
its application to policy. In doing so, he became in the eyes of millions of Americans an 
economist on par with those who taught, researched, and advised from their posts in 
academia and research bureaus. As the fight for farm relief continued, all that was 
modern about economics – the astute vision, ambiguous messaging, and the enviable but 
fickle social prestige – was on full display in the example of President Hoover.   
Hoover entered the debate over McNary-Haugen with a strong reputation as an 
expert administrator. There is no doubt that Hoover believed in a cooperative approach to 
policymaking, but the Midwest native also feared an overexpansion of government and 
readily dismissed ideas that he felt threatened Americans’ sense of individualism. A 
mining engineer by training, he had honed his administrative skills through the 
management of food relief efforts during the First World War and subsequent service as 
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head of the Food Administration during the war.540 In what would become indicative of 
his personality, Hoover had accepted the latter position on the grounds that he was 
granted total control of American food production. In his memoirs, Hoover later 
attributed this demand to his desire to avoid “the European failures of boards and 
commissions due to inevitable frictions, indecisions, and delays.”541 One can only 
speculate whether Hoover believed that any administrator could manage the American 
food relief effort, or instead saw himself as the only man qualified to carry out the job. It 
is clear from his actions as Food Czar and Secretary of Commerce that Hoover possessed 
a large ego. In the years immediately following the war, Hoover contemplated a run for 
the presidency, but chose instead to back Republican candidate Warren Harding. 
Harding, in turn, offered Hoover the much-maligned Secretary of Commerce post, which 
at the time possessed relatively limited powers and little promise of greatness. Hoover 
accepted, but only after assurances that his powers were to be wide-ranging and 
absolute.542  
Judging from what little evidence there is regarding the matter, the professional 
economics community appears to have generally approved of Hoover’s appointment as 
Secretary of Commerce. His aggressive purchasing plans during the war indicated that he 
was beyond the antiquated laissez-faire dogmatism of so many New Era Republicans. 
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Although journalists did not seek commentary from the economics community as they 
later did during Hoover’s Presidential campaign, economic journal articles throughout the 
war and the years prior to his appointment as Commerce Secretary reinforced Hoover's 
credentials as a practicing economist.543  
Hoover’s strong opposition to McNary-Haugen exacerbated friction between 
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace and President Harding (and later President Coolidge).544 
Hoover, who tended to focus on issues surrounding industrial production and the 
elimination of waste, viewed the price-guaranty program as un-American and a 
perpetuation of the sort of haphazard practice that had led farmers to trouble in the first 
place. Nearly thirty years later Hoover would still characterize Wallace as a fascist and 
McNary-Haugen as a radical proposition designed to control farmers’ production.545   
His rhetoric and enthusiasm for a large federal bureaucracy indicate his thinking 
had advanced beyond notions of a laissez-faire economy. But, as his 1923 book 
American Individualism demonstrates, Hoover remained firmly wed to traditional notions 
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about self-sufficiency and personal responsibility.546 He stressed the need to encourage 
“individualism” in order to “provide opportunity for self-expression, not merely 
economically, but spiritually as well.”547 He also warned against the pitfalls of socialism, 
foreshadowing his lifelong tendency to equate government authority with unequivocal 
despotism. Although Hoover clearly believed the federal government ought to provide 
some measure of protection against the concentrated control of industry and capital, his 
pursuit of theoretical solutions ended with a slightly modified version of classical theory 
that was seemingly flexible only under his personal supervision.548 
The gap between Hoover and the professional economics community was 
obscured by the dynamics of the debate over farm policy reform. On that particular 
matter, both Hoover’s opinion and the discipline’s consensus about farm policy aligned 
rather nicely. Neither group thought the price-fixing mechanism in McNary-Haugen 
workable and instead encouraged cooperative marketing backed by financing relief. The 
combination of Hoover’s popularity and apparent symbiosis with the discipline’s thinking 
precluded a public outcry on the part of the professional economics community. But 
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 Ineffective politicking certainly frustrated professional economists engaged with 
the farm question. President of the American Farm Association Thomas P. Cooper, in a 
thinly veiled reference to McNary-Haugen , expressed frustration with the continued 
dismissal of economists’ research, noting that “Instances, too, have been known where 
the presumed ‘failure’ has been that of refusing support to ‘pet remedies’ advocated by 
individuals who desired endorsement rather than suggestion or modification.”549 
Coolidge’s agricultural conference, assembled in late 1924 under recently appointed 
Secretary of Agriculture William Jardine, reiterated support for cooperative marketing, 
financing subsidies, and increased research.550 The Conference report also included a call 
for protective tariffs – a clear acknowledgment of at least one of the Farm Bloc’s wishes. 
But relations were raw on both sides of McNary-Haugen, and progress proved difficult. 
As with previous debates over economic policy, reasoning had taken a backseat to 
sectarian suspicions. An exchange between Wisconsin economist B.N. Hibbard and 
Henry A. Wallace, editor of Wallace’s Farmer (and son of Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry C. Wallace) captured the dynamic. Incredulous about a radio interview Hibbard 
gave in Madison, Wallace ran an editorial mocking the “classical economist” and his 
antiquarian thinking. Hibbard, clearly hurt by the attack, responded with a sharp letter 
likening the pro-McNary-Haugen crowd to those who supported Bryan’s Free Silver 
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campaign in 1896 and accusing the popular farmers’ periodical of myopia.551 
Taylor’s dismissal from the BAE in the summer of 1925 did little to soothe 
tensions. Although he had certainly assisted in the preparation of the McNary-Haugen 
Bill in his capacity as head of the Bureau, Taylor was far from a enthusiastic promoter – 
in fact, he had quite notably never endorsed the measure. Nevertheless, his work under 
Secretary Wallace placed him at odds with Coolidge and Hoover, both of whom viewed 
the Department of Agriculture as a source of strength for their political rivals. Wallace’s 
passing in October 1924 presented an opportunity for the administration to strike a blow 
against the Farm Bloc, and Coolidge responded by appointing University of Kansas 
President William Jardine. Jardine and Taylor clashed until the latter’s dismissal in 
August 1925. Edward A. Ross, still every bit the agitator, praised Taylor for his “stand 
against the powers that be” and likened it to his contested dismissal from Stanford 25 
years prior.552 Yet Taylor’s actions were far from controversial. Whereas Ross had at 
least “earned” his dismissal through inflammatory speech and public criticism of his 
employer, Taylor was the victim of political maneuvering, plain and simple. His role in 
McNary-Haugen had been that of an expert advisor, and his public lobbying for the 
measure all but non-existent. The pro-McNary-Haugen crowd had not had much use for 
professional economists in the first place, as they largely refused to back the price-fixing 
plan. But the Coolidge administration’s brash actions crushed what little remaining 
relevancy professional economists enjoyed in the debate over farm relief. Taylor’s 
dismissal meant that, more so than ever, economic expertise was a matter of opinion.    
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The subsequent outpouring of support for Taylor revealed the absurdity of the 
situation. Jardine took a positive shine toward the cooperative marketing plans advanced 
since Taylor’s dismissal – an odd development since, as Black noted in a letter, they were 
the same plans forwarded by Taylor the previous year.553 That the move was political was 
clear to the Madison Plow Company’s Charles W. Holman, who worried that the Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics was being transformed into a “political bureau.”554 Clarence 
Cannon, a Missouri Representative, echoed this concern while lamenting the “packing” 
of the Department of Agriculture.555  
 The back-and-forth sniping between supporters and opponents of McNary-
Haugen raged on as farm prices continued to slump. Those who predicted the market 
would readjust itself, such as Roger Babson, founder of Babson’s Statistical 
Organization, continued to predict an impending return to prosperity despite the lack of 
action in Washington.556 But the assumption that farmers could adjust in a timely fashion 
to evolving market conditions through better planning and hard work proved wrong. 
According to the Department of Agriculture, farmers had indeed responded to the price-
level crisis by raising productivity by 15 percent between 1922 and 1926.557 Yet farmers’ 
purchasing power remained well-below pre-war levels and Secretary of Agriculture 
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Jardine’s optimistic annual report for 1926 was met with resentment and skepticism.558 
 Economists continued to push for reform, their mantra largely unchanged from 
the end of the war: support cooperative marketing, avoid tariffs, provide financing, and 
reduce production on marginal lands.559 Alas, the discipline remained wholly dependent 
on outsiders to seize on their ideas and marshal them through the policymaking process. 
While pondering the life of what he called “kept researchers” – meaning economists 
tasked with providing relevant research to the larger community – new economist Walton 
H. Hamilton encouraged his colleagues to pursue projects that would cut to the core of 
the agricultural problem.560 But the problem was no longer a lack of information or 
compelling evidence. As with the money and labor questions, the professional economics 
community had provided a rough but reasonably clear solution to the problem in question 
at the beginning of the debate. Just as skepticism and entrenched partisans bogged down 
the process of reform in the past, the battle between the Farm Bloc and Hoover’s 







 Hoover eventually broke the political logjam and won the battle over farm reform 
when he made the move from the Department of Commerce to the Oval Office in 1928. 
His campaigning against McNary-Haugen had ensured that the bill stalled in Congress 
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from 1924 to 1926. Hoover was also instrumental in persuading Coolidge to veto the 
measure when it had passed Congress in 1927 and 1928. His triumph over McNary-
Haugen further polished his credentials as the nation’s economic czar. Throughout the 
1920s, the press had referred to Hoover as an economist and continued to do so in the 
build-up to his 1928 presidential victory. Referred to as a “glutton for statistics,” a “new 
kind of candidate,” or just plain “an economist,” the press touted Hoover’s credentials as 
an economist without any recognition that the import of such a label was often 
ambiguous.561 A widely publicized endorsement from Yale’s Irving Fischer cemented the 
former engineer’s image as the technocrat candidate in the 1928 Presidential election.562 
The endorsement was misleading, however. Fisher’s support derived from Hoover’s 
support for Prohibition rather than his economic prowess.563      
For the same reasons that the discipline struggled to act in a unified voice on 
policymaking issues, economists failed to point out that Hoover – although arguably 
more savvy about economic issues than many of his political colleagues – still fell short 
of qualifying as an economic expert. Perhaps association with the high-flying politician 
suited economists just fine. Or, in the case of Mitchell, Fisher, and other economists 
directly connected to Hoover, it is possible a desire for a role in Washington muted 
criticism. Regardless, Hoover swept into office with the credentials of an economist and a 
reputation as a politician dedicated to the solicitation of expert advice. 
In the wake of McNary-Haugen’s defeat, Hoover managed to gather enough 
support for his vision of farm reform. The Agricultural Marketing Act was passed in 
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1929. The measure was a compromise of sorts, as it authorized the Federal Farm Board to 
provide competitive loans to farm organizations and “manage surpluses” through the use 
of a $500,000,000 fund. Advocates of the Act argued that providing loans to farm groups, 
rather than to farmers themselves, would stimulate the growth of farmers’ cooperatives. 
Beyond that, the plan was exceedingly vague, as commentators were quick to note in 
leading economics journals.564 The mechanism for controlling surpluses was left to the 
discretion of the Federal Farm Board and as such was unclear. The Act also hinted at the 
possibility of limiting acreage, but again provided no firm guidance, to the chagrin of 
economists and farmers alike.565 As the farm crisis deepened, the concept of allotment – 
paying farmers not to grow crops and so contribute to overproduction – had gained 
traction in professional economics circles.566 It was difficult enough to secure subsidies 
for crops; the likelihood of convincing policymakers to pay farmers for not growing 
seemed impossible. 
Within a year of when Hoover assumed office, a brewing economic disaster 
began to test the Agricultural Marketing Act and Hoover’s ability to manage the 
economy in general. The president’s response to the economic downturn that gave way to 
the Great Depression has, with some good reason, been recognized as progressive for the 
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time.567 Hoover shook off the advice of the Social Darwinists within the Republican Party 
and tried to reverse the downward spiral. His attempts to organize wage minimums and 
prevent layoffs on a voluntary basis, his encouragement of state public works projects, 
and his administration’s cash infusions to key public institutions and the national banking 
system all reflected some of the wisdom that had spilled forth from economics 
departments and research bureaus in the preceding decades.  
It is possible to oversell such a forgiving revision of events. Even after it became 
clear that the recession was quickly devolving into a depression Hoover refused to wield 
the power of the state. The composition of his “economic general staff” – five 
businessmen, two government representatives, one labor representative, and only two 
economists – reflected his rigid adherence to private sector solutions.568 Although he 
urged public works projects and the maintenance of wages to encourage consumer 
consumption, he and the conservative Congress remained wedded to the spirit of 
Associationalism and voluntary measures. 
Panicked and frustrated, lawmakers turned to antiquated policy by promoting the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff bill in an effort to raise the cost of foreign goods and stimulate the 
consumption of domestic products. Despite Hoover’s later attempts at downplaying the 
significance of the Smoot-Hawley bill, it was a shockingly poor decision with wide-
ranging consequences.569  
After watching in silence as he delayed farm reform and co-opted the discipline’s 
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prestige. The professional economics community finally mobilized. More than 1,000 
economists from 178 colleges publicly petitioned the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
bill on the grounds that it would raise the cost of living and further the hardships of 
American farmers.570 One-time Hoover supporter Wesley C. Mitchell joined Fischer and 
others in signing the petition. The protest made front-page news. For the first time since 
the “Minnesota Memorial,” professional economists had organized to issue a public 
statement expressing their consensus about a key economic issue of the day.  
 Equally unconvinced that the Smoot-Hawley Act would ameliorate the 
increasingly desperate conditions of the depression, Senator Robert Wagner pushed a bill 
designed to stem the loss of jobs. The Wagner Act, a precursor to the better-known 
Wagner Act of 1935, called for federal oversight of employment offices and large-scale 
public works projects. Frustrated with Hoover’s lack in interest in the bill, Wagner 
publicly attacked the now-embattled president for refusing to apply the “public works 
principle,” which had been “recommended as both sound and feasible by the united 
opinion of economists.”571 Furthermore, Wagner characterized Hoover’s response to the 
growing depression, which had abided by his morally guided Associationalist philosophy, 
as nothing more than a series of “pep meetings” led by a number of Hoover-appointed 
“cheer leaders.” 
Economists, business leaders, and labor leaders soon followed with another public 
letter in support of the bill. Signatories included the prominent economists Frank Taussig, 
John B. Andrews, William Leiserson, Paul H. Douglas, and Fisher. In addition to 
submitting a copy of the letter to Congress, letter organizers made a point of sending a 
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copy to Hoover.572 As with the Smooth-Hawley petition, the letter received front-page 
coverage. By late 1930, Hoover had lost his credentials as a practicing economist. 
Economists’ criticism of the Smoot-Hawley Act was merely the beginning of their assault 
on Hoover’s conduct as President.573 As the depression deepened, it was clear that 
Hoover had failed as an economist. It was, of course, because he had been only an 
economist by name and not necessarily by training. Ironically, for some Hoover still 
stood as a shining example of what follies might ensue should the experts be allowed at 
the helm. 
The nation’s professional economists temporarily established their role as a 
monitor of federal economic policymaking through their public criticism of Hoover. To 
be clear, the discipline lacked cohesion and continued to spurn the opportunity to turn 
professional organizations into lobbying groups. But the once-strong voice within the 
community of professional economics that had advocated a socially active role for 
economists had reemerged. By the time voters began to consider their options in the 1932 
presidential election, economists’ criticisms of federal policy had gained more attention 
in the press. Not surprisingly, the Democratic candidate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
joined in the attack of Hoover’s capability as an economic policymaker and vowed to 
deliver the economic solutions Hoover feigned to possess. 
 The severity of the Great Depression forced policymakers to accept agricultural 
economists’ long-held understanding of the need to thoroughly research and coordinate 
the agricultural sector. It was a longtime coming for the millions of rural Americans who 
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suffered to throughout the 1920s. The failure to wed economic expertise to policymakers’ 
decisions resulted in a lost decade for the agricultural sector and surely contributed to the 
economic pre-conditions that fueled the Great Depression of the 1930s. As with the 
shortcomings of monetary and labor policy at the turn of the century, it is difficult to 
assign “blame” for the apparent disconnect. The nation’s professional economists, for 
their part, failed to effectively organize and publicize their concerns about the state of the 
agricultural sector. Nor did the discipline demonstrate a willingness to challenge 
Hoover’s credentials as an economist, leaving the public to believe in his Associationalist 
program as a bona fide theory. The nation’s farmers – including their representatives in 
Washington – unflinchingly dismissed economists’ skepticism toward price-fixing 
schemes as partisan sniping and backed the ill-fated McNary-Haugen for too long. The 
fight for unlimited price supports and protective tariffs undoubtedly delayed painful but 
necessary adjustments in acreage and marketing, as it encouraged the notion among 
farmers that market forces could be suspended by legislative decree.  
 The ascent of Roosevelt and his “brain trust” surely echoed the promise that 
accompanied Wilson’s first term in office. His was a campaign that seemingly valued the 
input of professional economists and suggested a key role for economic experts in the 
Roosevelt administration. The adoption of an agricultural allotment program in 1933 
finally began to impose some measure of order in the agriculture sector but the Roosevelt 
years still proved frustrating to professional economists. Beholden to the same political, 
social, and cultural forces as the policymakers that had preceded them, New Deal 
policymakers often kept the nation’s economic experts at arm’s length as they sought 
compromise on economic policies that were not designed to work when adopted in part. 
  
   
246 
 
 As the Great Depression of the 1930s developed into a full-blown political and 
economic crisis, the discipline that had grown in response to economic turmoil with the 
express goal of preventing such disasters remained but one voice among many. Rather 
than serving as an authoritative source of knowledge and policy recommendations for 
beleaguered representatives on Capitol Hill, professional economists continued to 
struggle with the challenge of applying economic theory to practice. The harsh realities of 
the 1930s economy did little to quell the layman’s suspicion of trained economists.574 If 
anything, the sudden and dramatic collapse of the economy seemingly added credibility 
to the claim that economists’ ideas were not only useless, but actually dangerous. Irving 
Fisher’s infamous claim that “stock prices are not too high and Wall Street will not 
experience anything in the nature of a crash” one month prior to the market crash that 
came to be known as Black Tuesday reflected poorly on the discipline.575 His later 
persistence that the slump was but a minor bump in an otherwise smooth road contributed 
to his image as an aloof academic and lent ammunition to those who were critical of 
professional economics in general.576   
 Fisher was not the only widely quoted professional economist during the 
depression decade, and therein lay another problem. Competing voices lent credence to 
longstanding claims that economist simply lacked the consensus necessary to effectively 
advise policymakers. Such claims were, as discussed in the preceding chapters, no wholly 
without merit. Although consensus existed in certain matters, like the harm posed by a 
tariffs or the general need to manage the money supply, virtually every issue had its share 
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of contrarians and problematic details. Politicians, lobbyists, and newspapermen eagerly 
seized on dissenting opinions within the discipline in an attempt to rally support to their 
cause, or at minimum to sell more newspapers. Throughout the depression decade, the 
same forces that had combined to sap professional economists’ influence earlier in the 
century continued to stifle the connection between economic expertise and economic 
policy while millions of Americans struggled to understand why no one, including the 
nation’s professional economists, seemed capable of ending the malaise. 
This claim stands in sharp contrast to the widely held perception of 1930s 
Washington as a hotbed of economic experimentation that was led by economists infused 
with the pro-interventionists policies of England’s John Maynard Keynes. Roosevelt, 
who had notably surrounded himself with a coterie of respected intellectuals during the 
1932 presidential race, continued to call on the members of his Brain Trust and additional 
interlopers to provide bold solutions to the nation’s problems. According to the popular 
narrative, the combination of desperation and the appeal Keynesian ideas overthrew any 
vestiges of the laissez-faire associationalist approach to economic management (albeit 
sans Keynes’ direct involvement, as he reputedly rubbed FDR the wrong way). Instead, 
an emerging consensus among economists in favor of counter-cyclical government 
spending spurred policymakers to adopt large public works projects that could “prime the 
pump” and stimulate economic activity. This narrative also suggests that the consensus 
on the need to stimulate consumer spending helped drive through social welfare 
legislation such as the Social Security Act and protections for worker’s collective 
bargaining rights – both of which were thought beneficial because they put money in the 
pockets of those most likely to spend. The fact of the matter is that federal policymakers 
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continued to ignore, dismiss, or modify professional economists’ recommendations just 
as they always had. Roosevelt in particular was notorious for his tendency to lure 
advisors into a false sense of sympathetic understanding only to ignore their 
recommendations.577 
The few clear examples of economists’ influence on economic policy stand as 
notable exceptions that prove the rule and highlight the discipline’s failure to achieve the 
new economists’ lofty ambitions to tightly bind economic analysis with government 
policy. Agricultural economists’ success in persuading policymakers to thoroughly 
regulate farm production through an allotment plan serves as an illustrative example. The 
system of checks on production implemented by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
closely resembled the ideas articulated by a number of agricultural economists near the 
end of the 1920s.578 Unlike the problematic price guaranties of the McNary-Haugen plan, 
advocates of allotment contended that paying farmers not to grow certain crops would 
directly relieve economic pressure on rural Americans by raising prices without 
simultaneously encouraging overproduction. The success of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA) proved to have a lasting effect on agricultural policy in the U.S. 
because the framework it established allowed for the reasonable coordination and 
management of agricultural production over subsequent decades.579  
Citing this momentous shift in agricultural policy as evidence of professional 
economists’ influence proves problematic for several reasons, however. To begin, the 
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measure’s lengthy gestation period serves as a reminder that agricultural economists’ 
expertise was challenged throughout the policymaking process. Professional economists 
had called for a reform of national agricultural policy in the immediate aftermath of the 
First World War. The concept of allotment, to be fair, had emerged later in the decade. 
But professional economists had been consistent in their call for reduced production and 
federal aid. Policymakers in the Farm Bloc nevertheless continued to support the 
untenable McNary-Haugen measure, thus soaking up the attention of Washington and 
agricultural economists for far too long.  
Additionally, the agricultural interest groups that had effectively undercut 
professional economists’ influence did not simply disappear during the Great Depression. 
The farmers’ groups and businessmen who depended on the agricultural industry 
continued to lobby lawmakers and hold sway in Washington, as evidence by the 
appointment of George Peek as administrator of the AAA. The former Moline Plow 
Company executive, whose plan for a price-guaranty program had led to the proposed 
McNary-Haugen bill, continued to clash with those who insisted on reducing output.580 
His attempts to wrest control of the AAA away the Department of Agriculture and 
implement a program of price guaranties backed by cartel agreements between the 
nation’s largest agricultural producers proved unsuccessful but nevertheless illustrates the 
persistent challenging of professional economists’ expertise.  
 Roosevelt’s mercurial pursuit of expert advisors raises even stronger challenges to 
the notion of the 1930s as the dawning of a golden era for professional economic. He 
does not appear to have engaged the discipline by sorting through salient arguments and 
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making decisions based on the consensus of expert opinion. Rather, Roosevelt considered 
professional economists’ recommendations alongside political considerations, always 
searching for the right combination of economic and political expediency.  
Roosevelt’s attitude toward the relationship between expertise and policymaking 
might help explain why the Treasury Department pursued such a problematic monetary 
policy during his first term. Following Cornell agricultural economist George F. 
Warren’s advice, Roosevelt encouraged his Secretary of the Treasury and longtime 
political companion Henry Morgenthau, Jr., to combat deflation by purchasing large 
quantities of gold. Warren’s influence is notable for its hints of nepotism and short-
sightedness – neither of which are traits typical associated with the marriage of expertise 
and public policy. 
 The White Houses’ interest in Warren as a monetary advisor was noted as 
peculiar from the beginning. As national newspapers illustrated, prior to 1933 Warren’s 
background was almost exclusively in agricultural economics.581 To be sure, he was 
familiar with fields outside his specialty; but Fisher’s claim that Warren was counted 
among the world’s preeminent monetary theorists was a stretch, at best.582 In fact, most 
leading American economists who specialized in monetary theory, including those with 
access to Roosevelt, disagreed with Warren’s assertion that raising the price of gold 
would automatically raise commodity prices.583 On the eve of the annual AEA meeting, 
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Walter E. Spahr, chair of the Department of Economics at New York University, publicly 
noted that virtually none of the nation’s leading monetary theorists endorsed Warren’s 
plan.584 Warren’s presentation of his plan alongside colleague Frank Parson led to 
something of a spectacle at the AEA meeting when economists packed the auditorium to 
poke holes in the commodity-dollar theory.585 O.M.W. Sprague, a widely respected 
monetary expert, resigned in protest from his position as economic advisor to the 
Treasury Department when Roosevelt refused to abandon an economic policy that was 
far afield from the discipline’s consensus.586 Following his resignation, Sprague criticized 
Roosevelt’s monetary policy in a series of nine articles written for The Hartford Courant, 
though he later returned to the Treasury Department as a consultant.587 
 The question of why Roosevelt ignored the professional economics community’s 
consensus and placed so much faith in Warren begs answering. One obvious explanation 
is that Roosevelt and Morgenthau were familiar with Warren. Roosevelt previously had 
called on Warren to provide policy as a member of his Agriculture Advisory 
Commission, which Roosevelt had established shortly after his inauguration as governor 
of New York in 1929. Warren served on the panel alongside Morgenthau, a Roosevelt 
confident and good friend since his their days in New York politics. An agriculturalist by 
trade, Morgenthau lacked any formal training in economics, but was certainly aware of 
the deflationary forces that had depressed agricultural commodity prices over the 
previous decade. Warren biographer Bernard Stanton notes that Warren’s conduct as a 
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member of the Agriculture Advisory Commission resulted in “a strong professional 
relationship” between the farm economist and future president.588 During his first two 
years in the White House, lobbyists of all stripes assailed Roosevelt with a cacophony of 
monetary reform proposals. The question of whether or not to stay committed to the gold 
standard preoccupied not only the Roosevelt administration, but Washington at large. In 
the first half of 1933, at least twenty-four different bills designed to alter U.S. monetary 
policy were introduced to Congress.589 Overwhelmed by the waves of economic advice 
that poured into the Oval Office, Roosevelt ultimately turned to Warren, who was a 
friendly and familiar face from the days as Governor of New York. 
 The simplicity of Warren’s gold purchasing plan may also offer insight into why 
Roosevelt seized on the plan of one particular professional economist. Pressure to raise 
prices had mounted steadily since the early days of the Depression. The assumed 
connection between higher prices and economic recovery drove a growing number of 
lawmakers to promote inflationary policies, and the increasingly popular Thomas 
Amendment to the Farm Relief Bill proposed to fulfill the call through outright printing 
of money.590 Afraid of reckless inflation but in agreement that prices ought to raise, 
Roosevelt appears to have been attracted to Warren’s plan as much for its political 
expediency as for his faith in its creator. The Gold Purchase Plan would in theory raise 
prices in proportion to the amount of gold purchased, thus maintaining the link between 
the nation’s paper currency and its gold reserves while avoiding the temptation to print 
money outright.  
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 But by early 1934 the plan was deemed a failure. The gold purchases did indeed 
devalue the dollar by forty percent, but domestic commodity prices continued to 
decrease.591 Warren’s argument that people still adjusted the value of goods and services 
based on fluctuations in the price of gold was quickly revealed as poorly conceived.592 
The historical data that Warren and his colleague Frank Parson had used to justify their 
assumptions was exposed as problematic at best by their professional colleagues. The 
professional economics community’s initial response to Roosevelt’s decision regarding 
monetary policy was vindicated, but Roosevelt was hardly contrite. In the wake of the 
failed Gold Purchase Program, the president infamously dismissed the advice of British 
economist John Maynard Keynes, commenting that Keynes seemed to be more 
mathematician and political economist.593    
In typical fashion, the AEA remained above the fray, although its members 
continued to attempt to answer the call to end the economic malaise. Members were 
certainly sensitive to the issues at hand, but insisted on their long-held belief that 
academic freedom depended on organizational neutrality. Instead, the nation’s 
professional economists sought to influence economic policy as individuals or members 
of intellectual camps. The results of such efforts were less than stellar. One of the more 
notable and ambitious efforts,  the “Chicago Plan” for bank reform, fell well short of 
remaking the American banking system. The plan, first introduced in mimeographed 
form but soon elaborated in books and journal articles, called for 100 percent reserve 
banking at depository institutions as a means of stabilizing the American economy by 
preventing further bank runs and granting the federal government more direct control of 
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the monetary system. The plan was the collaborative fruit of the University of Chicago’s 
Department of Economics, which included Frank Knight, Henry C. Simon, Henry 
Schultz, and Paul H. Douglas. It found ready support among additional economists 
outside Chicago who appear to have arrived at similar conclusions independently of the 
Chicago crowd’s influence.594 Simon, Douglas, Lauchlin Currie, and Irving Fisher all 
published books that promoted the plan in one form or another, and they did successfully 
attract attention in Congress.595 However, as historian Russell Phillips documents in his 
history of the proposal, the Chicago Plan failed to overcome political gamesmanship and 
a skeptical public.596   
 A considerably less influential but no less interesting attempt to influence policy 
emerged from the economics departments of Harvard and Tufts, where seven young 
economists collaborated to publish An Economic Program for American Democracy, 
which strongly promoted government spending and the re-doubling of New Deal 
efforts.597 Scholarly reviews of the book were critical. The young economists were 
chastised for failing to adequately defend their claim that the New Deal programs had 
considerably improved the economic situation, and they were similarly criticized for 
neglecting to include any real discussion of democracy in a book that purported to focus 
                                                          
594
 Albert G. Hart, “A Proposal of Making Monetary Management Effective in the United States,” The 
Review of Economic Studies 2, no. 2 (February 1935): 104–116. 
595
 Henry Calvert Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic 
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). Lauchlin B. Currie, The Supply and Control of Money 
in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934). Irving Fisher, 100% Money (New 
York: Adelphi, 1935). Paul H. Douglas, Controlling Depressions (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1935). 
596
 Ronnie J. Phillips, The Chicago Plan & New Deal Banking Reform (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
597
 Richard V. Gilbert and et al, An Economic Program for American Democracy (New York: Vanguard 
Press, 1938). 
  
   
255 
 
on the subject.598 The parallels between the upstart Keynesians of Harvard and the new 
economists of the late nineteenth century are intriguing to note. Both embraced new 
theories as a solution to pressing social problems and endured the criticism of their 
“elders” as a result. Similarly, both the new economists and the Keynesians appealed to 
the need for practical, real world solutions that would work within the inescapable rules 
of economics while also satisfying the demands of policymakers and their constituents. 
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The Legacy of the Professional Economists 
 
A full account of professional economists’ individual efforts to resolve the Great 
Depression would require a book of its own. Still, if the period leading up to the decade 
and the examples briefly discussed in the previous chapter are any indication, the 
recurrent themes noted throughout this study of the profession’s formative decades might 
very well have extend through the 1930s. Interdisciplinary strife, the popularity of folk 
economics, and the connection between political savvy and influence over economic 
policy have proven to be powerful and persistent barriers to the melding of economic 
expertise and economic policy. It should come as no surprise that these themes resonated 
throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty first, as they were embedded into 
the discipline early in the professionalization process, as explained throughout the 
preceding chapters.  
The push to establish economic expertise in the United States was rapid and 
contentious, which left room for prominent folk economists like Henry George and 
William “Coin” Harvey. These untrained economists were just as influential, if not more 
so, than the academically trained professional economists who derived their social capital 
from the nation’s growing colleges, universities, and later, federal agencies and bureaus. 
George’s proselytizing failed to yield the land and tax reforms he argued would place 
productive resources in the hands of the working poor, but his work did directly 
challenge the legitimacy of those academically trained economists who cautioned against 
such radical reform and led to the creation of single-tax political clubs. Likewise, 
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Harvey’s books and public debates with the University of Chicago’s J. Laurence 
Laughlin did not result in a move off the gold standard, but his voice combined with 
others to establish an intellectual justification for changing the nation’s monetary policy 
that rivaled the arguments presented by the academy. 
The relative ease with which those untrained in economics were able to publicly 
confront and repudiate professionally trained economists’ ideas and policy 
recommendations dealt a severe blow to the new economists’ early hopes for a more 
technocratic society. Eager for the public’s participation, and perhaps a bit desperate for 
their annual membership dues, the American Economic Association embraced public 
participation in the first decades of the organization’s existence. But by the 1910s, the 
gap between professional and amateur had grown and become increasingly problematic. 
As noted in chapters three and five, the widening gulf between trained and untrained 
economists exacerbated the public’s skepticism regarding professional economists’ intent 
and allegiances. There were exceptions, such as banker Paul Warburg, who successfully 
engaged with economists by participating in their conferences and engaging with their 
work on a regular basis. Untrained economists who joined activist organizations, such as 
the Manufacturers and Merchants Federal Tax League that attacked Richard T. Ely for 
his opposition to a single-tax, were leagues apart from the discipline, however.  This gulf 
consistently undermined economists’ efforts to apply economic theory and research to 
practice, as the constant stream of criticism folk economists directed toward the 
discipline mitigated some of the social capital that stemmed from having established 
economics departments on every major college campus by the 1920s. 
Of course, the folk economists’ criticisms were not always unsubstantiated. The 
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discipline did do a poor job of presenting a unified front, by design. As noted in chapter 
three, the discipline only gradually worked through disagreements over methodology. By 
the 1920s, a reasonable degree of consistency had been obtained when it became clear 
that the new economists’ methodological revolution had in fact largely resulted in the 
modification of earlier classical theory. Disagreements persisted, however. Professional 
economists never reached the sort of compact that would allow for unanimous agreement 
on economic policy. Realizing the potential danger of trying to force such agreement at 
an early stage, the AEA committed itself to strict neutrality on policy matters. The results 
of this decision were mixed. On the one hand, professional economics thrived as an open 
and democratic field of inquiry. On the other, economists slowly, and unfairly, gained a 
reputation as highly skilled technicians incapable of offering direct answers to questions 
about economic policy. In fact, a general consensus had emerged on at least some of the 
key issues of the day. As discussed in chapter two, professional economists 
overwhelmingly cautioned against free silver monetary policy. A study of labor 
economists and the struggle to reform labor relations strongly suggests that the discipline 
predicted New Deal labor reforms, though few policymakers paid close attention. 
Similarly, chapter six illustrates how agricultural economists reached a reasonably clear 
consensus about the need for federal reform of the agricultural market that went 
unheeded until crisis forced the adopted of an allotment program. 
It is tempting to say that economists “got it right” in all three instances, yet were 
unfairly or unwisely ignored by policymakers and the general public. Of course, the cases 
studies examined in this dissertation were conducted with the benefit of hindsight. 
Professional economists in the U.S. only rarely presented a unified front – as they did 
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promoting taxation during World War I or opposing the Smoot-Hawley tariff at the 
beginning of the Great Depression. More often than not, the nation’s community of 
professional economists appeared to be in such disagreement as to delegitimize their 
findings. Even after separating from sociology, the new economist-cum-institutionalists’ 
push to incorporate sociology, history, and psychology into their work threatened to 
subvert economists’ authority by destabilizing the discipline through the addition of an 
ever-expanding catalogue of methodological turns. The bulk of U.S. economists, 
including many of those “young turks” who had initially challenged the maxims of 
classical thought with ideas from the German Historical School, gradually accepted the 
premise of a reasonably rational man. A century, and counting, of methodological 
consensus followed, yet jokes about indecisive and inconsistent economists have 
persisted.
599
 Even in those instances when the nation’s professional economists reached a 
rough consensus about how to translate theory to policy, the steadfast neutrality of the 
discipline’s leading institutions precluded action.     
This is not to suggest that professional economists did not exert any influence on 
U.S. economic policy in the early twentieth century. The ideas that emerged from the 
Wisconsin School clearly shaped Wisconsin state economic policy and served as a model 
for equally progressive communities. Likewise, the economists who attended the 
Indianapolis Monetary Commission, served on the War Industries Board during WW I, 
and advised FDR in the depths of the Great Depression surely played a role in crafting 
policy. Even so, the evidence makes clear that these minor triumphs fell well-short of the 
ideal relationship between economic expertise and economic policy pursued by the early 
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professional economists.  
As noted in the three case studies on monetary, labor, and agricultural policy, 
professional economists struggled to gain traction without the strong political backing 
that emanated from outside the discipline. The AEA’s recommendations on monetary 
policy garnered scant attention, yet economists managed to acquire some agency in the 
fight over monetary reform by joining the privately-organized Indianapolis Monetary 
Commission. In the case of Commons and the Wisconsin School, the popularity of liberal 
governor Robert La Follette elevated the state’s leading economists from intellectuals to 
key policy advisors. Likewise, George Warren’s association with Henry Mogenthau, Jr., 
and FDR turned the otherwise unremarkable economist into one of the nation’s leading 
experts in a field outside his expertise. In each instance, political expediency and 
networking played a large role in determining whose ideas were chosen by policymakers 
when trying to craft economic policy. It was a far cry from the marriage of knowledge 
and practice that the new economists had envisioned when they drafted the first 
constitution of the AEA. 
 
Into the Post-WW II Period 
 
This poorly defined but oft discussed relationship between professional 
economists and policymaking appears to have persisted throughout the twentieth century, 
which helps explain why economists draw praise for their intellectual prowess in one 
sentence and criticism for their failure to prevent economic catastrophe in the next. To be 
sure, in the approximately 25 years following the end of World War II it seemed there 
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was mostly praise. There is a fairly strong consensus regarding a golden age in the United 
States in which economic expertise was wed to public policy, starting with the World 
War II and collapsing in the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges during the 
1970s. Whether explaining the course of economic thought, the source of post-war 
economic prosperity, or the “state of the world” in the period preceding the rise of neo-
liberalism, many seem to agree that the decades immediately following World War II 
were marked by careful collaboration between professional economists and economic 
policymakers.600 The move toward a more active, interventionist federal government is 
undeniable, as the Keynesian Revolution certainly seems to have been a real 
phenomenon. The emergency economic reforms of the 1930s were expanded through the 
1960s. The number of economists in general, and Washington in particular, increased. 
AEA membership grew nearly three-fold from 1935 to 1960, and professional economists 
continued to find employment in the expanded bureaucracy of the federal government. 
The creation of the Council of Economic Advisors by way of the Employment Act of 
1946 established an official body of professional economists to advise the President and 
help craft the office’s annual economic report, thus formalizing the advising process 
between the nation’s leading professional economists and policymakers.  
Newspapers and popular magazines such as Time and Business Week ran glowing 
profiles of the nation’s leading economic experts, while public discussion of 
macroeconomic issues such as GDP, unemployment, and growth became commonplace. 
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The most prominent economists of the era embraced the role of public advocate and 
furthered the image of the discipline as conquerors of the economic uncertainty that had 
plagued previous generations. Walter Heller spoke positively of his relationship as an 
advisor to Kennedy and Johnson; Herbert Stein concurred that a general cooperation 
between professional economists and government defined the immediate post-war period, 
as did Arthur Burns.601 John Kenneth Galbraith stepped away from his duties at Harvard 
to embark on a wildly successful career as a public intellectual, diplomat, and 
government advisor. His books on the nature of capitalism and the American economy 
were best-sellers – further evidence of the mounting influence of and respect commanded 
by professional economists. This trend deepened the already prevalent misconception that 
professional economists were inherently well-suited – and indeed required as a measure 
of success – to play a role as a direct participant in the policymaking game. 
 If anecdotes and personal recollections are not enough, proponents of the 
narrative that connects economic expertise and economic policy can point to the 
overwhelming success of the American economy as evidence of an apparent link. The 
American economy did, after all, grow steadily from 1945 to 1973. Furthermore, 
unemployment remained well-below 1930s levels and the percentage of Americans living 
in poverty was gradually reduced during the 1950s and 1960s. The American middle-
class became the envy of the world. Success on such a large scale does not just happen, 
the argument goes, but was rather the result of coherent and well-thought-out economic 
policies designed to build a class of prosperous consumers. Professional economists must 
have played a large role in developing and implementing policies that kept energy prices 
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low, raised paychecks, and put record numbers of Americans through college. The goal 
for policymakers and the American public in general, it would seem, is to recreate this 
era of symbiosis between expertise and policy in order to recapture the economic magic 
of the post-War period. 
The notion that Keynesian economists introduced a fundamentally new concept 
when they advocated counter-cyclical government spending should strike students of 
nineteenth century labor and reform movements as questionable. The idea that 
government ought to spend in order to employ the out-of-work until the economy 
recovered may have been novel to professional economists but it certainly was not 
unheard of among laborers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Voters and 
policymakers in the 1930s likely did not wait for professional economists to validate their 
impulse toward government relief – rather they called for such reform based on desperate 
need and then cited the relevant experts as justification. It is worth exploring whether this 
relationship between political need and justification persisted post-World War II. In 
particular, did economic policymakers in 1945 pursue policies based on the arguments 
presented by professional economists, or did they pursue policies based on the need to 
sustain political coalitions and gather support at the polls? Were Keynesian policies the 
“right” policies because they derived from a consensus among professional economists 
and delivered economic prosperity, or were they the “right” policies because they 
satisfied voters’ demands and happened to succeed because global economic conditions 
promised prosperity barring all but the most ludicrous economic policies?    
Further complicating matters is the dramatic rise of the business economist in the 
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post-war decades.602 Connections between academic economists and private business 
were fairly common in the early twentieth century, but the formation of the National 
Business Economists Association in 1959 seems to suggest a new dynamic. Private 
businesses increasingly employed professional economists and used their in-house 
research to lobby Washington. Should privately employed, trained economists be 
included in discussions of professional economists’ influence over public policy, given 
their presumed allegiance to the firms or industries they are paid to represent? 
Given the degree to which the pre-World War II policymakers managed to 
include professional economists without necessarily incorporating their advice, perhaps it 
is time to question the connection between expertise and policy in the post-World War 
period. It is clear that presence does not equal influence and that political expediency 
more often than not overrules the type of systematic thinking toward which professional 
economists are inclined. Given the nature of the discipline and the structure of its leading 
organizations, it is unlikely that professional economists offered policymakers clear, 
actionable, and non-contradictory advice from 1945 to 1973. A case in point: future AEA 
president William Baumol’s conclusion, presented to the FCC, regarding reasonable rates 
for AT&T services in a pivotal case, was ignored. Economist William Melody had 
offered a competing analysis of AT&T’s rate structure and the regulators accepted it as 
the more politically attractive of the two expert conclusions.603 It is admittedly a relatively 
small incident in the grand scheme of things, but how many such examples might be 
discovered if we begin looking closely?  
                                                          
602
 Hugh S. Norton, The Professional Economist: His Role in Business and Industry (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1969). 
603
 Peter Temin and Louis Galambos, The Fall of the Bell System: A Study in Prices and Politics 
(Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 39. 
  
   
265 
 
 The decades following the collapse of the Keynesian consensus prove no less 
problematic to our understanding of the connection between economic expertise and 
economic policy in the U.S. As most would agree, by the 1970s the political viability of 
Keynesian policies began to fade quite rapidly. The combination of growing 
unemployment and stubborn inflation led many to question the wisdom of counter-
cyclical spending and the maintenance of social safety nets. As more and more 
Americans grew to fear rising taxes and decreasing benefits, the University of Chicago’s 
neoclassical guru Milton Friedman appeared to siphon Galbraith’s public prestige. With 
each passing year it seems more appropriate to characterize the Keynesian years from 
1941 to 1973 as a transient period of relatively high cooperation between professional 
economists and public policymakers – albeit a qualified cooperation with many 
exceptions.604  
Faced with declining real incomes and confused by the intellectual battle between 
Keynesian and more conservative neoclassical economists, many Americans questioned 
the discipline’s usefulness. The public skepticism noted throughout earlier chapters 
proved resilient, as many wondered whether economists were still capable of offering 
competent advice to policymakers. A 1979 study published in the American Economic 
Review in response to mounting criticism that the discipline lacked either coherency or 
relevancy offered a more complicated picture.605 The professional economists who 
responded to the survey showed a fairly high degree of consensus on twenty of the thirty 
issues addressed, such as the tendency of tariffs to reduce economic welfare, rent 
controls’ negative effect on the availability of housing, and the tendency of a minimum 
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wages to increase unskilled unemployment. The survey also revealed a lack of consensus 
on ten pressing issues, however. These included the efficacy of wage-price controls in 
fighting inflation, the connection between monopolistic practices and oil prices, and the 
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. In sum, the survey found strong evidence of 
consensus among U.S. professional economists, but also disagreement around hot-button 
issues that most required expert advice. A similar dynamic was demonstrated by a repeat 
of the survey 16 years later, although as the study’s authors noted, opinions regarding 
monetary issues had shifted.606 Research by sociologist Andrew Abbott suggests this 
perpetual state of change within disciplines is entirely predictable, as the changing 
fortune of intellectual paradigms mimics the rise and decline of new generations of 
scholars.
607
 Such a proposition seemingly deals a sharp blow to the visions of a rigorous, 
consistent, and scientific discipline expressed by the U.S.’s earliest professional 
economists.    
 The ascent of Ronald Reagan to the White House ushered in a new era in 
American economic policy. “Reaganomics,” as it was colloquially known, emphasized 
tax cuts and reductions in social spending as a means to reducing the national deficit and 
restoring economic prosperity. Many professional economists in the U.S. strongly 
disagreed with the basic assumptions of Reagan’s economic policies, including Nobel 
Laureates Robert Solow and James Tobin.608 The two invoked the consensus of the 
discipline in their condemnation of Reaganomics, prominently published in a Sunday 
edition of The Washington Post, where they declared “After only a year of Reaganomics, 
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the country senses what the economics profession knew all along; the wilder claims of 
‘supply-side economics’ are a joke. Massive tax reductions do not pay for themselves. No 
instant productivity miracle can be had.”609 Reagan’s image as an economic maverick has 
since stuck, and with good reason. The former governor of California had campaigned on 
the image of being a gunslinger in the world of public policy. As economist and Reagan 
advisor Martin Anderson noted in his sympathetic account of Reagan’s rise to national 
prominence, “The most important player on Ronald Reagan’s economic team [was] 
Ronald Reagan.”610 This apparent flouting of economic expertise, combined with the 
subsequent radical departure from the economic policies of the immediate post-war 
period, opened Reagan to accusations of being an economic Luddite.611  
 Reaganomics did find substantial support among professional economists, 
however. The turn toward supply-side policies therefore raises the impossible-to-resolve 
matter regarding the relationship between consensus, advising, and policy. Reagan’s 
word may have been final, but he counted among his advisors Milton Friedman, Arthur 
Burns, and Hendrik Houtakker, all three former presidents of the AEA. Additional 
advisors included George Schultz, Alan Greenspan, and Paul McCracken, all assuredly 
within the realm of professional economics. Despite Reagan’s independent streak, 
Anderson counted no fewer than 74 economic advisors on Reagan’s campaign team in 
the build-up to the 1980 presidential election.612 Reagan may have ignored or selectively 
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implemented his economic advisors’ advice, but the same could be said of any 
administration in the twentieth century. The composition of the Council of Economic 
Advisors and the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board can be scrutinized, but a 
connection between economic expertise and economic policy nevertheless remained.613 
 Solow claimed that the discipline stood in defiance of Reagan’s economic 
policies, yet the survey published in the AEA’s own journal offered a more complicated 
explanation that suggested growing numbers of economists were turning away from the 
Keynesian policies of the 1950s and ‘60s. This raises an interesting question regarding 
the development of economic theory in the U.S. Did the relatively brief supremacy of 
Keynesian theory spur young economists toward newer intellectual pastures as a means 
of distinguishing themselves in an increasingly competitive discipline? Or perhaps it is 
possible professional economists were attracted by the political opportunities offered by a 
switch to classic liberal thought, just as new economists may have consciously or sub-
consciously seen opportunity in abandoning classicism in the early twentieth century. In 
his account of economists’ role in government William J. Barber speaks of a “two-way 
street” relationship in which public service has an unspecified effect on the views of 
professional economists.614 His comments note that the realities of governance 
undoubtedly shape the economist’s understanding of what can and cannot work in terms 
of policy, but they implicitly raise the question of professional integrity. If professional 
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economists are prone to adapt their conclusions in an attempt to secure better positions 
then one must seriously reconsider the role they play in the policymaking process.  
It is an important issue that echoes historian Mary Furner’s argument that the new 
economists of the late nineteenth century abandoned their radicalism in exchange for 
lengthy careers in academia.615 In the wake of the recent sub-prime mortgage financial 
collapse critics assailed not only the discipline’s alleged incompetence, but also its 
apparent lack of ethical standards.616 Documentary filmmaker Charles Ferguson’s grilling 
of Harvard economists associated with culpable firms in his Academy Award-winning 
documentary Inside Job powerfully articulated the notion that professional economists 
were highly susceptible to such opportunism. In response, the AEA moved to establish a 
committee to draft a code of ethics that included Reagan critic Robert Solow.617 The 
committee found itself more limited than some outside observers would have preferred. 
When asked whether the committee would address issues such as whether or not an 
economist should advise an oppressive government, Solow responded “I doubt this 
committee wants to go there, one man’s despot is another man’s hero.”618 Solow’s 
comment highlights the dilemmas inherent in accounting for economists’ earnestness. 
One man’s opportunistic charlatan is another man’s intellectual champion, and we must 
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be careful when distinguishing between the two lest we write off significant portions of 
the discipline because they do not mesh with ideal narratives or personal beliefs 
regarding what constitutes sound economics. 
 Continuing to chart the connection between economic expertise and economic 
policy is crucial, as it may fundamentally alter the way we interpret our economic past 
and understand economic policy options in the present. Consider the dilemma of Reagan 
in his first term of office – inflation was out of control, unemployment increasing, and the 
rate of growth declining. Reagan openly flouted Keynesian professional economists’ 
opinions, and it is perhaps easy to understand why, given perceptions at the time. Over 
the course of the 1970s federal economic policy had appeared unable to deal with the 
challenges that accompanied changes in the global economy. But Reagan’s dismissal of 
Keynesian economists rested on the assumption that those experts were responsible for 
guiding economic policy in decades past. We know, in certain cases, that professional 
economists’ advice during the assumed era of Keynesian influence was wholly ignored at 
crucial junctures. Johnson refused to believe the U.S. would struggle to afford both a 
major war and expansion of social welfare programs and rejected his economic advisors’ 
suggestion to raise taxes.619 Similarly, Nixon ignored his economic advisors’ strong 
reservations against price-fixing and implemented controls in a vain attempt to stem 
inflation.620  
 Furthermore, a growing body of research suggests that support for neoclassical 
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economic policy not only survived during the years of alleged Keynesian dominance, but 
actually thrived.621 Correspondence between Chicago School economists Milton 
Friedman and George Stigler reveals that the two prominent thinkers perhaps felt 
embattled, but were never marginalized by their Keynesian rivals.
622
 Noted pro-free 
market public intellectuals like Friedrich Hayek and Ayn Rand were popular throughout 
the 1940s and ‘50s. The astounding circulation numbers of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom or 
Rand’s Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged strongly suggest that the pressure of public 
skepticism consistently countered whatever influence Keynesian American professional 
economists possessed.623   
 How we characterize the connection between economic expertise and economic 
policy therefore carries significant implications for how we identify cause and effect in 
economic history. If we are to conclude that the Keynesian consensus was genuine, then 
deeper study is needed to adequately explain how professional economists managed to 
overcome internal dissent and deliver coherent economic policies on which policymakers 
could act. Why did the public temporarily suspend its skepticism of economic experts and 
accept their recommendations? And how policymakers manage to integrate professional 
economists’ advice alongside that of the many other lobbyists constantly demanding 
attention?  
 If, on the other hand and as I suggest, it seems more likely that the Keynesian 
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consensus has been misunderstood, then it becomes difficult to talk about the historical 
efficacy of particular economic theories and practices. The past suddenly becomes less of 
a guide for future policy than a reminder of continued failure to extract maximum value 
from what should be a prized source of policy insight. To repeat an oft used maxim of the 
past fifty years, ideas matter. Ideas do matter – including the idea that ideas matter. 
Overselling the significance of economic policies as prescribed while deemphasizing 
factors that typically nullify economic advisors’ timely advice can lead to a poor 




In Praise of the Dismal Science 
 
 
Given all the roadblocks to applying economic theory to economic practice in the 
U.S., it seems unrealistic to ever expect economic policy to match the general consensus 
of professional economists. As historian Gabriel Kolko notes in his analysis of American 
capitalism, the failure to apply technical ability to public problems seems strong evidence 
of American capitalisms inherent instability.
624
 Such a critique suggests a fundamental 
resistance to the absorption of the lessons derived from the study of economics. Although 
much of this study finds evidence for this claim, such a conclusion seems a bit hasty. 
Kolko is correct in pointing out the U.S.’s poor track record of applying theory to 
practice, but he is incorrect to suggest that this has been a fatal flaw, or that there has not 
been tremendous progress along the way. Economic advisors in the Great Depression 
may not have been able to solve the economic crisis that unraveled before them, but at 
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least they were in the room and equipped to offer solutions. That is more than can be said 
of the 1877 or 1893 economic depressions.  
  It is perhaps misguided to look at the situation in terms of success or failure in 
applying the “right” policies, as determined by economic experts. After all, as those of 
the German Historical School at the turn of the twentieth century might remind us, 
desired outcomes are often dependent on cultural and social conditions. Much of the 
struggle over economic policy has revolved around disputes regarding optimal outcomes 
– issues that require the input of philosophers and political scientists just as much as 
economists. One of the discipline’s alleged shortcomings is its inability to offer a one-
shot solution to society’s economic problems. But economists cannot possibly be 
expected to offer such panaceas given the myriad of interest groups engaged in lobbying 
for special considerations from government. Simply put, the common-sense solutions that 
the new economists briefly thought would emerge once the data was laid before 
lawmakers and the voting public failed to materialize, although the public’s expectations 
of such miracles persists. 
The enthusiasm of the new economists, powerful though it was, did not wholly fit 
with the realities of American politics and its fractious nature. Still, early professional 
economists recognized the importance of freedom in general and academic freedom in 
particular. Historian Mary Furner’s suggestion that the social sciences had attempted to 
abandon subjective morality by the early twentieth century was largely correct, save this 
one notable exception. Early economists may have pursued a common language, but they 
strongly resisted the temptation to codify economic theory and its study. Rather than 
adopting an identity based on exclusion, economists insisted on an “open-tent” 
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philosophy – albeit a philosophy undercut by the de facto gender and race segregation. 
Home economics remained a respected and recognized discipline in American colleges 
and universities until the 1950s, at which point cultural change began to chip away at the 
gender divide. Home economics gradually became a source of jokes and derision in 
American culture, and schools across the country responded by changing the name of 
their home economics departments in an attempt to avoid criticism.625 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, opportunities emerged for women in professional economics over the 
same stretch of time. The number of women who received degrees and employment in 
economics increased during the second half of the twentieth century, albeit at a slow rate. 
From 1956 to 1970 the proportion of women among Ph. D. recipients averaged around 
four percent, then showed signs of substantial change by rising to eleven percent between 
1971 and 1976.626 The upward trend continued until recently, when the proportion of 
women among Ph. D. recipients reached 34 percent in 1999 and remained and has 
remained at that level since.627 Not surprisingly, women remain underrepresented at all 
levels of academic employment.628 The discipline remains a predominantly male 
endeavor, which continues to beg questions regarding the relationship between social 
identity and economic expertise in American society. 
The cost of this qualified intellectual freedom has been high, for it has continually 
undermined disciplinary consensus and fueled suspicion and animosity among voters and 
their political representatives. Widespread willingness to accept the persistent presence of 
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lay dissenters and trust the American public and its policymakers to seek out the proper 
economic policy has proven a messy process. Surveying the second half of the twentieth 
century, it is difficult to identify individual amateur economists whose influence matches 
that of either William “Coin” Harvey or Henry George at the turn of the century. Yet the 
persistence of calls to return to the gold standard or the brief popularity of Herman Cain’s 
“9-9-9” tax reform plan in the 2012 Republican Presidential primary race, neither of 
which would have garnered support from members of the AEA, clearly indicate a 
sustained audience for folk economics. American economic thought and policy continues 
to be shaped not just by advances within academia but also the less formalized thinking 
of the American public. 
It is difficult to fault either the discipline or policymakers for this apparent failure 
to link economists’ expertise to economic policy in a more reliable fashion. Economists 
have operated in a democratic society with many competing interests and an underlying 
commitment not only to economic efficiency, but also to shifting notions of personal 
liberty. Balancing efficiency and liberty was as much a challenge then as it is today. 
Understanding this consistent challenge is crucial to understanding the oft expressed 
existential angst of economists who acknowledge the proliferation of contradictory ideas 
within the discipline without offering a viable plan to resolve the conflict.629 
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Furthermore, although professional economists appear to have rarely delivered 
precise, detailed recommendations, they did presage necessary policy adjustments with 
some regularity. In regard to the “money question,” professional economists were near 
universal in their call for a centrally controlled, gold-backed, flexible currency. The 
nation adopted a rigid gold-backed standard until the panic of 1907 finally drove 
lawmakers to pursue the type of central banking system economists in the 1890s had 
envisioned. A similar dynamic was repeated in the case of collective bargaining and an 
allotment-based relief plan in agriculture. In both instances, professional economic 
advisors and commentators struggled in vain to steer lawmakers away from ultimately 
untenable reform plans. John R. Commons, recognizing the futility of Walsh’s show-
hearings dissented in the Commission’s final report but had to wait until the 1930s before 
his vision of collective bargaining came to light. Henry C. Taylor, John D. Black, and 
additional leading agricultural economists similarly criticized the McNary-Haugen Plan 
as strong in sentiment but weak in practice. Black’s call for an allotment based system 
that could raise prices while avoiding incentives for ruinous overproduction was stalled 
by nearly a decade as a result.  
In the wake of the most recent economic crisis, a group of economists met to 
specifically discuss why economists still seem to fail in the face of economic crisis. The 
conference participants offered three lines of argument that were quite different from 
those presented in this dissertation:  the uncertainty of markets; the unpredictable impact 
of global forces; and the role of economic models that failed to take into account 
intangible factors such as morality.630 While these three points are certainly true, they 
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ignore how the very ambiguity of professional economists’ role in society might have 
contributed to the crisis. It is clear that the failure to predict crises reflects poorly on the 
discipline, although it is not necessarily the indication of incompetence some frustrated 
lay persons would claim. To begin, critics who focus on the discipline’s failure to predict 
and warn of the impending financial crisis tend to overestimate the degree of 
coordination within professional economics. The atomization of the discipline is part of 
the legacy of the professionalization process through which the discipline underwent 
from 1885 to 1929. Economists generally cooperate, hence the codified terminology and 
robust institutions like the AEA. But just like any other profession, practitioners of the 
dismal science pursue their chosen research topics in relative isolation. Professional 
economists’ attentions are divided among a myriad of pressing issues micro- and 
macroeconomic issues, which makes it difficult to arrive at accurate and confidently 
supported conclusions about the likelihood of sudden shocks. 
More importantly, narratives of the 2008 Financial Crisis that blame professional 
economists assume that economists exercise some degree of control on governments’ 
economic policy – either directly through their bureaucratic posts or indirectly through a 
vaguely defined role as watchmen on the wall. The level of influence exerted by lobbyists 
for the financial industry alone challenges such assumptions, and professional economists 
in the U.S. have consistently insisted that theirs is the role of a passive advisor, 
however.631 In fact, some economists of high repute did express concerns about 
investment trends in the housing market and the potential for economic disaster fueled by 
loose credit and risky speculation, though it is fair to note that very few economists seem 
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to have consistently and accurately identified the systemic risk that became apparent in 
2008.
632
 Prominent economists Henry Kaufman and Nouriel Roubini did accurately warn 
of the danger, but their reputations as doomsayers reflects the degree to which their 
opinions were marginalized and the challenges economists face in convincing investors 
and lawmakers to voluntarily respond to economic analysis before being forced to react 
to crisis.
633
    
The lessons of the past are not directly transferable, but if we consider the genesis 
of professional economists in the U.S. alongside the role they have come to play as 
economic experts in the twenty-first century, it becomes clearer why crises continue to 
confound policymakers. Neither the AEA nor any of its sister organizations are any 
closer to regulating economic thought than they were in the early twentieth century. Such 
a goal continues to be both unthinkable and impractical. As a result, the voting public and 
their elected representatives are forced to wade through a sea of conflicting ideas 
generated by those who are at liberty to describe themselves as economic experts.  
Meanwhile, the struggle to balance voter preference and economic imperatives continues 
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U.S. Population Economists 
per 100,000 
1885 182 56,584,488 0.322 
 1890 500 62,979,766 0.792 
1895 617 69,536,883 0.887 
1900 706 76,094,000 0.928 
1905 1029 83,822,000 1.228 
1910 1205 92,407,000 1.304 
1915 2444 100,546,000 2.431 
1920 2301 106,461,000 2.161 
1925 2916 115,829,000 2.518 
1930 3853 123,076,741 3.131 
1935 3663 127,250,232 2.879 
1940 4475 132,122,446 3.387 
1945 4159 139,928,165 2.972 
1950 6936 152,271,417 4.555 
1955 7,555 165,931,202 4.553 
1960 10,837 180,671,158 5.998 
1965 14,127 194,302,963 7.271 
1970 18,908 205,052,174 9.221 
1975 19,564 215,973,199 9.059 
1980 19,401 227,224,681 8.538 
1985 20,606 237,923,795 8.661 
1990 21,578 249,438,712 8.651 
1995 21,056 262,764,948 8.013 
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